International Public Management Network (IPMN)

Vol. 7, No. 1

BOOK REVIEW: HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, Edited by B. GUY PETERS AND JON PIERRE
BOOK REVIEW: REENGINEERING HEALTH CARE THE COMPLEXITIES OF ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION By Terry McNulty
     and Ewan Ferlie
DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, GOVERNANCE AND CONDITIONALITY: POLITICS MATTER
MODERNIZATION THE TEN COMMITMENTS OF NEW LABOUR’S APPROACH TO PUBLIC MANAGEMENT?
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT POLICY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA: PERFORMANCE-ORIENTED
     BUDGETING IN COLOMBIA, MEXICO, AND VENEZUELA (1994-2000) 
TOWARD A POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH TO POLICY-BASED LENDING
VOLUNTARILY REPORTING PERFORMANCE MEASURES TO THE PUBLIC: A TEST OF ACCOUNTING REPORTS FROM U.S. CITIES

Documents

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VOLUNTARILY REPORTING PERFORMANCE MEASURES TO THE PUBLIC: A TEST OF ACCOUNTING REPORTS FROM U.S. CIT VOLUNTARILY REPORTING PERFORMANCE MEASURES TO THE PUBLIC: A TEST OF ACCOUNTING REPORTS FROM U.S. CIT

Filesize: 317.91 kB

KENNETH ALAN SMITH

This study examines performance reporting in the publicly available financial reports of U.S. cities and tests various political and economic factors that are expected to be associated with the extent of this reporting. While performance reporting is required in many jurisdictions throughout the world, U.S. cities engage in this process voluntarily. The study addresses the question of whether publicly reporting nonfinancial performance measures appears to be a "quality" reporting activity similar to following GAAP accounting or earning awards for financial reporting. The conclusion is that nonfinancial performance reporting appears to be a quality reporting activity. However, unlike the quality reporting of financial activities, two factors limit the growth of this practice: 1) variability in practice, and 2) managerial resistance. The use of the comparable data method (CDM) is introduced as a possible solution to both limitations.

TOWARD A POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH TO POLICY-BASED LENDING TOWARD A POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH TO POLICY-BASED LENDING

Filesize: 230.52 kB

GEORGE ABONYI

This article suggests that basic and recurring problems associated with policy-based lending (PBL) of international financial institutions (IFI) such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank go beyond problems of implementation. They arise because of characteristics of the policy environment: the political economy context within which design and implementation of PBL takes place. As a consequence, political economy considerations should be explicitly recognized from the outset, accommodated in PBL design, and monitored as implementation unfolds. This may reduce the gap between expected and actual results in policy reform and PBL, and increase the development effectiveness of IFIs. While problems traditionally encountered in PBL are unlikely to be eliminated in view of the nature of policy issues and reform, their frequency and intensity may be reduced if the political economy context is reflected from the outset in the PBL design process.

PUBLIC MANAGEMENT POLICY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA: PERFORMANCE-ORIENTED BUDGETING IN COLO PUBLIC MANAGEMENT POLICY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA: PERFORMANCE-ORIENTED BUDGETING IN COLO

Filesize: 208.43 kB

DAVID ARELLANO-GAULT, JOSÉ RAMÓN GIL-GARCÍA

This article presents some of the theoretical and practical problems the design and implementation of public management policies (following the definition that Barzelay [2001] proposes) face in some countries. We specifically emphasize those factors that affect the expected results of performance-oriented budgeting (POB). There is an interesting polemic going on between some scholars and practitioners who think performance and efficiency should be the main values of government policies and others arguing for a greater role for accountability and democratic control. POB may be the solution for this policy dilemma, but there are political, legal, and organizational factors that make it difficult to achieve the benefits promised by these types of reform strategies. Moreover, the design and implementation of POB is especially difficult in developing countries due to some specific organizational and political constraints. The most important may be the difficulty of freeing public managers to make decisions in a context that urges more control and strengthened accountability rather than granting more discretion. This article explores the implementation of POB in three Latin American countries: Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela.

MODERNIZATION THE TEN COMMITMENTS OF NEW LABOUR’S APPROACH TO PUBLIC MANAGEMENT? MODERNIZATION THE TEN COMMITMENTS OF NEW LABOUR’S APPROACH TO PUBLIC MANAGEMENT?

Filesize: 222.65 kB

PERRI 6, EDWARD PECK

Since 1997, Britain's New Labour government has developed a distinctive combination of strategies in public management reform. Accounts of New Labour's strategy that stress continuity with approaches developed under the previous Conservative administration, constitutional innovations such as devolution, managerialism, or the handing of key decisions such as the setting of interest rates to technocrats, are not adequate. In policy statements, ministers have generally described their approach as modernization, a term which has been defined neither in the official literature nor in ministerial speeches. The article identifies ten themes, comprising both strategies and instruments, which together make up New Labour's distinctive signature in public management reform. These are inspection, central standard setting, area-based initiatives, horizontal coordination and integration under the slogan of joined-up government, devolution but limited decentralization, earned autonomy, an extended role for private capital, modest increases in citizens' obligations, enhanced access to services, and electronic service delivery. The combination is historically and internationally distinctive, even though none of the particular elements is. New Labour has experienced considerable difficulties both in implementing its program and in gaining public acceptance, although there have been significant achievements: these will provide important lessons for other countries interested in Britain's modernization initiative.

DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, GOVERNANCE AND CONDITIONALITY: POLITICS MATTER DEVELOPMENT FINANCE, GOVERNANCE AND CONDITIONALITY: POLITICS MATTER

Filesize: 325.44 kB

CARLOS SANTISO

A salient aspect of the reform of the international financial architecture concerns the uses and misuses of governance conditionality in aid policy. However, the debates tend to focus on the quantitative dimensions of conditionality, oscillating between concerns over how much is too much and how much is enough. Less attention is paid to the manner in which conditionality is applied and the politics of governance reform. This article examines the difficult combination of governance and conditionality in multilateral development finance. It argues that a fundamental paradox characterizes the multilateral development institutions’ approach to governance. Furthering governance is conceived both as a condition and an objective of development finance. The effectiveness of multilateral development finance institutions will largely depend on how successfully they will resolve this tension. Ultimately, it is argued, these institutions of global governance ought to explicitly address issues of power, politics, and democracy. This requires ending the economic- political divide of international development assistance.