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Using Organization Theory to Understand International Organizations: Four Models of Multilateral Decision Making

ABSTRACT: This article addresses an enduring public management question: "Is organizational functioning a product of politics, management, or both?" It speaks to this issue by analyzing the decisional dynamics of the world's most inclusive, and prominent international organization: the United Nations. To assess the ability of international organizations to develop and implement international public policy, this study draws upon an extensive literature in organization theory to develop four models of multilateral decision making:

- A Cognitive Ambiguity Model;
- A Bounded Pragmatism Model;
- An Organizational Expansion Model; and
- A Political Interests Model.

In considering the obstacles to effective policy, this study asks whether policy is produced by intellectual confusion, routine-based decision making, bureaucratic ego, or base political motives. This project closes by arguing for broad approaches to the politics/management continuum, and an integration of the four models. Only by weaving together the distinct strands of organization theory, can scholars and practitioners fully appreciate the intellectual and political dynamics of publicly

managed organizations, and thus, the aids and obstacles to their functioning.

Is organizational functioning a product of politics, management, or both? Conventional wisdom holds that organizations are driven by their environments as well as by the individuals who stand at their helms. However, the distinct influence of each variable has proven difficult to disentangle, and their precise interaction hard to map.

Whether politics or management drives organizational functioning is a question of particular significance to international organizations, which have assumed increasingly prominent roles in international society. Scholars and practitioners have tended to view organizations as malleable entities which are likely to benefit from far-reaching reforms. However, evidence suggests that we don't know much about the decisional dynamics of international organizations, and therefore aren't well-equipped to make such an assessment.¹

The failure of the academic and policy communities to come to terms with the internal workings of international organizations is problematic for two reasons:

1. Such entities play an important role in the development and implementation of international public policy; and
2. Efforts to reform international organizations are likely to fail unless they are premised upon a thorough understanding of the dysfunctions plaguing world bodies.

In essence, the failure to understand the decisional dynamics of international organizations limits the international community's ability to devise and implement good public policy.

This article examines the role of politics and management in the functioning of international organizations. It speaks to this issue by analyzing the decisional dynamics of the world's most inclusive, and prominent international organization: the United Nations. To assess the ability of international organizations to develop and implement international public policy, this study draws upon an extensive literature in organization theory to develop four models of multilateral decision making:

- A Cognitive Ambiguity Model;
- A Bounded Pragmatism Model;
- An Organizational Expansion Model; and
- A Political Interests Model.

In considering the obstacles to effective policy, this study asks whether policy is produced by intellectual confusion, routine-based decision making, bureaucratic ego, or base political motives. To answer this question, this study:

1. Explores each model's theoretical underpinnings;
2. Lays out each model's unique conceptualization of policy, actors, and the policy arena;
3. Examines each model's policy prescriptions; and
4. Tests each model using data gathered from more than sixty interviews with an elite segment of the conflict management community.²

As the empirical sections of this paper demonstrate, the four processes of decision making developed by each model explain (poor) multilateral decision making and (problematic) policy implementation at the U.N. in the early post-Cold War era.

The field of international conflict management comprises an auspicious laboratory for examining the workings of the United Nations because of its dynamism, increased prominence, and pervasive uncertainty. Intellectual and political obstacles have been especially evident as the international community has grappled with how best to respond to post-Cold War security challenges.

In devising models of multilateral decision making and applying them to the early post-Cold War experience, this study contributes to public administration, international relations, and conflict management literatures. First, this article formulates systematic models which can be applied to policy arenas characterized by partnerships among numerous entities. As the concluding section of this article demonstrates, the four frameworks developed in this study illuminate not only peacekeeping outcomes, but also child support policy trends and decision making dynamics. Second, this work demonstrates the utility of organization theory to the study of international organizations. Third, this article provides scholars and policy makers with tools for analyzing the decisional dynamics of international organizations. Fourth, this study generates prescriptions for improving the policy outputs of international organizations. Finally, this work illuminates a generally disregarded area of conflict management—the ideational and political factors driving peacekeeping decision making.

Each of the models developed and utilized in this study reveals a unique facet of multilateral decision making. Because the frameworks are complementary, they can be used in conjunction with one another to enrich scholarly and practitioner understandings of the decisional dynamics driving policy outcomes. As a concluding section of this article suggests, one strategy for approaching the politics/management continuum from a broad perspective involves developing a general framework which draws the most compelling features of the four models into a single, integrated structure. Taken separately, however, the models focus

too narrowly to explain all features of early post-Cold War peacekeeping. A discipline grappling with such large questions as the role of politics and management in administration, must examine organizations from an integrative perspective—one which appreciates the intellectual as well as political obstacles to their functioning.

Before presenting the four models and applying them to peacekeeping decision making, this study examines the puzzle posed by recent changes in the tool of conflict management.

THE PUZZLE

The early post-Cold War era has witnessed an incredible transformation of peacekeeping. Since 1989, more peacekeeping missions have been deployed than during the previous four decades of the U.N.'s existence—a shift which resulted in an expansion of peacekeepers in the field “from about 11,000 at the beginning of 1992 to some 82,000 in 1993,” and an increase in the cost of U.N. missions “from \$400 million in 1991 to an estimated \$3.7 billion in 1993.”³ Over the period of just a few years, the United Nations went from being involved in an average of 3.5 peace operations per year, to administering 18 missions at the height of the early post-Cold War expansion.⁴ Long accustomed to “piecing together field operations only now and again,” the U.N. “found itself having to build them two and three at a time” as the year 1992 witnessed the near-simultaneous creation of three of the largest peacekeeping missions ever in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and Somalia.⁵ These developments led to a fourfold increase in the cost of peacekeeping from \$700 million to approximately \$2.8 billion during the first half of 1992.⁶

While the numerical expansion of peacekeepers has been dramatic, a far more intriguing puzzle derives from qualitative changes in peacekeeping—in particular, the deployment of the blue helmets to situations where there is “no peace to be kept.” Originally designed to provide breathing space to warring parties in situations where a cease-fire had been achieved, in which disputants had consented to the presence of an international force, and where U.N. troops could fulfill a limited mandate while retaining their impartiality, U.N. peacekeeping has been invoked for far more ambitious purposes, in situations where few, if any, of these conditions exist. As the international community has groped to provide some response to post-Cold War crises, peacekeepers have found themselves protecting vulnerable populations, repatriating refugees, providing security for elections, monitoring human rights, delivering humanitarian relief, developing infrastructure, administering states, as well as restoring, and in some cases, implanting democracy—tasks which extend far beyond the confines of traditional peacekeeping.

While some of the U.N.'s new tasks are consistent with the “Chapter VI and

one-half" philosophy underlying traditional peacekeeping, others have pushed the organization toward a "Chapter VII" or enforcement orientation, prompting some to term post-Cold War peacekeeping "Chapter VI and three-quarters." Initially envisioned as a means of dampening hostilities through the moral weight imposed by a "group carrying U.N. insignia,"⁷ peacekeeping has increasingly involved "constant danger."⁸ "It is no longer a question of thin blue lines separating combatants or monitoring ceasefires."⁹ Peacekeeping "post-Cold War style," has instead involved the pursuit of ambitious mandates in climates "of continuing armed conflict, sometimes where there are no defined borders or ceasefire lines and no guarantee of respect for their [peacekeepers'] safety or role."¹⁰ As the application of the descriptors "wider," "multifunctional," "robust," and "second generation" to this tool of conflict management indicate, the era of "traditional" peacekeeping has drawn to a close.

"Skinny Bartenders" and "Drunken Brawls"

The international community's efforts to tackle post-Cold War crises with the limited tool of United Nations peacekeeping poses an intriguing puzzle. As one highly placed U.S. government official characterized the situation: "in the drunken brawls of the world, United Nations peacekeepers are the skinny bartenders." As is the case with "skinny bartenders," U.N. peacekeepers are only able to do something about disputes once the warring parties have fought it out; should the skinny bartender intervene before the parties have fought it out, he will either "get sucked into the conflict" or "get his butt kicked."¹¹

The early post-Cold War period has been replete with instances of U.N. peacekeepers getting both "sucked into" conflicts and having their "butts kicked." The pitfalls of designating peacekeepers the "midwife of political transitions"¹² have been most vividly demonstrated in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. In these quagmires, the U.N. and member states acting under U.N. mandates have had their agreements rejected, their forces attacked, their convoys ambushed, their headquarters shelled, their planes shot down, their troops taken hostage, and their "safehavens" overrun. In essence, asserted a prominent New York diplomat, peacekeepers have been deployed to crises which "no military man in his right mind would pursue."¹³

Devised from the unique coupling of organization theory with international relations scholarship, the analytical constructs used in this study are uniquely poised to illumine the decisional dynamics of international organizations. By applying the four models to peacekeeping decision making, this study demonstrates that the increased and innovative use of the blue helmets has been the product of many forces:

1. A failure to hone in on the principles of traditional peacekeeping;

2. A sense that peacekeeping could be evolved to fit qualitatively distinct crises;
3. A desire to bolster the mission of an organization confronted with a rapidly unfolding international environment; and
4. Sheer desperation to avoid political fallout by providing some response to conflicts with complex humanitarian dimensions.

This article begins with an overview of the Cognitive Ambiguity Model.

MODEL I: COGNITIVE AMBIGUITY

Overview of Model I

Theoretical Underpinnings

The Cognitive Ambiguity Model begins from the premise that human beings and the organizations they comprise are plagued with cognitive deficiencies. Despite its intuitive appeal, this proposition and its implications have been relatively neglected within organizational analyses. As March and Olsen have observed, "there has been considerable examination of the . . . limits on rationality" in the literature on organizations; however, "[l]ittle comparable effort has been devoted to assessing the cognitive and evaluative limitations on organizational learning."¹⁴ Despite their professional devotion "to the application of reason to man's affairs," social scientists have tended to be "more impressed by the use and misuse of power than by the use and misuse of knowledge."¹⁵ In an effort to bring ideational factors to the forefront of organizational analyses, the Cognitive Ambiguity Model explores "how organizational memory functions and how it functions differently at different times and for different parts of the organization."¹⁶ To address this issue, Model I examines the processes by which "organizations encode, store, and retrieve the lessons of history despite the turnover of personnel and the passage of time."¹⁷

As the literature on organization learning suggests, the cognitive and evaluative limits on memory retrieval and knowledge transmission in organizations are complex and far-ranging. At an individual level, human beings have been known to make "systematic errors in recording the events of history and in making inferences from them."¹⁸ Human beings overemphasize recency and saliency in their assessments of events; they ignore sample size; they tend to see intentionality in all actions; they fail to see the complex causes for most events; they associate causality with correlation, and assume that big effects must have big causes.¹⁹

However, even if individual learning were simple and flawless, there would be little reason to assume the same of organizational learning. This is the case, argues E. Haas, because while bureaucracies are comprised of individuals, their learning

processes are distinct from those of human beings.²⁰ Particularly noteworthy are the ways in which “[o]rganizational arrangements confound the interpretation of history.”²¹ By imposing “fragmented structures of thought on their members,”²² and creating clearly defined patterns of attention and responsibility, organizations tend to divide interest in and knowledge of bureaucratic functions. In so doing, organizations limit the possibilities for effective knowledge transmission.

In addition to facing learning obstacles, organizational memory shares with human thought processes, susceptibility to decline in efficiency of function. According to the Cognitive Ambiguity Model, organizational memory tends to be eroded over time through structures and processes which undermine the connectivity of organizational “neurons,” and thus, the capacity of the organization to deal with the contingencies it faces.

Having laid out the Cognitive Ambiguity Model, I now test the model by applying it to the early post-Cold War experience with peacekeeping.

Empirical Insights

The Cognitive Ambiguity Model takes as its focus the intellectual foundations of peacekeeping and the numerous factors which have interfered with the transmission of such knowledge from one policy realm to another. Drawing upon a wealth of literature addressing impediments to learning within and among organizations, Model I attributes the difficulties of post-cold war peacekeeping to intellectual shortcomings—in particular, policy makers’ inability to understand, and consequent failure to adhere to the fundamental principles of peacekeeping. Had policy makers better understood the limitations of traditional peacekeeping, they would have resisted the temptation to plug the blue helmets into challenging crises, or would have more effectively operationalized the tool in its multidimensional form.

In its examination of knowledge diffusion within and among organizations, the Cognitive Ambiguity Model considers the age-old question of how a relatively obscure body of knowledge makes it from the halls of academia, (and in this case) from the offices of journalists, the diplomatic consulates of troop contributor countries, the headquarters of peacekeeping practitioners U.N. commanders, and the thirty-seven floors of the United Nations Secretariat, to “the room where decisions are made”²³—the Security Council chambers. The Cognitive Ambiguity Model attributes the disjuncture between the traditional lessons and present use of peacekeeping to pervasive confusion surrounding this tool of conflict management. As the Cold War experience demonstrated, peacekeeping has been most effective in inter-state (rather than intra-state) conflicts where a viable cease-fire exists, where the parties to the dispute have agreed to the presence of a U.N. force, and where the blue helmets are able to perform limited mandates while retaining their impartiality and using force only in self-defense. Despite clear lessons

regarding the limitations of peacekeeping, post-Cold War policy makers have deployed the blue helmets to highly challenging intra-state conflicts. Perhaps the most striking indication of the conceptual nature of peacekeeping's post-Cold War difficulties, is the considerable confusion surrounding mere definitions of the tool.

Peacekeeping was developed out of the international community's need for a tool of conflict management which entailed more forcible measures than those contained in Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, but less coercive or automatic, and therefore, more politically viable than the collective security system contained in Chapter VII of the Charter. Appropriately, one of peacekeeping's inventors, U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, dubbed the tool "Chapter VI-and-a-half." Despite the tool's clear identification as a "Chapter VI and one-half" enterprise during the first four decades of its existence, peacekeeping has increasingly been referred to by post-Cold War policy makers as either a "Chapter VI" and "Chapter VII" activity, with "Chapter VI" referring to traditional missions, and "Chapter VII" referring to robust operations.²⁴

Conceptual ambiguities extend beyond disagreements over terminology. The early post-Cold War experience has been replete with evidence of considerable uncertainty regarding the tool's potentialities and limitations. According to Model I, the deficiencies of peacekeeping policy have been the product of ambiguity generated by four factors: the structural transformation of the international system, vast personnel changes, pervasive policy disconnects, and the blinding headiness of the new era.

In its analysis of the grand geopolitical shift of the past decade, Model I stresses the cognitive challenges posed by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the emergence of a multilateral system which has yet to take full shape. As a result of the Cold War's demise, member states have been forced to re-evaluate the intellectual prisms through which they have interpreted international actions for the past half century. Because "no-one has fully come to terms with the end of the Cold War," there exists "a serious intellectual vacuum among member states," asserted Ian Williams, President of the U.N. Correspondents Association. The post-Cold War era has been characterized by "profound confusion among the P5 as to what the term 'national interest' means."²⁵ Building on this point, a Congressional source explained, there is simply "no roadmap anymore to guide foreign policy of any kind, much less peacekeeping."²⁶

Vast personnel changes have compounded the intellectual difficulties posed by the transformation of the international system. Largely the province of troop contributors and U.N. bureaucrats during the Cold War, peacekeeping increased in expansiveness and strategic importance in the early post-Cold War period. As a result, the tool once considered "a parlor game" to be left to the Nordics and other troop contributors,²⁷ fell largely under the purview of the great powers with

the demise of the Cold War. As a member of the U.S. Mission to the U.N. characterized the problem, “the whole P5 is not used to doing this [peacekeeping].”²⁸ Building upon this point, a State Department official asserted, the relative lack of experience implementing peacekeeping has left the great powers with “no real sense of how peacekeeping is supposed to work,”²⁹ as evidenced by a New York diplomat’s observation that “the Americans keep practicing peacekeeping with live ammunition.”³⁰

The P5’s willingness to involve itself in peacekeeping decision making has resulted in a grand personnel change—one which has impeded the transmission of peacekeeping knowledge. The result has been tremendous uncertainty regarding the tool’s potentialities and limitations. As Diehl has observed, “despite the prominence of the peacekeeping option and the increasing resort to it, there is little systematic understanding of its appropriate application.”³¹ Concurring with this assessment, a former U.N. official pointed out, “the traditional principles of peacekeeping have been lost on post-Cold War policy makers; there has been no thinking through of the implications of pushing peacekeeping into an enforcement zone.”³²

The formulation of peacekeeping policy has been impeded not only by the geopolitical transformation and changes in the conflict management landscape, but also by substantial gaps in the institutional foundations of peacekeeping. As March and Olsen have observed, “[t]he degree of ambiguity” within a particular policy realm is largely a product of “the efficiency of the channels through which interpretations are transmitted.”³³ Drawing upon this insight, Model I attributes difficulties in memory retrieval and knowledge transmission to pervasive policy disconnects. A defining characteristic of the early post-Cold War period has been a vast disjuncture between the holders of peacekeeping expertise and policy makers charged with the difficult task of responding to post-Cold War crises. Policy disconnects have been evident:

1. Among member states;
2. Between member states and the United Nations;
3. Within the United Nations; and
4. Within and among the foreign policy agencies of individual member states.

As a policy realm driven (at least theoretically) by the 185 member states comprising the United Nations, the foreign policy agencies of each of the U.N.’s member states, and the U.N. Secretariat, peacekeeping has proven particularly vulnerable to disconnects between the holders of expertise and the most influential shapers of policy. The institutional structure of the United Nations narrows the range of effective policy makers to the fifteen Security Council members, and perhaps ultimately, the five members who hold vetoes. Nevertheless, there exists

a plethora of foreign policy agencies driving the decisions of the “permanent five.” Within the United States alone, peacekeeping falls under the jurisdiction of Congress and the President, whose executive agencies include the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the National Security Council. According to a Pentagon official, the linkages between such agencies and the U.N., as well as among such agencies exhibit “substantial disconnects.”³⁴ While such gaps have been partially remedied by institutional innovations such as the development of an interagency process, disconnects continue to exist “all over the place,” confirmed a Congressional source.³⁵

In addition to existing at the national level, policy disconnects abound among member states, between member states and the United Nations, and within the United Nations. Such institutional gaps have been particularly prevalent in the realm of peacekeeping, where those charged with reaching negotiated settlements must link up with those responsible for planning and implementing such agreements if conflict management is to be effective. While reservoirs of peacekeeping expertise exist within member states and the U.N. bureaucracy, they are difficult to access due to their compartmentalized and disjointed nature.

Compounding the confusion generated by the geopolitical transformation, personnel changes, and policy disconnects was a fourth factor—the blinding headiness of the new era. The demise of the Cold War not only increased member states’ uncertainty regarding how best to operate within the new international system; it engendered hopes for the emergence of a new world order. The enthusiasm of the era was perhaps best exemplified in the euphoric embrace of Desert Storm troops, who, with flair, finesse, and impressive unity, successfully evicted Iraq from Kuwait.

Both a cause and an outgrowth of the intoxication of the new era was the metamorphosis of the U.N. Security Council from a moribund talk shop to a center of great power collaboration. As a member of a Washington-based think tank reminisced, “we were so excited to have agreement to send peacekeepers into crisis situations, that we never stepped back to consider the problems involved in making these agreements operational.”³⁶ Expanding upon this point, a member of the French Mission to the U.N. explained, there was “a feeling that everything was possible and easy” in the Security Council.³⁷ Buoyed by the enthusiasm of the new era, the Security Council acted on “virtually anything that came to its attention without consideration of the practicalities of its actions,” confirmed a State Department official.³⁸

Uncertain of their interests, unfamiliar with the basic precepts of peacekeeping, and intoxicated with the arrival of a new era, policy makers impulsively plugged the blue helmets into conflicts without considering their appropriateness to the tasks at hand. In essence, the early post-Cold War era was characterized by “a fever for peacekeeping,” recalled a member of the Argentine Mission to the U.N.³⁹ “There was a real sense that we were in an era of new possibilities,”

explained a New York diplomat. Put simply, “[t]his was not an environment in which to consider limitations or to ask ‘what if’ questions.”⁴⁰

Summary of the Cognitive Ambiguity Model

Feeling their way around a new geostrategic environment, thrust into a policy realm which they hadn’t thought much about for the previous four decades, impeded in their capacity to draw on expertise by pervasive policy disconnects, and caught up in the headiness of the new era, policy makers failed to assess adequately peacekeeping’s appropriateness to recent conflicts. “[W]e simply didn’t do our job in making the mental leap” from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, suggested a senior State Department official.⁴¹ Concurring with this perspective, a member of the U.N.’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations lamented, “there has been a lack of thoughtfulness in our post-Cold War interventions.”⁴²

The Cognitive Ambiguity Model therefore provides a means of exploring the intellectual foundations of peacekeeping, and examining the institutional mechanisms by which such understandings are transmitted from one policy arena to another. Seen through the lenses of Model I, the difficulties of post-Cold War peacekeeping have been a product of the failure to understand, or to adhere to the fundamental principles of peacekeeping. As the following presentation of Model II suggests, however, there may be a fine between policy incoherence and policy experimentation in the realm of international conflict management.

MODEL II: BOUNDED PRAGMATISM

Overview of Model II

Theoretical Underpinnings

At the heart of the Bounded Pragmatism Model lies the assumption that policy comprises little more than the collection of choices created by piecemeal and ad hoc efforts to deal with the most pressing issue of the day. According to Model II, policy makers merely “stagger through history,”⁴³ marginally adjusting old solutions to new problems. Policy making, then, is a routine-based process which involves choosing among unattractive options and feeling out the potentialities and limitations of available remedies through practice.

The Bounded Pragmatism Model takes issue with the intuitively appealing, yet unrealistic conceptualization of decision making as a process geared towards the generation of optimal means/ends connections. According to Model II, evidence of satisficing and muddling through can be found in all realms of decision making—governmental as well as non-governmental. As Janis and Mann have reminded us, “[i]mportant life decisions” such as those relating to careers and

marriage, are often “incremental in nature, the end product of a series of small decisions that progressively commit the person to one particular course of action.”⁴⁴

Having laid out the Bounded Pragmatism Model, I now test the model by applying it to the early post-Cold War experience with peacekeeping.

Empirical Insights

The Bounded Pragmatism Model conceptualizes policy as the culmination of incremental efforts to put out daily brushfires. Building upon scholarship addressing decisional tendencies toward “bounded rationality,” “satisficing”⁴⁵ and “incrementalism,”⁴⁶ Model II takes as its focus, peacekeeping’s status as a sensible, routine response to low level international crises. Peacekeeping was not only an available tool of conflict management; its pragmatic and evolutionary history suggested genuine possibilities for successful adaptation to the demands of early post-Cold War crises. In this new era, policy makers have been uncertain of their interests, enabled by a functioning Security Council, in search of an institutional basis upon which to premise post-Cold War security, and faced with qualitatively distinct crises. Confronted with such pressures, boundedly rational policy makers made a pragmatic choice: they attempted to incrementally adapt peacekeeping to the demands of a new security environment. Seen through the lenses of Model II, the revitalization of peacekeeping has been the product of efforts to “muddle through”⁴⁷ in an era of increased demands and unprecedented political opportunities.

According to Model II, the post-Cold War revitalization of peacekeeping has been the product of “a series of small decisions” made by boundedly rational, satisficing policy makers eager to plug the gaping holes of the new security order with available remedies. In the words of a State Department official, the heavy post-Cold War reliance on peacekeeping has been largely a product of “muddling through in this new era of multilateral possibility.”⁴⁸

Implicit within the Bounded Pragmatism Model is a focus on two distinct, yet complementary features of early post-Cold War conflict management:

1. Optimism in peacekeeping’s adaptability to the demands of post-Cold War crises; and
2. The availability of limited options within the international community’s conflict management arsenal.

Together, the two perspectives underlie Model II’s analysis of early post-Cold War conflict management.

Confidence in peacekeeping’s adaptability has been the product of the tool’s improvisational nature, its unique origins as an ad hoc response to international crises, and the unprecedented political opportunities of the new era. At the dawn

of the new era, peacekeeping had a fairly effective Cold War record, an institutional foothold within the U.N., and a legacy of improvisational development. According to an official with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, such factors were at the forefront of policy makers' minds as they sought to expand peacekeeping. "There was a sense in the early post-Cold War period that much more could be done with peacekeepers, that peacekeeping had the potential for expansion in non-enforcement oriented directions."⁴⁹ Though perhaps new to the blue helmets, the performance of tasks such as the monitoring of elections and the repatriation of refugees are compatible with their traditional role as impartial facilitators of peace agreements. In the words of a senior administration official, many post-Cold War peacekeeping tasks have been "traditional in spirit," but "more expansive in operationalization."⁵⁰

The belief that peacekeeping could be molded to fit early post-Cold War crises has been the product of more than policy makers' familiarity with the tool's improvisational history; it has also been the outgrowth of the political opportunities opened by the demise of the Cold War. Such opportunities have manifested themselves in a general rethinking of international security, the advent of a functioning Security Council, and the opening to resolution of numerous Cold War conflicts. As the following overview illustrates, the post-Cold War era has been characterized by a profound sense of the possible. In the words of a high ranking U.S. government official, "[w]e knew what we were doing. We knew we were pushing the envelope of peacekeeping."⁵¹

A central impetus behind peacekeeping's post-Cold War revitalization have been concerted efforts to move the politics of security away from balances of power to institutions. As Barnett has observed, "perhaps the most striking feature of the post-Cold War security dialogue is that few policy-makers or scholars are openly advocating a return to the balance-of-power and alliance politics of past years."⁵² Instead, noted analysts with the U.S. Institute of Peace, most are engaged in "the slow process of rethinking security arrangements and institutions."⁵³ While still underway, the reconceptualization of international security has yielded a "pronounced inclination toward multilateralism."⁵⁴

As the world's only near-universal body, the United Nations has assumed a central role in post-Cold War politics. A particularly noteworthy manifestation of the international community's multilateral leanings has been the emergence of a functioning Security Council. The demise of the Cold War brought with it "profound changes in the political environment"—a primary outgrowth of which has been "a big turn around in Security Council politics," explained a prominent New York diplomat. The existence of a functioning Security Council has rendered the U.N. a far cry from its previous role as a defunct bystander to Cold War animosities. As the official recalled, "upon hearing about the prospect of a 15–0 vote in the Security Council, I went to see it first-hand; now 15–0 is standard." Revitalized by transformations in the political environment, the United Nations

became in the early post-Cold War period, “the common vehicle for the pursuit of common security interests.”⁵⁵

According to Model II, the U.N.’s value as a multilateral institution was commonly perceived and acted upon in the early post-Cold War period—most notably, by the five permanent members of the Security Council. Speaking during the height of the Bosnia crisis in the summer of 1995, a member of the British Mission to the U.N. explained, “in this new era, the Security Council does things like convene formal meetings at 3 am to take binding decisions” on crucial issues such as the development of a Rapid Reaction Force.⁵⁶ The U.N. Security Council remains an institution of central importance to post-Cold War security, as illustrated by continued multilateral efforts to neutralize the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s weapons program, and recent attempts to defuse the escalating crisis in Kosovo.

In addition to fostering movements away from balances of power and creating new opportunities for Security Council cooperation, the end of the Cold War lessened the intensity of some regional conflicts. In so doing, it provided policy makers with an outlet for testing peacekeeping’s potential for successful adaptation and evolution. The opening to resolution of conflicts maintained, if not ignited, by Cold War rivalries, therefore constitutes a third impetus for peacekeeping’s revitalization. From the Iranian/Iraqi border to the Afghan/Pakistani one, the dissipation of Cold War tensions rendered the parties to longstanding disputes “more amenable to international intervention.”⁵⁷ In essence, the new era brought to the international arena what Sir Brian Urquhart, former Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, characterized as “a new confidence in, and enthusiasm for, the technique of peace-keeping.”⁵⁸

Complementing the optimistic interpretation, is a less-rosy assessment. Seen from this angle, the increased reliance upon the blue helmets has been the product of the international community’s lack of tools for dealing with crises unleashed with a fury anticipated by noone.

As an instrument which falls short of war or large scale intervention, but which encompasses more force than diplomacy or sanctions, peacekeeping falls into a category of conflict management for which there are great demands, but few options. Of available alternatives, few have been as well-developed or as extensively employed as United Nations peacekeeping. Too often, the alternative to peacekeeping is to do nothing, or to establish a regional conflict management force—a derivation of peacekeeping whose effectiveness tends to be hampered by the appearance of partiality, few resources, and less political authority than the U.N. Security Council possesses.⁵⁹ Edward Luck, President of the United Nations Association of the U.S., captured the challenge of post-Cold War conflict management with the observation: policy makers have been confronted in this new era by numerous crises, but “few tools” with which to plug the gaps of the

emerging security order. "Imperfect though it may have been for these new circumstances," peacekeeping has been invoked due largely to its mere availability.⁶⁰

According to Model II, the recent difficulties of the blue helmets have been the product of the highly challenging nature of post-Cold War conflicts. "The problems of collapsed states hit the international community unprepared" explained a member of the U.N.'s Department of Political Affairs.⁶¹ Reflecting upon the challenges posed by early post-Cold War crises, a State Department official remarked, "we know the techniques of traditional peacekeeping; the boy scouts could do Cyprus." The problem with intra-state crises "like Bosnia" however, is that they skew "attempts to practice traditional peacekeeping."⁶² In the words of James Dobbins, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, "we didn't realize how demanding these missions were destined to become."⁶³

Early post-Cold War conflict management has been complicated not only by initial difficulties assessing complex crises, but also by transformations which have occurred once peacekeepers have been deployed. Faced with intense pressure to "do something" to alleviate the humanitarian consequences of complex crises, policy makers deployed U.N. peacekeepers often to find that initial assessments of the conflict were flawed, or that the crisis mutated into a more severe form a short time after the blue helmets arrived. It is worth remembering after all, that at the time Sarajevo was chosen as the location for UNPROFOR headquarters, Bosnia was not engulfed in the raging civil war which so thoroughly dominated the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

As Model II emphasizes, the natures of early post-Cold War conflicts have vastly complicated efforts to operationalize peacekeeping. Armed with "standardized 'cookie-cutter mandates'" during the Cold War, policy makers had only to decide whether or not to intervene in crises deemed "threats to international peace and security," explained a prominent academic. "As peacekeepers have been plugged into more challenging conflicts" however, "there is a need for better thought out mandates, and adjustments in response to changing ground situations"—requirements which the international community proved unprepared to meet at the dawn of the new era.⁶⁴

Summary of the Bounded Pragmatism Model

According to the Bounded Pragmatism Model, the environment in which peacekeeping came to be perceived as adaptable and indispensable has been one of new opportunities as well as new demands. The demise of the Cold War promoted a general shift toward multilateral institutions, instituted a functioning Security Council, and rendered a number of conflicts ripe for resolution. However, it also unleashed a torrent of qualitatively distinct crises. Together, the opportu-

nities and the demands of the new era created a situation in which peacekeeping was perceived as a viable and an essential stopgap with which to plug the gaping holes of the emerging international order. Desperate to respond to post-Cold War crises and finding few remedies within the international community's conflict management medicine cabinet, boundedly rational, satisficing policy makers attempted to adapt an existing treatment to the exigencies of pressing conflicts.

The Bounded Pragmatism Model therefore provides a means of reconciling the improvisational and evolutionary nature of peacekeeping with the distinct nature of post-Cold War demands. Confronted by typical limitations on time, resources, and options, and eager to provide some response to challenging conflicts, decision makers made the pragmatic choice of attempting to adapt peacekeeping to the demands of a rapidly unfolding security environment. Seen through the lenses of Model II, the story of early post-Cold War peacekeeping has been much the same as that of Cold War peacekeeping—one of continuing efforts to feel out the potentialities and limitations of the tool through practice.

While Models I and II provide compelling means of framing the cognitive processes underlying post-Cold War peacekeeping, Models III and IV take as their focus the political determinants of peacekeeping decision making. As the following discussion of Models III and IV suggests, a consideration of the power of, and power over organizations comprises a novel and worthwhile undertaking.

MODEL III: ORGANIZATIONAL EXPANSION

Overview of Model III

Theoretical Underpinnings

The Organizational Expansion Model begins from the assumption that organizations are survival-seeking entities, populated by self-interested bureaucrats. Central to Model III is a conceptualization of policy as the output of bureaucrats charged with the oversight and day-to-day operation of organizations. Policy, then, is the output of civil servants in pursuit of self-aggrandizement and eager to promote missions with which they identify. To achieve the two (often interconnected) aims, bureaucrats seek to expand their organizations. According to Model III, there exist compelling reasons to consider the inherent expansionism of organizations—even international ones.

In its analysis of the policy process, Model III builds upon two separate, but related strands of organization theory. The first is the proposition that organizations are survival-seeking entities which strive to ensure their continued existence by maximizing their autonomy. The second is the assumption that ambitious individuals are attracted to powerful organizations. Though distinct, the underly-

ing assumptions of Model III are quite complementary: survival-oriented organizations require strong leaders, while power-hungry individuals tend to seek out vehicles through which to pursue their personal ambitions. While “the endurance of [an] organization depends upon the quality of [its] leadership,”⁶⁵ the self-aggrandizement of individuals entrusted with leadership hinges on the resources of the organizations with which they affiliate.

A crucial, yet generally unappreciated component of the organizational expansion imperative is the passion with which many civil servants embrace the missions of their organizations. As institutions with lives and interests of their own, organizations tend to be led and staffed by bureaucrats who identify strongly with their missions. For such individuals, organizational expansion is not only a way of augmenting power, but a means of furthering goals in which they believe, with mechanisms at their disposal.

Model III’s conceptualization of organizations as survival-seeking entities derives from the biologically, psychologically, and sociologically inspired view of organizations as living organisms. In his pioneering study of the Tennessee Valley Authority, Selznick⁶⁶ has posited, “organizations are not unlike personalities: the search for stability and meaning, for security, is unremitting.”⁶⁷ Concurring with this perspective, Moe has observed that each organization “begin[s] life as a unique structural reflection of its own politics.” Once created, however, the organization, and the civil servants it employs, become “political actors in their own right” capable of “alter[ing] the political game” in which they are enmeshed.⁶⁸

Intriguingly, although scholars of international organization are trained primarily in political science, most adhere to the sociological vision of international organizations as entities with lives of their own, capable of nudging member states away from purely nationalist modes of thinking to internationalist ones. This view derives in part from the latent idealism of international organization scholarship. As Claude has eloquently articulated this perspective: “[i]nternational organization is something more than a gathering of national governments; it is, in a very rudimentary sense, an expression of the concept that there is an international community.”⁶⁹

All is not starry-eyed idealism within the study of international organizations however. There exists something of a dark underside to the assertion that international organizations are more than mere “gadgets” or “arbitrarily contrived devices to deal with current problems.”⁷⁰ The proposition that international organizations have lives of their own, carries with it the proposition that they have interests of their own as well—a possibility which most states find quite threatening.

Having laid out the Organizational Expansion Model, I now test the model by applying it to the early post-Cold War experience with peacekeeping.

Empirical Insights

According to Model III, the revitalization of peacekeeping has been the product of the expansionistic initiatives of the U.N.'s first post-Cold War Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Caught in a transformational environment and led by bureaucrats intent on expanding the organization's turf and promoting its mission, the United Nations pushed peacekeepers into roles for which they were woefully unequipped and vastly unprepared. The Organizational Expansion Model therefore takes as its concern organizational dynamics and assertive, committed leadership.

In its analysis of the early post-Cold War path of the United Nations, the Organizational Expansion Model examines Boutros-Ghali's 1992 Agenda⁷¹ and other proposals advocating U.N. empowerment and an augmentation of the independence of the office of the Secretary General. Seen through the lenses of Model III, peacekeeping's revitalization has been the product of the expansionistic imperatives of an organization confronted with the uncertainties of a transformational environment. To ensure the U.N.'s survival amidst such turmoil, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali attempted to revitalize the organization by carving out an enlarged post-Cold War role for it. By imposing his vision of an expansive United Nations on member states, Boutros-Ghali pushed them into the era of multidimensional peacekeeping.

Although no adherent of Model III, Sir Brian Urquhart has captured the underlying thrust of the Organizational Expansion Model with his observation that in the eyes of many policy makers, the U.N. "is seen as a capricious foreign entity, acting independently of its member governments and often heedless of their concerns."⁷² As the following sections demonstrate, while far from universal, the Organizational Expansion perspective holds considerable sway over segments of the U.S. policy community—particularly among individuals residing on Capitol Hill.

Utilizing a Model III perspective, former Senate Majority Leader and 1996 Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole chastised President Bill Clinton for allowing "NATO to act as a subcontractor to the whims of United Nations bureaucrats and Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali."⁷³ Another prominent adherent of Model III, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Jesse Helms, has accused Secretary General Boutros-Ghali of using "a well-publicized campaign of U.N. 'empowerment'" to transform the "power-hungry and dysfunctional" United Nations "from an institution of sovereign nations into a quasi-sovereign entity in itself."⁷⁴ Although most closely identified with the political posturing of prominent U.N. nay-sayers, Model III is also lent credence by other members of the conflict management community.

Reflecting upon the organizational expansion imperative, a former National Security Council official asserted, "Boutros-Ghali bares a large part of the blame

for the post-Cold War peacekeeping mess.”⁷⁵ Concurring with this assessment, a Pentagon official accused the U.N. of biting off “more than it could chew” in its efforts to tackle challenging post-Cold War crises.⁷⁶ Building upon these themes, a Congressional source charged the Secretary General with having engaged in purposeful “empire-building,” despite the fact that the organization “didn’t have anything near the capability to meet Boutros-Ghali’s grand designs for the post-Cold War U.N.”⁷⁷

Much of the suspicion surrounding the Secretary General stems from the ambitious *Agenda for Peace* which Boutros-Ghali submitted to the Security Council in response to its summit meeting request of January 31, 1992. In this first ever meeting of the institution at the level of heads of state, the Security Council called upon the Secretary General to recommend ways of enhancing the peace and security role of the United Nations.⁷⁸ In response to its request, “the Security Council got far more guidance and analysis than it had expected.”⁷⁹ Instead of receiving an abbreviated, vague reaffirmation of the principles of the Charter, the Security Council was presented with what Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans characterized as “an up-beat and forward-looking response to . . . the new era of security cooperation.”⁸⁰ The nine months which it took the Council to respond fully to Boutros-Ghali’s ground-breaking document indicates how unexpectedly extensive and bold the Council found the fifty page *Agenda*.⁸¹

Within his 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali called for the mobilization of the entire United Nations system to deal with international crises. The Secretary General also laid out specific proposals for strengthening the U.N.’s capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace-making, and peace-building. Boutros-Ghali articulated a “wider mission” for the United Nations, and applied it with vigor to peacekeeping, suggesting that the international community “work to preserve peace, however fragile.”⁸² Boldly, the Secretary General urged member states to “seize the moment” provided by improved relations between states, to realize the Charter’s objectives and to create an organization “greater than the sum of its parts.”⁸³

While disagreements exist over the specific aims and eventual impact of the *Agenda*, most observers agree that the document was influential. Although “not a free-lance enterprise,” the *Agenda* “did have a momentum of its own” asserted New York Times correspondent Paul Lewis. “It pushed the envelope of peace-keeping . . . by adding new elements to the political dialogue” and by influencing “assessments by member states of what could be done, and where the U.N. could go.”⁸⁴ Concurring with this assessment, an official with the U.N.’s Department of Political Affairs credited the *Agenda* with having “considerably affected the thinking within member states regarding the possibilities for dealing with international crises.” The *Agenda* was particularly well-suited to such a role because its suggestions “were tailored to the new post-Cold War world.”⁸⁵ In

essence, posited a member of the Canadian Mission to the U.N., “the *Agenda* provided a roadmap to the world ahead.”⁸⁶

The path-setting 1992 *Agenda* was not the only indication that Boutros-Ghali envisioned an expanded role for the post-Cold War United Nations. With the exception of Dag Hammarskjöld’s tenure as Secretary General from 1953 to 1961, Boutros-Ghali’s activism stands unrivaled in the history of the world body. If the title of Boutros-Ghali’s article “Empowering the United Nations” isn’t suggestive enough, one can find a full elaboration of the Secretary General’s mission in his rallying cry that the international community “seize this extraordinary opportunity to expand, adapt and reinvigorate the work of the United Nations so that the lofty goals as originally envisioned by the Charter can begin to be realized.”⁸⁷ Feeding suspicions that he was in search of self-aggrandizement, Boutros-Ghali proposed in 1996 that “the role of the secretary-general . . . be created anew” in a manner which recognizes the “indispensable . . . independence” of the office.⁸⁸

Evaluations of Boutros-Ghali’s role in expanding the U.N.’s peace and security apparatus ride not only on assessments of his policy pronouncements, but also upon his failure to resist expansive trends in peacekeeping. According to Selznick, a central facet of effective leadership is the ability “to specify and recast the general aims of the organization so as to adapt them . . . to the requirements of institutional survival.”⁸⁹ On this criterion the Secretary General fell short, as evident in his failure to raise cautionary flags once enormous tasks were dumped on the organization. “Boutros-Ghali could have tempered rather than fed the momentum in which the organization found itself in the early post-Cold War period” asserted a former National Security Council official. “Boutros-Ghali could have done a more effective job of making the U.N.’s limited capacities clear.”⁹⁰

Summary of the Organizational Expansion Model

Seen through the lenses of the Organizational Expansion Model, the post-Cold War revitalization of peacekeeping has been the product of the inherent expansionism of the organization coupled with the ambitions of its Secretary General. Confronted with vast demands, and forced to navigate a new strategic environment, the United Nations found itself in desperate need of a transformational leader at the dawn of the new era. Instead of receiving an individual intent on balancing external demands with internal capabilities, however, the United Nations was placed under the tenure of an individual considered by some to be a determined turf-grabber.

Considered from an Organizational Expansion perspective, Boutros-Ghali failed in two respects: first, in seeking an expansive role for an organization barely able to walk, much less run, following its four decades of paralysis; and second, in failing to resist the dumping of near impossible tasks on the organization. In

neglecting the need to locate the appropriate balance between “what the organization can do and . . . what it must do,”⁹¹ Boutros-Ghali failed a crucial test of effective leadership. As an official with the U.N. Department of Political Affairs summed up the situation at the dawn of the new era: “the U.N. was like a kid in a candy store”—unwilling and unable to resist the opportunity to expand its role.⁹² As the following discussion of the Political Interests Model suggests, however, the United Nations was not the only actor to deem peacekeeping an attractive means of pursuing its objectives.

MODEL IV: POLITICAL INTERESTS

Overview of Model IV

Theoretical Underpinnings

The Political Interests Model begins from the assumption that organizations are mere tools in the hands of their political masters. As Claude has captured the underlying thrust of Model IV, “[s]tates hold the power of life and death over the organization: they created and sustain it, and they can starve or destroy it.”⁹³

At the heart of the Political Interests Model lies a conceptualization of policy as a reflection of the will of the most powerful within an issue area. According to Model IV, policy is no more coherent or well-intended than the political arena from which it emerges. The primary aim of policy is not the creation of a societal good, but the promotion of the interests of those holding the reins of power. In its analysis of the interests driving organizational outcomes, Model IV draws heavily upon organizational approaches to power and Realist theories of international relations. To the extent that scholars from either school concern themselves with international organizations, they conceptualize them as no more than the sum of their parts, to be used, and at times abused, by the member states who comprise them. International organizations are subject to such enormous influence by member states that some analysts contend they ought to be referred to as “interstate organization[s]”—a term intended to capture their status as mere derivations of a multistate system.⁹⁴ As creatures of sovereign nation-states existing within a self-help system, international organizations tend to be viewed by member states “as nothing more than another channel for diplomacy available to them.”⁹⁵ According to Model IV, multilateral organizations are precisely that—“instrument[s] of many powers”⁹⁶ whose actions, capabilities, and development are dependent upon “what its members, especially the more powerful ones, wish it to become, allow it to become, and force it to become.”⁹⁷

While insights regarding the weight of interests date back to the time of Thucydides, the issues which have tended to comprise the national interest have changed tremendously over time. To capture the dynamics driving recent

transformations of state interests, Model IV also draws upon Neo-Liberal insights regarding the weight of interdependence, and Constructivist assertions regarding the perceptual dimensions of the growing sense of connectivity. According to the Political Interests Model, the interdependence which has so transformed state interests derives not only from an objective vulnerability to other actors (as Neo-Liberals emphasize), but also from an intersubjective appreciation of that vulnerability (as Constructivists contend). In highlighting the sources of deepening interdependence and assessing its impact upon the actions of member states, Constructivist and Neo-Liberal approaches enable Model IV to engage in a sophisticated analysis of the role of interests in post-Cold War peacekeeping deployments.

Having laid out the Political Interests Model, I now test the model by applying it to the early post-Cold War experience with peacekeeping.

Empirical Insights

Beginning from the premise that the U.N. is its member states, Model IV attributes the increased and innovative use of peacekeeping to the tool's political attractiveness, particularly among the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the Security Council. In this new era, member states have been confronted with intense pressure to "do something" amidst public unwillingness to intervene unilaterally, to accept casualties, or to expend resources quelling conflict in countries of little strategic significance. Faced with such demands, policy makers made the politically astute choice of deploying highly visible, relatively inexpensive, U.N.-sanctioned blue helmets to international crises. In its analysis of the early post-Cold War path of the United Nations, Model IV emphasizes power.

Taking as its starting point the concern with the exercise of power over organizations by their political principals, Model IV attributes the difficulties of early post-Cold War peacekeeping to the dumping of impossible, and near impossible tasks on the United Nations by its member states. As an official with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations summed up the post-Cold War decision making dynamic: "politics rather than analysis has taken precedence in guiding the Security Council's actions."⁹⁸ Expanding upon this point, a State Department official explained, "[w]e knew from the beginning that peacekeeping wasn't optimal;" the problem was that "there simply wasn't the will to do more."⁹⁹ In essence, argued a prominent New York diplomat, the post-Cold War experience with peacekeeping has been driven by "cold political calculation, not naive, assertive multilateralism."¹⁰⁰

As the world's only near-universal organization, the United Nations plays host to numerous power brokers. By design however, the world body is dominated by the five veto-possessing, permanent members of the Security Council.

Adherents of Model IV maintain that the locus of decision making authority

within the United Nations lies not with the international civil service, not with long-time peacekeeping participants such as the Nordic countries, but with the P5 (the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China). While the U.N. Security Council is comprised of a total of fifteen members (ten of whom occupy two-year rotating terms), the five veto-wielding permanent members hold the levers of power within the organization. Because “the real wheeling and dealing” occurs “behind the scenes among the P5,” explained New York Times correspondent Paul Lewis, the non-permanent members of the Security Council “feel like they are being presented with a *fait accompli* when decisions are to be made.”¹⁰¹

Although all P5 members possess veto power, some have argued that in this new era peacekeeping decision making has been the province of the P3 (the U.S., Great Britain, and France). In the words of a diplomat from a developing country, the story of post-Cold War peacekeeping is generally one of “the Americans, Brits, and French ignoring the advice of others and manipulating peacekeeping to serve their own agenda and purposes.”¹⁰²

Of the marginal changes Member States have instituted with respect to the central organ of the world body, one of the most notable has been the establishment of regularized gatherings between troop contributing countries and Security Council members. “Troop Contributor Meetings,” as they are called, allow for exchange of information between Security Council members and troop contributing countries on a monthly basis.¹⁰³ Such consultations hold the potential for generating more effective conflict management decisions. However, Troop Contributor Meetings carry no formal influence over Security Council actions, and represent at best, a flimsy substitute for a meaningful consultative process among the P5 and lesser powers with an interest in peacekeeping.

Both in design as well as current political practice, the United Nations remains an institution which aggrandizes and legitimates the power of the political victors of World War II. As “the biggest and fattest P5 member,”¹⁰⁴ the United States has played a central role in determining to which conflicts the blue helmets have been deployed, and in devising the mandates with which peacekeepers have been equipped. Concerned with the danger posed by the veering of peacekeeping toward peace enforcement, and the burdened with unreimbursed peacekeeping expenses, troop contributors have objected to what they have viewed as parochial, and at times, irresponsible Security Council decisions. Particularly noteworthy have been criticisms of a lack of leadership by the world’s remaining superpower. A complaint frequently voiced among troop contributors is that “the U.S. is prepared to fight until the last Canadian” [or Swede, or Australian, or Norwegian . . .].¹⁰⁵ Conveying the sentiment from which such complaints emanate, a member of the Canadian Mission to the U.N. lamented, “[p]eacekeeping is going where national interests dictate and where those of us silly enough to follow, follow.”¹⁰⁶

As the following sections demonstrate, while perhaps not an optimal means of

tackling early post-Cold War conflicts, peacekeeping was anything but a “silly” choice politically. Peacekeeping has proven an irresistible tool of conflict management to policy makers keen on stemming pressure to intervene while securing international legitimation, maximizing the visibility of their actions, sharing financial and manpower burdens, and diffusing the political risks of acting.

A central force behind post-Cold War peacekeeping deployments has been what a State Department official dubbed the “gee, we have to do something” imperative.¹⁰⁷ At the heart of the “do something” imperative lies an increasing domestic interest in international conflict. As a member of the U.S. Mission to the U.N. confirmed, “there is a strong element of domestic political input to peacekeeping decision-making.”¹⁰⁸ A recent phenomenon, the “do something” imperative has been driven by a host of inter-related factors: worldwide media coverage of humanitarian tragedies, a nascent sense of moral interdependence, and an increased concern with internal security dilemmas.

Reflecting upon the weight of interests in conflict management decisions, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans has posited that “in the context of peace keeping as elsewhere” issues recognized as matters “of ‘international’ peace and security [are] what the Security Council is prepared to regard as such.”¹⁰⁹ In this era of international media coverage, issues the Security Council is prepared to regard as a matters of “international peace and security” have substantially expanded.

Media coverage has assumed a more expansive role in international affairs for three inter-related reasons: first, vast changes have taken place in communications technologies; second, timely and visual news coverage has become available globally; and third, media organizations have become increasingly competitive in pursuing stories with striking human dimensions.

Technology has rendered possible the transmission of compelling images from war-torn and famine-stricken regions of the world to the living rooms of average citizens of industrialized countries. Struck by the personalization of such misery, even ordinarily aloof citizens are prompted to pressure their governments to “do something” to alleviate the suffering, despite its occurrence often half-way around the world. “The immediacy of imagery is a very powerful impetus to foreign policy decision making” confirmed Edward Marks of the Institute for National Strategic Studies.¹¹⁰ Building on this point, Robert Gray of the Council on Foreign Relations suggested that the U.S. Civil War may have ended sooner “had Gettysburg been on television.”¹¹¹

A central impetus behind the “do something” imperative has been the power of visual imagery and the speed with which modern communication systems have made possible its delivery. Reflecting upon the immediacy of news transmission, a member of the Argentine Mission to the U.N. recalled, “the peacekeepers taken

hostage in Bosnia were on TV before the U.N. even had the opportunity to get the word out through more formal diplomatic channels.”¹¹²

Among the pressures facing member states in this new era has been the need to respond to conflicts in a highly visible manner. In this new era, “[d]emocracies’ reflexes are continually tested as CNN beams close-ups of casualties into every home” asserted Michael Stopford, Director of the U.N. Information Center (1994: 695). As an official with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations explained, “because of the ‘CNN effect’ governments are forced to act in a visible way—in a way that is emotionally and morally acceptable, although not necessarily effective.”¹¹³ According to an official with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, a desire to advertise the UNITAF response to the Somali crisis was the central impetus behind the scheduling of the U.S. marine landing for 8 p.m. Eastern Time—“prime time in D.C.” and “a time requested by CNN.”¹¹⁴

The vividness of television imagery and the speed of its transmission have played an important role in prompting member states to “do something” about post-Cold War crises. Because member states have lacked the political will to intervene with considerable force, peacekeeping has come to be relied upon as that “something.” Pressured to intervene by publics with short attention spans and vague understandings of the complexities of post-Cold War conflicts, governments have made a self-interested choice: they have pursued short-run political gains at the expense of the long-run effectiveness of the blue helmets. In short, they have deployed peacekeepers to crises for which lightly armed buffer forces were never intended. As the following sections elaborate, the political attractiveness of the blue helmets has been a product of their visibility, their legitimacy, and the opportunities they provide member states to engage in burden-sharing.

Confronted with media-generated pressure to intervene, policy makers have responded to post-Cold War crises with a tool which brings with it, substantial media coverage. “Peacekeeping is politically attractive because it entails sufficient visibility,” explained a high-ranking New York diplomat. Said otherwise, the blue helmets comprise “enough of a response to suit the political needs of those under pressure to act.”¹¹⁵ By deploying peacekeepers to pressing crises, international policy makers can appear as if they are doing something meaningful to stem conflicts, while in reality providing what has frequently turned out to be an ineffective stop-gap. In the words of a Pentagon official, peacekeepers have been deployed so that member states “could appear to take action without taking risks.”¹¹⁶

International media coverage has done much to raise consciousness of worldwide humanitarian suffering and to generate sufficient political will to act. Problematically however, television-inspired domestic pressure generally does not bring with it long term political commitment. The result argue adherents of Model IV, is a willingness to plug peacekeepers into challenging crises absent the

political backing essential to their success. As Sir Brian Urquhart, former U.N. Undersecretary General for Special Political Affairs, has elaborated the problem, “[w]hile popular pressure impels governments to bring the UN into violent and complex situations, they remain reluctant to provide solid support for such operations” (1994: 29).

In addition to capitalizing on peacekeepers’ “immediacy and visibility,”¹¹⁷ member states have sought to make the most of the blue helmets’ affiliation with the United Nations—the international community’s only near universal body. “Peacekeeping . . . fits the needs member states have for a legitimate form of intervention,” posited a member of the U.S. Mission to the U.N.¹¹⁸ Reflecting upon the political imperatives of the times, Ian Williams, President of the U.N. Correspondents’ Association recalled, “[p]ost-Cold War crises were met with a triumphant cry across the world to send in the U.N.”—“a forum in which intra-state interventions could be justified.”¹¹⁹ The concern with internal as well as external perceptions of interventions stems from member states’ growing recognition of their membership in international society. As Barnett has elaborated the underlying dynamic, “states seek to be viewed as legitimate by other states, to be understood as acting with a degree of moral authority and sanctioned purpose.”¹²⁰ In essence, asserted a State Department official, “[p]eacekeeping has been invoked . . . for the political cover afforded by a U.N. operation.”

Concerns with visibility and legitimacy have not comprised the only factors driving the heavy reliance upon the blue helmets. A defining feature of the post-Cold War environment has been member states’ interest in burden-sharing. “We have entered an era in which countries cannot afford to go it alone,” asserted a member of the U.S. Mission to the U.N.¹²² Building upon this point, a State Department official explained that although “the U.N. wasn’t the optimal forum” for tackling post-Cold War crises, “it did allow for burden-sharing.”¹²³ Peacekeeping aptly fit the policy niche of post-Cold War conflicts because the tool allows policy makers to “do something” without assuming the financial burdens, manpower losses, or political risks of unilateral responses.

Elaborating the logic behind member states’ efforts to distribute the burdens of intervention, Edward Luck, President of the U.N. Association of the U.S. explained, “there is a great desire to appear as if we are doing something without accepting any dead or paying large sums financially”—both of which would be required given higher levels of commitment.¹²⁴ “The unwillingness of member states to accept casualties”¹²⁵ together with efforts “to get a fighting army on the cheap”¹²⁶ have not comprised the only reasons for the increased reliance upon the blue helmets. In deploying peacekeepers more frequently and more forcefully, member states have managed to deflect onto U.N. bureaucrats the greatest burden of all—political responsibility for failed missions. As the Somalia and Bosnia experiences have aptly demonstrated, should a peacekeeping mission encounter

difficulties, member states have available to them “the luxury . . . of ultimately blaming the U.N.”¹²⁷

Summary of the Political Interests Model

Inspired by Realist theories of international politics and organizational approaches to power, the Political Interests Model provides a means of examining the political dynamics driving the international community’s more frequent and forceful use of peacekeeping. Faced with compelling demands for intervention amidst public unwillingness “to go it alone,”¹²⁸ “to accept bodybags,”¹²⁹ or “to empty the cash reserves,”¹³⁰ member states made the politically astute choice of deploying peacekeepers to challenging post-Cold War crises.

While the institution of peacekeeping has changed considerably over the early post-Cold War period, the political will essential to its success remains the same as in 1956 when force level peacekeepers were first deployed. According to Model IV, the post-Cold War experience of the United Nations has been much the same as that of the organization during the Cold War—one of use and abuse by member states jockeying for political advantage. In the words of an official with the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations remains “an instrument through which member states . . . pursue their objectives.”¹³¹

IMPROVING MULTILATERAL DECISION MAKING

Improving policy requires more than an understanding of the decisional processes and a diagnosis of the dysfunctions of international organizations; fundamentally, it necessitates the development of mechanisms for improving their functioning. As P. Haas and E. Haas have argued, assisting member states in devising more productive governance mechanisms necessitates the development of “flexible institutions with expanding organizational visions.”¹³²

While Models I and II focus on intellectual dynamics, Models III and IV concern themselves with political imperatives. In diagnosing the dysfunctions of multilateral decision making, the models developed in this study suggest changes which must occur if nation-states and international organizations are to become more effective policy makers, and by extension, more adept managers of post-Cold War conflicts.

In recognition of the need to devise innovative, adaptive structures for governing international society, the decision making models developed in this study yield prescriptive advice on improving multilateral decision making. In so doing, they provide policy makers with suggestions for institutionalizing effective decision making within the United Nations. As the following overview of each model’s policy prescription suggests, while the lessons are similar, the empirical and theoretical underpinnings of each model’s prescription have been distinct.

According to the Cognitive Ambiguity Model, poor communication has comprised the primary dysfunction plaguing the peacekeeping arena. Like a brain absent synapses, pervasive policy disconnects have combined with vast personnel turnover to create an environment in which few channels exist for transmitting peacekeeping knowledge from one policy realm to another. The result has been the diminishment of historical memory, and greater susceptibility to policy deficiencies. Exacerbating the problems generated by the absence of effective consultative mechanisms has been the lack of tools for tackling intra-state crises.

Better understandings of peacekeeping are essential to improving conflict management practices; however, intellectual progress means little without tools with which to achieve more effective policy outcomes. With regard to post-Cold War crises, I use the term "tools" to refer to conflict management mechanisms which meet the challenges posed by recent crises. Such "tools" achieve this by more effectively mixing peacekeeping and peace-enforcement activities. Although plagued by its share of difficulties, the K4 force deployed to Kosovo in the Spring of 1999 serves as one example of the internal community's efforts to create hybrid peacekeeping/peace-enforcement tools suited to post-Cold War conflicts.

To improve multilateral decision making, Model I advocates the development of conflict management tools better suited to the tasks of the new era; and institutional reforms intended to facilitate the exchange of ideas among the various sectors of the peacekeeping community.

Taking issue with Model I's diagnosis of the problem, Model II draws its attention to the boundedly rational character of policy makers, together with the reactive, time-constrained nature of the policy process. These elements have comprised typical, yet dysfunctional elements of the peacekeeping arena. Lacking a comprehensive focus, and compelled to deal with pressing demands, policy makers have groped along, incrementally adapting existing tools of conflict management to new challenges.

To improve multilateral decision making, Model II advocates the development of institutional reforms intended to foster a long-range perspective and to facilitate the adoption of more comprehensive conflict management frameworks. The promotion of more thorough understandings of conflicts comprises only part of the solution, however. Policy makers must also have at their disposal more extensive conflict management options, and must be encouraged to consider the full menu of alternatives before plugging lightly armed peacekeepers into challenging crises.

In contrast to Models I and II, Models III and IV begin from a perspective which considers political dynamics, rather than cognitive complexity or bounded rationality, the source of post-Cold War peacekeeping difficulties. Conceptualizing the United Nations as a political entity in its own right, with survival-seeking imperatives and self-interested leadership, the Organizational Expansion Model

considers the primary policy dysfunction of the peacekeeping arena to be the turf-grabbing initiatives of the world body.

Seen from a Model III perspective, institutional reforms will improve multilateral decision making. Such reforms would attempt to temper bureaucratic ambitions and to foster greater attentiveness by the Secretariat to the operational limitations of the world body. Greater institutional connectivity is needed between the peacekeeping and peacemaking arms of the United Nations. Enhanced communication should also be fostered among U.N. bureaucrats, troop contributing countries, mission commanders, and Security Council members. In addition to recognizing the benefits of enhanced consultations, adherents of Model III champion the development of additional tools of conflict management—some of which could be deployed by actors operating outside of the United Nations framework.

Envisioning the United Nations as a political entity dominated by its member states, the Political Interests Model considers the tendency of member states to use and abuse the United Nations the primary policy dysfunction of the peacekeeping arena. Intent on pursuing their interests and dismissive of the U.N.'s limited capabilities, policy makers have deployed the highly legitimate, visible blue helmets to crisis-torn regions.

Considered from a Model IV perspective, institutional reforms which assist member states in gearing their policies toward enlightened, rather than base understandings of their interests, will improve multilateral decision making. Reforms aimed at making the Security Council more accountable to interested parties to disputes, troop contributors, and the international civil service comprises only part of the solution, however. Policy makers also need at their disposal tools of conflict management as capable of managing post-Cold War crises, as they are politically attractive.

Strikingly, although the four models of multilateral decision making take their inspiration from distinct conceptualizations of policy, build upon unique theoretical traditions, and differ in their assessments of the early post-Cold War experience, they generate policy prescriptions which converge upon a dual theme: the need to expand the consultative mechanisms by which the international community generates peacekeeping policy; and the need to devise more effective tools of conflict management—ones which better approximate the challenges of post-Cold War crises by distinctly mixing peacekeeping and peace-enforcement activities.

These prescriptions aim to remedy the intellectual and political dysfunctions of multilateral organizations. In so doing, they generate concrete suggestions for enhancing multilateral decision making. In essence, whatever the motivations of the actors, whatever the information, and whatever the organizational dynamics, improved communication and policy tools which better approximate organizational challenges will improve organizational functioning.

WEAVING TOGETHER THE STRANDS OF THE MODELS

Each of the models developed and utilized in this study reveals a unique facet of multilateral decision making. Because the frameworks are complementary, they can be used in conjunction with one another to enrich our understanding of the decisional dynamics driving policy outcomes. As the models suggest, the policies generated from multilateral deliberations are likely to reflect many factors: intellectual deficiencies exacerbated by severe organizational disconnects, policy pragmatism coupled with a heightened sense of the possible, organizational expansionism channeled by self-interested bureaucrats, and the exercise of raw political power by member states over international organizations.

Each model contributes to scholarly understandings of the intellectual and political obstacles to organizational functioning by focusing upon particular variables and devising distinct explanations for the early post-Cold War experience. Particularly noteworthy is the focus by Models III and IV on political dynamics among public bureaucrats and their political principals. These models acknowledge the increased emphasis which public management scholars have placed upon politics as a fundamental part of any management task. Like their domestic counterparts, international organizations are creatures both of the ambitious individuals who populate them, and of the broader political systems in which they exist. Attempts to reform world bodies must therefore address both internal and external political realities.

While Models III and IV hold the greatest insight for public administration literatures, Models I and II contain the greatest "value added" for international relations scholarship. Within the field of international relations, the overwhelming emphasis upon power tends to obscure the influence of ideational factors on organizational functioning. Because Models I and II take cognitive dynamics seriously, they help to remedy the neglect of ideational forces within mainstream international relations literature.

Taken separately, the models focus too specifically to explain all features of early post-Cold War peacekeeping. In this respect, the models demonstrate the limitations of overly narrow approaches to organizational functioning, and thus, the need to approach the politics/management continuum from a broad perspective.

Toward a General Framework of Multilateral Decision Making

One strategy for approaching the politics/management continuum from a broad perspective involves developing a general framework which draws the most compelling features of the four models into a single, integrated structure. Central to such a framework would be a sophisticated analysis of the processes by which power dynamics (highlighted in Models III and IV) and intellectual processes (delineated in Models I and II) work to shape policy outcomes. Comprised of

individual models which highlight different mixes of actors, arenas, and policy challenges, a general model would necessarily be dynamic. A general model would be inclusive enough to allow for different explanations of policy outcomes; it would also be fluid enough to acknowledge that unique blends of actors and approaches dominate different stages of the policy process. The value of a general model (over competing individual models), is its ability to integrate the compelling features of the individual models into a single, rich, explanatory framework.

What would a general framework look like? First, it would feature a rubric which allows for different combinations of theoretical assumptions, decision making dynamics, challenges, tools, policy makers, and policy arenas. The general framework would weave together different strands of Models I through IV to generate nuanced and sophisticated policy explanations. For instance, a general model would begin with the assertion that how one envisions policy is closely linked to the challenge being addressed, the players at the table, the nature of the policy arena, and the availability of policy tools. Sometimes policy is best envisioned as a process geared towards the optimization of means/ends connections (as Model I asserts). Other times, the concept is best captured by differing assumptions such as Model II's suggestion that policy is the culmination of practical, incremental efforts to put out daily brushfires with available tools.

Second, a general framework would acknowledge that different policy features weigh prominently in organizational decision making at different times. In some periods, cognitive complexity (Model I) may define decisional dynamics. However, in other periods, bounded rationality (Model II), bureaucratic turf-grabbing (Model III), or power politics (Model IV) may dominate the process.

Applied to early post-Cold War peacekeeping outcomes, the general framework would allow for an examination of distinct combinations of forces driving policy outcomes at different times. Although P5 members have led the charge toward more numerous peacekeeping interventions (as suggested by Model IV), their involvement in this formerly neglected policy arena is significant for intellectual as well as political reasons (as Model I argues). Weaving a third strand into the model, one might utilize the argument of some that base political motives have figured less prominently in the equation than a genuine desire to resolve challenging crises for which few tools have been developed (as Model II highlights). Finally, one might consider Model III's assertion that member states were not the only entities who stood to gain from greater reliance upon peacekeeping in the new era.

Use of an integrated framework also allows one to tease out the significance of the variables at distinct times. For instance, Model III's examination of the role of the Secretary General in pushing for an expanded U.N. peacekeeping agenda would likely be most appropriate when examining the early phases of the new era. By contrast, the more assertive role of member states in pushing for peacekeeping

interventions—a factor highlighted by Model IV—would be more appropriately considered when looking further down the timeline.

An examination of the role of various actors in peacekeeping outcomes comprises only one section of the puzzle. The nature of arenas, challenges, and tools also matter. But as this example illustrates, Models I through IV each generate valuable insights in piecing together the factors driving post-Cold War peacekeeping outcomes.

Only by weaving together the distinct strands of organization theory, can scholars and practitioners fully appreciate the intellectual and political dynamics of publicly managed organizations, and thus, the aids and obstacles to their functioning. The general framework developed in this section provides one example of how the complementary strands of organization theory highlighted by Models I through IV can be woven together to create a coherent, yet sophisticated explanation for specific policy outcomes.

CONCLUSION

In an era characterized by complex humanitarian emergencies, an international community inclined to tackle such challenges multilaterally, and a limited conflict management arsenal, policy makers and scholars would do well to examine possibilities for improving conflict management decisions. The ability to devise effective policies, however, necessitates that the policy and academic communities come to terms with the processes driving conflict management outcomes. This study has contributed to this crucial policy endeavor by developing four models of multilateral decision making, by demonstrating their applicability to recent peacekeeping outcomes, and by deriving prescriptive insights from them. This article closes by arguing for integrative approaches to public administration; by assessing the significance of this study to public administration, international relations, and conflict management literatures; and by examining the applicability of the frameworks to the child support policy realm.

Organizational Functioning along the Politics/Management Continuum

This article opened by asking a central question of public administration: “how do politics and management affect public organizations?” Conventional wisdom holds that both politics and management drive organizational outcomes; yet, their distinct impacts have proven difficult to unravel, and their interactions difficult to graph. How can organization theorists tease out the impacts of politics and management upon public organizations? This study has examined the impact of politics and management on organizational functioning by developing models of multilateral decision making, and testing them against the early post-Cold War

experience with peacekeeping. As this case study has illustrated, policy decisions lay at the complex intersection of both forces.

Significance of this Study

This study has viewed peacekeeping decision making through the lenses of four models of multilateral decision making. In so doing, this article has demonstrated how different conceptualizations of the policy process channel one's thinking regarding an empirical puzzle. This study not only explicates the functioning of international organizations; it generates insights of general interest to public administration theorists.

In addition to generating an empirically rich and theoretically grounded explanation of early post-Cold War peacekeeping, this article has formulated systematic models which can be applied to other policy arenas characterized by partnerships among numerous entities with distinct stakes in public organizations. One arena to which these models apply is child support policy—an issue area increasingly characterized by partnerships among public and private entities at the international, federal, state, and local levels.

Applicability of the Frameworks to Child Support Policy

The extent to which the child support arena is characterized by partnerships has become especially evident in recent years as agencies charged with enforcing child support orders have taken advantage of the increased sophistication of child support enforcement techniques. One strategy for making use of new technologies has involved setting up multi-level partnerships with private and public entities.¹³³

With respect to inter-agency cooperation at the state level, for instance, the State of Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development (where the Bureau of Child Support is housed) is aggressively pursuing delinquent obligors by setting up data-sharing agreements with 14 other state agencies. In addition to cooperating with other state agencies, the Department is working with private financial institutions to seize the assets of individuals in violation of child support orders, and working with federal and local entities to ensure that new enforcement tools are properly implemented.

Recognizing that the child support policy arena is characterized by numerous partnerships, and thus, likely to exhibit dynamics addressed by the frameworks developed in this study, some readers might be inclined to ask, "Which decision making model is most applicable to the child support?" Like the policy arena to which this question applies, the answer to this question is complex.

Viewed from a long-term perspective, federal child support directives have been driven largely by Model II decision making dynamics. As individual states have experimented with, and discovered techniques for increasing child support

collections, the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement has pushed Congress to pass laws mandating that all states adopt such practices. For instance, the now standard practice of having employers withhold income directly from the paychecks of non-custodial parents began as a State of Wisconsin demonstration project. Because income withholding was successful within the State of Wisconsin, federal policy makers mandated its practice on a national level.

The incremental policy making captured by the Bounded Pragmatism Model is evident not only with respect to the federal/state dynamics of child support policy, but also to state dynamics. As the child support landscape has changed, policy makers and administrators have grappled with enormous challenges. As nonmarital childbirths have increased, and the state's public assistance program has been transformed, child support administrators have engaged in practical, incremental efforts to put out daily brushfires with available tools.

Within Model II's broad incrementalist framework, decisional dynamics outlined in Models I, III, and IV are also evident. This is particularly true as one moves from a consideration of federal dynamics to an analysis of state ones.

As Model I suggests, the child support arena is characterized by tremendous ambiguity and numerous policy disconnects. The lack of mechanisms for transferring institutional and complex program knowledge from segments of the bureaucracy to others is especially problematic given the increased need to link up both in an automated and a manual way with partner programs (i.e., such as Wisconsin's W-2 program); and the fast moving nature of the child support policy arena.

Model III also holds insights for understanding the increasingly expansive nature of child support tasks. While many tasks have been dumped on state administrators, federal mandates are often requested by states. Although some task expansion has been driven by a commitment to an organization's mission, and thus, an eagerness to tackle public policy problems at a more expansive level, others elements have undoubtedly been put forward by individuals interested in augmenting organizational turf, attaining prestige, and advancing their careers.

Finally, Model IV helps to explain child support policy outcomes by reminding readers that the locust of power generally rests with legislators rather than administrators. Task expansion has not only been a product of bureaucratic ambitions, but also of efforts by power brokers to dump new, and politically popular tasks on organizations already struggling to implement complex policies.

As has been demonstrated by the application of the frameworks to child support policy, to fully unravel the intellectual and political dynamics of publicly managed organizations, one must weave together the distinct strands of organization theory. As this cursory examination of child support policy has illustrated, the frameworks developed in this study are applicable to other policy realms. The significance of this study does not stop with the generalizability of the models.

Utility of Organization Theory to the Study of International Organizations

Compellingly, this study has demonstrated the utility of organization theory to the study of international organizations. As Moe has argued, “political scientists . . . need to become organization theorists again.”¹³⁴ His urging that political scientists “reassume their role as active contributors to organization theory,”¹³⁵ is perhaps most relevant to international relations. In this subfield, scholars have done little systematic probing of organizational theory beyond Allison’s compelling work.¹³⁶

While inspired by Allison’s persuasive use of explanatory models, this project has taken seriously Bendor and Hammond’s suggestion that “alternative versions of Allison’s models . . . be developed to highlight somewhat more fundamental factors in policymaking.”¹³⁷ In developing models which uncover cognitive and political, as well as domestic and international factors, this article has taken a step towards elucidating the “fundamental factors” underlying the formation of international public policy.

APPENDIX
Four Models of Multilateral Decisionmaking: Theories, Dynamics, Challenges, and Tools

<i>Four Models</i>	<i>Conceptualization of Policy</i>	<i>Theoretical Underpinnings</i>	<i>Primary Decisionmaking Dynamic/Dysfunction</i>	<i>Policy Challenges</i>	<i>Policy Tools</i>
Model I: Cognitive Ambiguity	policy as a process geared towards the optimization of means/ends connections	scholarship addressing impediments to learning within and among organizations	cognitive complexity	which completely confound policymakers	which can be utilized absent a full understanding by policymakers of the tool's origins, parameters, or objectives
Model II: Bounded Pragmatism	policy as the culmination of practical, incremental efforts to put out daily brushfires fires with available tools	literature addressing the tendencies toward satisficing, bounded rationality, and incrementalism in organizational decisionmaking	bounded rationality	which appear amenable to resolution via the invocation of existing organizational routines	which are readily available and comprise a mere extension of existing organizational routines
Model III: Organizational Expansion	policy as the output of self-interested bureaucrats who dominate the organizations responsible for implementation	scholarship addressing organizations as survival-seeking entities dominated by ambitious leaders	bureaucratic turf-grabbing	which link up well with the agendas and domains of existing organizations	over which expansionistic organizations claim ownership and which are marketable as highly germane to the policy challenges at hand
Model IV: Political Interests	policy as a reflection of the will of the most powerful actors within an issue area	power approaches within organization theory Realist theories of international relations Neo-Liberal and Constructivist insights on interdependence	power politics	which necessitate highly visible, legitimate, and inexpensive response mechanisms	which allow for highly visible, legitimate, and inexpensive responses to policy challenges

Four Models of Multilateral Decisionmaking: Policymakers and the Policy Arena

<i>Four Models</i>	<i>Policymakers</i>	<i>Policy Arena</i>
Model I: Cognitive Ambiguity	Policymakers: politically committed to effective policy, intellectually capable, but, impeded by <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● their lack of policy expertise ● institutional disconnects/their inability to link up with those holding policy knowledge, ● the cognitive challenges involved in working within a new policy environment as well as ● the confusion and emotion generated by vast transformations in the policy arena 	Policy Arena: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● in which necessary expertise is deeply embedded in the obscure niches of an organization ● pervaded by institutional disconnects within and among relevant organizations ● characterized by enormous change
Model II: Bounded Pragmatism	Policymakers: politically committed to effective policy, intellectually limited by <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● their predisposition for defining policy challenges in terms of pre-existing problems ● their boundedly rational, satisficing nature ● their tendency to respond to crises on the basis of solutions available, rather than by detached assessments of the specifics of the policy challenge ● their inability to break with incremental, routine-based decisionmaking and further impeded by <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● the qualitatively distinct nature of policy challenges ● pressure to respond to numerous daily crises 	Policy Arena: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● characterized by numerous demands/brush-fires ● characterized by new political opportunities ● populated by organizations which place great emphasis on routines, often at the expense of strategic planning
Model III: Organizational Expansion	Bureaucrats: intellectually capable, politically committed to the expansion of their turf <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● for reasons of bureaucratic ego ● as well as a belief in the organization's capacity to do good who perceive threats to themselves and their organizations, who envision opportunities for self-promotion and/or organizational expansion, and who are knowledgeable of how best to promote themselves and the missions of their organizations Power Brokers: desperate for bureaucratic expertise willing to allow bureaucrats expanded decisionmaking influence	Policy Arena: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● characterized by transformations which pose new threats to organizational survival and generate new opportunities for organizational expansion ● populated by organizations which seek to expand their turf and which possess capabilities marketable as highly germane to the policy challenges at hand

(Continued on next page)

Policymakers and the Policy Arena—Continued

<i>Four Models</i>	<i>Policymakers</i>	<i>Policy Arena</i>
Model IV: Political Interests	Power Brokers: intellectually capable politically committed to the augmentation of their power, prestige, and influence, perceiving few risks and possible advantage in using an organization and its tools to serve their base political interests and willing to risk policy failure over the risk of failing to respond to the policy problem Bureaucrats: powerless to fend off the political elite's use and abuse of themselves and their organization	Policy Arena: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● dominated by obvious power brokers ● consisting of organizations which are easily shoved around due to their lack of autonomy and possession of few sources of political support

Four Models of Multilateral Decisionmaking: Applied to the Early Post-Cold War Experience with Peacekeeping

<i>Four Models</i>	<i>Main Actors</i>	<i>Central Proposition</i>	<i>Empirical Focus</i>	<i>Policy Prescriptions</i>
Model I: Cognitive Ambiguity	P5 members—particularly the U.S. and Russia, whose arrival to the peacekeeping scene has been recent, and whose knowledge of peacekeeping is therefore limited	inability to understand and consequent failure to adhere to the fundamental principles of peacekeeping	intellectual foundations of peacekeeping ambiguities created by the geopolitical transformation, personnel changes in the realm of peacekeeping decisionmaking, policy disconnects, and the blinding headiness of the new era	1) foster greater institutional connectivity among the various elements of the peacekeeping community, and 2) develop more effective tools of conflict management
Model II: Bounded Pragmatism	civil service employees of the U.N. and member states charged with the difficult task of adapting available instruments to the challenges of early post-Cold War conflicts	pragmatic efforts to adapt an existing tool to complex crises with unforeseeable outcomes	peacekeeping's improvisational origins and evolutionary history unprecedented political opportunities and qualitatively distinct demands of the new era	1) foster greater institutional connectivity among the various elements of the peacekeeping community, and 2) develop more effective tools of conflict management
Model III: Organizational Expansion	U.N. bureaucrats set on expanding the organization's turf and promoting its mission "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war"	expansionistic imperatives of an organization led by an ambitious leader and caught in a transformational environment	Boutros-Chali's 1992 Agenda and other proposals advocating U.N. empowerment and an augmentation of the independence of the office of the Secretary General	1) foster greater institutional connectivity among the various elements of the peacekeeping community, and 2) develop more effective tools of conflict management
Model IV: Political Interests	P5 and other member states intent on pursuing their own interests via use and abuse of the U.N.	dumping of inappropriate tasks on the U.N. by member states in pursuit of the political gains of being seen as doing something about post-Cold War crises	decisionmaking authority of the Security Council "do something" imperative peacekeeping's visibility, its ability to confer international legitimation on an intervention, and its status as a vehicle for sharing political, financial, and manpower burdens	1) foster greater institutional connectivity among the various elements of the peacekeeping community, and 2) develop more effective tools of conflict management

NOTES

1. The dearth of knowledge on the functioning of international organizations is the product of two factors: 1) the overwhelming focus by international organization scholars on explaining how such entities come to be established, rather than how they work once established; and 2) the failure of international organization scholars to link their works up with the research programs and multidisciplinary insights of organizational theorists. The result is a deep chasm in our knowledge of how international organizations work, and by extension, in our understanding of the reasons they often fail to work. See Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore. "The Politics, Power, and Pathology of International Organizations." *International Organization*. Autumn 1999. Volume 53, No 4, pp 699–733.
2. Within the U.S., or what broadly comprises the "national level" of analysis, I interviewed Pentagon and State Department officials, Congressional sources, members of the National Security Council, academics, and journalists. At the United Nations, or what broadly comprises the "international level" of analysis, I spoke with representatives of various permanent missions to the United Nations, primarily focusing on the Permanent Five and traditional troop-contributing countries. Shifting my focus from member states to the international civil servants, I interviewed members of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs, and the U.N. Department of Political Affairs. My research was further informed by discussions with representatives of non-governmental organizations and interests groups whose missions have been deeply affected by recent changes in United Nations peacekeeping.
As a result of peacekeeping's controversial nature, together with the constraints which all but the highest ranking officials face with regard to speaking "on the record," virtually all of my more than sixty interviewees insisted that I safeguard their anonymity. Most however, have allowed me to associate their agency or organization with the information and opinions revealed in the interview.
3. Gareth Evans, 1993. *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond*. (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin), pp 124, 119.
4. Sarah Doyle, Kimberly Smith, and Kemper Vest, 1994. *The Changing Shape of Peacekeeping*. Conference Report sponsored by The Center for National Security Negotiations of Science Applications International Corporation; (14–15 June), p C2.
5. William J. Durch, ed., 1993. *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*. (New York: St Martin's Press), pp 9, 463.
6. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992/1993 "Empowering the United Nations." *Foreign Affairs*, 71, (Winter): 89–90.
7. Leroy A. Bennett, 1977. *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.), p 132.
8. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1995. *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*. A/50/60–S/1995/1, (3 January): 9.
9. Sir Anthony Parsons, 1992. "The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era." *International Relations*, XI/3, (December): 189–200.
10. Evans, *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond*, p 106.
11. Interview, July 18, 1995.
12. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis*, p 10.
13. Interview with a New York diplomat, June 16, 1995.

14. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 1988. "The Uncertainty of the Past: Organizational Learning under Ambiguity." Pp. 336–7 in James G. March, ed. *Decisions and Organizations*. (New York: Basil Blackwell).
15. Harold L. Wilensky, 1967. *Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry*. (New York: Basic Books), p 7.
16. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*, (1979 (1976)), p 60.
17. Barbara Levitt and James G. March, 1988. "Organizational Learning." *Annual Review of Sociology*. 14: 319.
18. Barbara Levitt and James G. March, 1990. "Chester I. Barnard and the Intelligence of Learning." P 19 in Oliver E. Williamson, ed. *Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
19. Levitt and March, "Organizational Learning," p 323.
20. Ernst B. Haas, 1991. "Collective Learning: Some Theoretical Speculations." Pp. 62–99 in George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock eds., *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*. (Boulder: Westview Press).
21. James G. March, ed., 1988. *Decisions and Organizations*. (New York: Basil Blackwell), p 13.
22. Gareth Morgan, 1986. *Images of Organization*. (Newbury Park: Sage Publications), p 89.
23. Wilensky, *Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry*. p 41.
24. The tendency to inappropriately characterize peacekeeping as a "Chapter VI" or "Chapter VII" activity was confirmed during the 63 interviews I conducted in the summer of 1995. Decision makers rarely invoked the term "Chapter VI and one-half" to refer to traditional peacekeeping, or the terms "Chapter VI and three-quarters" or "Chapter VI and seven-eighths" to refer to robust peacekeeping.
25. Interview, June 13, 1995.
26. Interview, July 13, 1995.
27. Interview with Congressional source, July 13, 1995.
28. Interview, June 8, 1995.
29. Interview, July 17, 1995.
30. Interview, June 20, 1995.
31. Paul F. Diehl, 1993. *International Peacekeeping*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press).
32. Interview, June 21, 1995.
33. March and Olsen, "The Uncertainty of the Past: Organizational Learning under Ambiguity," p 343.
34. Interview, July 19, 1995.
35. Interview, July 17, 1995.
36. Interview, July 17, 1995.
37. Interview, June 12, 1995.
38. Interview, July 18, 1995.
39. Interview, June 13, 1995.
40. Interview, June 20, 1995.
41. Interview, July 19, 1995.
42. Interview, June 12, 1995.
43. Boulding in Janis, Irving L. and Leon Mann, 1977. *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment*. (New York: The Free Press).
44. *Ibid.*, p 35.

45. Simon, Herbert A., 1976 (1945). *Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization*. (New York: The Free Press.)
Simon used the term "bounded rationality" to capture the limited capacity of human beings to formulate and solve complex problems in a manner approximating that necessary to achieve objectively rational behavior. "Satisficing," or the making of choices absent a full delineation and examination of alternatives, occurs as a result of man's boundedly rational nature. Decision makers tend to settle for courses of action that fit simple rules of thumb and are "good enough" because as human beings, "they have not the wits to maximize."
46. Lindblom, Charles E. (1959) 1982. "The Science of "Muddling Through." Pp. 113-127 in Stella Z. Theodoulou and Matthew A. Cahn, eds., *Public Policy: The Essential Readings*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
According to Lindblom, "incrementalism" is a decision strategy policy makers use to avoid departing grandly from previous policies or former paths of implementation. Apprehensive about the consequences of new programs, policy makers consider alternatives that differ to only a small degree from existing policy. In Lindblom's classic phrasing, decisionmakers "muddle through."
47. Ibid.
48. Interview, July 14, 1995.
49. Interview, June 12, 1995.
50. Interview, July 17, 1995.
51. Interview, July 18, 1995.
52. Michael Barnett, 1995. "Partners in Peace? The UN, Regional Organizations, and Peace-keeping." *Review of International Studies*, 21: 411-33.
53. United States Institute of Peace. *The Professionalization of Peacekeeping*. A Study Group Report. 2nd printing. January 1994, p v.
54. Morgan, Images of Organization, p 336.
55. Interview, June 20, 1995.
56. Interview, June 16, 1995.
57. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*, p 166.
58. Brian Urquhart, 1990. Beyond the 'Sheriff's Posse.' *Survival*, 32/3 (May/June 1990): 196.
59. See Barnett, "Partners in Peace? The UN, Regional Organizations, and Peace-keeping," and Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*.
60. Interview, June 21, 1995.
61. Interview, June 6, 1995.
62. Interview, July 10, 1995.
63. Interview, July 17, 1995.
64. Interview, June 15, 1995.
65. Chester I. Barnard, 1938. *The Functions of the Executive*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University), p 282.
66. Philip Selznick, 1949. *The TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study of Politics and Organization*. (University of California Press), p 47.
67. Ibid., p 47.
68. Terry M. Moe, 1989. "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure." Pp. 282 in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., *Can the Government Govern?* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution).
69. Inis L. Claude, Jr., 1956, 1964. *Swords into Plowshares*. (New York: Random House, 3rd edition (revised)), p 404.
70. Ibid., p 4-5.

71. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992. "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping." (U.N. document A/47/277-S/24111).
72. Brian Urquhart, 1994. "Who Can Police the World?" *The New York Review of Books*, XLI/9 (May 12, 1994): 29.
73. "Excerpts From Dole's Speech on the President's Foreign Policy." *The New York Times*. June 26, 1996, A10.
74. Jesse Helms, 1996. "Saving the U.N.: A Challenge to the Next Secretary-General." *Foreign Affairs*, 75/5 (September/October, 1996): 2.
75. Interview, July 19, 1995.
76. Interview, July 19, 1995.
77. Interview, July 13, 1995.
78. United Nations Security Council, 1992. "Statement by the President of the Security Council." U.N. Document S/23500, 31 January 1992.
79. Interview with a member of the New Zealand Mission to the U.N., June 13, 1995.
80. Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond. p xi.
81. United Nations Security Council. "Statement[s] by the President of the Security Council." U.N. Documents, S/25344, S/24728. S/25036, S/24872, S/25184, S/25859.
82. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 1992. *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*, U.N. document A/47/277-S/24111, paragraph 15.
83. *Ibid.*, paragraphs 8, 86.
84. Interview, June 20, 1995.
85. Interview, June 14, 1995.
86. Interview, June 7, 1995.
87. Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," p 89.
88. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 1996. "Global Leadership after the Cold War." *Foreign Affairs*, 75 (March/April 1996): 88-98.
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