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Review article

The New Public Management: a bibliographical essay for Latin American (and other) scholars

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Abstract

The New Public Management is a field of professional and policy discussion—conducted internationally—about public management policy, executive leadership, design of programmatic organizations, and government operations. Scholars specializing in public administration/political science have contributed to this discussion for a decade; however, their contribution has yet to be examined as a whole. The paper—a bibliographical essay, rather than a literature review—attempts to fill this gap. Studies published in the 1990–96 period are examined in detail, while subsequent works are briefly discussed. The paper aims to help scholars situated outside the original English-speaking precincts of the NPM discussion to benefit from and contribute to this maturing literature. This aim is pursued here in three main ways: first, by reviewing each study's distinctive methodological and theoretical approach; second, by contrasting each item with a common benchmark; and, third, by including two studies about Latin America within the review. The bibliographical essay can be used for envisioning the public administration/political science contribution to the NPM discussion in its second decade, as well. © 2001 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.

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1. Introduction

The New Public Management is a subject of strong interest to Latin American scholars, as demonstrated by their participation in CLAD-UNESCO's distance learning course on the subject, conducted through the Internet from September 1999 to June 2000. I was given the responsibility to direct the course from my "virtual professorial chair" (*Catedra Virtual*). This experience, occurring alongside my ordinary teaching duties at the LSE, confirmed that the literature on the New Public Management does not teach itself. Indeed, the literature as a whole borders on being inaccessible to anyone new to the subject, including trained scholars. This paper responds to this problem, as well as to an invitation to speak on "The New Public Management in Latin America" at the annual CLAD (Latin American Center for Administration and Development) Congress, held in October 2000.

Experience shows that definitional matters are a sensible point of entry into discussions about New Public Management (NPM). I define NPM abstractly as a field of professional and policy discussion—conducted internationally—about subjects concerning public management, including public management policy, executive leadership, design of programmatic organizations, and government operations (Barzelay, 2001).¹ One of the media through which this discussion takes place is published works. In speaking to the assigned topic, I will analyze and comment upon two high-quality publications written about the subjects of public management policy and the design of programmatic organizations in Latin America (about Mexico and Brazil, respectively).²

The term "public management policy" roughly corresponds to the conventional, but ambiguous, term "administrative reform." Public management policy is concerned with guiding, motivating, and controlling the core public sector as a whole. The instruments of public management policy are institutional rules and organizational routines in the areas of expenditure planning and financial management, civil service and labor relations, procurement, organization and methods, and audit and evaluation. (Administrative reform generally involves changes in public management policies.) One of the works discussed later in this paper is concerned with public management policy, specifically budget reform (Arellano et al., 2000).

The design of programmatic organizations, the second subject, is concerned with public service delivery. "Public service" refers to the performance of governmental functions, including public service provision in the normal sense, as well as in the extended senses of regulation, taxation, and defense. The term "delivery" includes the performance of administrative functions, including operations, management, and oversight. This subject, unlike that of executive leadership, is primarily concerned with "organization design." The term, "organization" is used in both the normal sense of a single bureaucratic or other entity, and in the extended sense of a network of entities involved in providing a public service. The term "design" indicates that the subject is primarily concerned with formal administrative choices rather than with informal, emergent properties of organizations or with organizational interventions conducted by institutional power centers or individuals. The specific work on this subject discussed here is a study of the network of organizations that provided preventive health care services to target client groups in the northeastern Brazilian state of Ceará through the Health Agent Program (Tendler and Freedheim, 1994).

I regard the studies on Latin America discussed in this paper as meaningful—and potentially highly significant—within the field of discussion called New Public Management. For this reason, it makes sense to analyze and comment upon these works from the standpoint of a scholar knowledgeable about the NPM literature. Bringing this perspective to bear in commenting upon the Latin American studies is intended to expand the range and depth of the NPM field of discussion, which remains centered in the English-speaking “family of nations” (Castles, 1993). The prospective benefits of doing so are, first, to allow researchers concerned with public management in Latin America to tap into the intellectual resources of the NPM discussion, and second, to enrich this same field by incorporating studies about public management in Latin America.³

It would be easier to carry out this task if I could refer the reader to a satisfactory literature review on the New Public Management. However, I am unaware of any such work.⁴ To be satisfactory, such a review would have to draw, at least, on the North American literature as well as on that rooted in the experiences of the UK, Australia, and New Zealand. The former needs to be discussed because North America is a major reference point for discussions of public management in Latin America, while the latter represents the “heartland” of NPM. As no satisfactory review already exists, this paper begins with one. Indeed, the paper devotes more space to this exercise than to commenting on the selected studies about Latin America—a fact that might make this bibliographic essay of use even to scholars who have no particular interest in that region.⁵

2. Origins of the NPM discussion

The New Public Management (NPM) began life as a conceptual device invented for purposes of structuring scholarly discussion of contemporary changes in the organization and management of executive government. The actual term was coined by political scientists working in the field of public administration in the UK and Australia. The most cited original reference on NPM is Hood (1991); however, an equally important work covering much of the same ground—and more—is Hood and Jackson’s *Administrative Argument* (1991). Hood and Jackson conceived NPM as both an *administrative argument* and as an accepted *administrative philosophy*. These two concepts were fraternal rather than identical twins, as one inherited its personality from the theory of practical argumentation, while the other’s genes came from empirically-oriented political science (Barzelay, 2000a). Pressing the biological metaphor further, the concepts of administrative argument and administrative philosophy were Siamese twins, incorporating the same concepts of *doctrines* and *organization design*. Both conceptions of NPM are apparent in writings on this subject by other scholars.

Fig. 1 provides a simplified diagram of Hood and Jackson’s conceptual framework. In this map, the major concepts are represented as “nodes,” while relationships among these concepts are represented as “links.” The concept of *administrative argumentation* is introduced as the covering term for *administrative argument* and *administrative philosophy*. In what follows, I describe these two concepts in detail and discuss how NPM is an instance of

Figure 1
Administrative Argumentation:
A Conceptual Map




Fig. 1.

both. In subsequent sections, I analyze other significant early works on NPM in relation to Hood and Jackson (hereafter H&J).

2.1. *NPM as an administrative argument*

Administrative arguments are “nested systems” (Simon, 1969: 84–115) of ideas concerned with organizational design. According to H&J, any administrative argument can be disaggregated into a set of subarguments. Whereas each administrative argument is typically concerned with a broad spectrum of organization design issues, each subargument is concerned with a single issue of organizational design. This aspect of H&J’s conception of administrative argument can be stated formally, as follows:

$$(1) \quad AA = \{aa_1, aa_2, aa_3, \dots, aa_n\},$$

where *AA* refers to any given administrative argument and $\{aa_1, aa_2, aa_3, \dots, aa_n\}$ refers to *AA*’s subarguments. H&J went on to describe the structure of any given subargument, aa_i . The elements of this level of administrative argument were identified as administrative doctrines and justifications. A *doctrine* is a view as to how a single organization design issue should be resolved, whereas a *justification* is a rationale for that view.

To a substantial degree, H&J's discussion tracks Stephen Toulmin's widely known approach outlined in *The Uses of Argument* (1958). As Toulmin's contribution to argumentation theory is well known within an intellectual community wider than public administration, it is useful to translate H&J's discussion into its terms.⁶ A schematic representation of Toulmin's (1958) conception of an argument is as follows:

$$(2) \quad C = A(\cdot).$$

where C refers to an argument's claim and $A(\cdot)$ refers to the basis of the claim (Barzelay, 2000a). The term A refers to the intellectual operation known as *argumentation*. A synonym for this operation is *practical inference* (Walton, 1992). Under this operation, the reasonableness of C is inferred from various considerations.⁷ These considerations are symbolized by the term (\cdot) . General considerations are called *warrants*, while the circumstances are called *grounds*. Thus,

$$(2') \quad C = A(W, G),$$

where W refers to warrants and G refers to grounds.

H&J's discussion of administrative subarguments, aa_i , can be formalized in these same terms. Let us say that any given aa_i displays the structure, $C = A(\cdot)$ introduced as Expression (2). Without a doubt, the concept of administrative *doctrines* in H&J corresponds to *claims* within Toulmin's frame of reference. In translating H&J into Toulmin's framework, the term C in Expression (2) may be specified as d_i . The term d refers to *doctrine*, while i refers to the particular issue of organizational design with which a given d is concerned. Substituting d_i for C in Expression (2) yields the following representation of a unit of administrative argumentation, aa_i :

$$(3) \quad d_i = A(\cdot).$$

Translating H&J's concept of *justification* into Toulmin's frame of reference requires some interpretation, however. This concept may refer either to *considerations*, (\cdot) , or to the relationship between (\cdot) and their corresponding doctrine, d_i . Within Toulmin's framework, the relationship between *considerations* and *doctrines* is mediated through the intellectual operation of practical inference, symbolized in Expression (3) by A . In what follows, let us assume that *justification* in H&J refers to *considerations*, (\cdot) , in Toulmin's frame of reference.

In analyzing these *considerations*, H&J identified three affinity groups or clusters of *administrative values*. These clusters are sigma-type (σ) values, theta-type (θ) values, and lambda-type (λ) values. The sigma cluster gives priority to the efficient performance of tasks, the theta cluster gives priority to honesty and fairness, and the lambda cluster gives priority to robustness and adaptability of systems.⁸ The concept of *administrative values* in H&J's analysis is closely related to *warrants* within Toulmin's framework. To express the idea that *doctrines* are backed by at least one cluster of *administrative values*, Expression (3)'s model of any given aa_i can be restated as follows:

$$(3') \quad d_i = A(\sigma, \theta, \lambda),$$

Table 1
Doctrines of New Public Management

Use independent public bureaucracy
Use private/independent organization
Use differentiated ranks/one boss/delegation
Separate 'policy' and 'admin' specialism
Decide by discretion
Multi-source supply/between organizations
Multi-source supply/within organizations
Prefer admin/managerial skills
Contract out/for the field
Promote on merit/bosses' judgement
Prefer paid work/variable/pay by outcome
Limit tenure/by recall/hirer fires
Have a pluriform structure
Control through business methods
Control by output measures

Source: Hood & Jackson, 1991: 33–34.

where the Greek symbols represent the three clusters of administrative values identified by H&J.

We are finally in a position to understand what H&J meant in saying that NPM is an instance of an administrative argument. NPM is a point of view about organization design in government composed of subarguments, $aa_1, aa_2, aa_3, \dots, aa_n$, whose doctrinal claims, $d_1, d_2, d_3, \dots, d_n$, flow ultimately from administrative values. As an administrative argument, AA, NPM can be grasped by analyzing this set of subarguments. H&J's analysis of these subarguments focused on their elements, specifically their *claims* and *warrants* in Toulmin's terms. In focusing on *claims*, H&J proposed a list of NPM *doctrines* (see Table 1). In focusing on *warrants*, NPM was described as a set of claims resting largely on sigma-type *administrative values*. In sum, NPM was described within the frame of reference of *administrative argument* in two complementary ways. Highlighting the left side of Expression (3'), NPM was portrayed as a set of doctrinal teachings about organization design in government. Highlighting the right side of Expression (3'), NPM was depicted as an administrative argument based on familiar, if debatable, administrative values.

This model of administrative arguments allowed H&J to make three key points about New Public Management, directed mainly to colleagues in academic public administration in the UK and Australia, many of whom at the time dismissed ascendant approaches to public management in their countries. First, they characterized NPM as a *point of view* about organizational design in government. As a point of view, NPM was described neither as a theory of administration nor as an ad hoc collection of thoughts about public management. Second, and relatedly, H&J (and especially Hood, 1991) argued that NPM was not utterly lacking in substance, since sigma-type values are plausible warrants for administrative doctrines. Third, H&J pointed out that a reasonable person might reject NPM on the grounds that theta-type values of honesty and fairness, for instance, should be given priority over the sigma-type values of efficient task performance.⁹ In this way, the authors sought to enlarge the space for critical discussion (Walton, 1992) of the New Public Management.

2.2. NPM as an administrative philosophy

As mentioned earlier, Hood and Jackson characterized NPM not only as an administrative argument, but also as an administrative philosophy. Generically, an *administrative philosophy* is a body of doctrinal teachings that enjoys widespread acceptance in a given place and time. Other such administrative philosophies have been 18th century German Cameralism and 19th century British Utilitarianism, and 20th century American Progressive Public Administration. The concept of an *administrative philosophy* belongs to a different frame of reference than that of *administrative argument*. This frame of reference includes the following concepts:

- administrative philosophy
- climate of opinion
- doctrines
- persuasive rhetoric
- acceptance
- acceptance factors
- government agenda
- history

The frame of reference surrounding *administrative philosophy* can be described in terms of the following statements.

Administrative philosophies are *doctrines* that have been *accepted*.

Administrative philosophies affect the *governmental agenda* regarding organizational design questions by establishing the *climate of opinion* on these matters.

As a matter of *history*, *administrative philosophies* that enjoy *acceptance* at one time are typically rejected or forgotten at another.

Acceptance of *doctrines* is a process that includes *persuasive rhetoric*.

Effective *persuasive rhetoric* typically involves the use of rhetorical techniques, referred to as *acceptance factors*.¹⁰

As can be seen, the frame of reference surrounding *administrative philosophy* is intended to explain the governmental agenda regarding organizational design questions in a given place and time. In this sense, the concept of *administrative philosophy* is a tool of political analysis. In using this tool, the analyst isolates (and emphasizes) the role of ideas in shaping the governmental agenda. The burden of argumentation is to explain why beliefs have changed over time.

Within this second frame of reference, NPM is an administrative philosophy concerning organization design in government that emerged in the 1980s. NPM became an administrative philosophy through an acceptance process, which H&J modeled by drawing on theories of persuasion codified in the literature on rhetoric. H&J asserted that NPM influenced governments' agendas by establishing a climate of opinion in favor of its doctrines. Thus, to explain decisions that resolve organization design issues in particular circumstances, H&J

suggested that researchers proceed by first identifying the reigning administrative philosophy and second by explaining how this body of doctrine acquired such an influential status.

2.3. *H&J as benchmark*

H&J's book can serve as a point of reference in reviewing the varied NPM literature. Some works have considered NPM to be an *administrative argument*, while others have considered it as an influence over governmental decision making. Some works have *described* administrative arguments, others have actually *made* such arguments. Some works have taken the view that NPM is concerned with organization design in government; others have pursued the idea that NPM is a distinctive way for public managers to think and act. Some works have accepted the view that NPM exerted a decisive influence on governmental agenda-setting, while others have scrutinized this conjecture by conducting comparative, case-oriented research.

Due to this wide variety in approaches, the NPM literature presents as a disordered field, even within the public administration/political science literature. This disorderliness makes the subject difficult to teach. In my experience, running a course centering on NPM is like asking the fabled blind men to describe the proverbial elephant (and then subjecting them to a two-hour unseen exam at year's end!).¹¹ H&J's framework, if nothing else, provides a clear picture of the NPM beast at an early stage of its evolution. For this reason, the works reviewed here will be situated within the NPM literature by comparing them to H&J. Doing so provides a coherent picture of the scholarly contribution to the NPM field of discussion by specialists in public administration and political science.¹²

With Fig. 1 at our side, let us now proceed to review several works that appeared at roughly the same time as H&J.

3. Works from the early 1990s

3.1. *NPM as the odd couple*

Although it did not employ the term NPM, Aucoin (1990) is also considered a seminal work in the literature on this subject. This discussion was similar to H&J in contending that changes in accepted ideas help to account for administrative reform in the UK, Australia, and New Zealand in the 1980s. However, Aucoin's analysis of this administrative philosophy differed from H&J's in significant ways. He argued that NPM is based on two fields of discourse, or *paradigms*, known as public choice and managerialism. Public choice is a contemporary field of discourse about government with wider concerns than management, whereas managerialism is a field of discourse initially meant to apply to organizations in the private sector.¹³

Insofar as Aucoin was describing the role of ideas in administrative reform in the 1980s, his discussion of NPM corresponds to the right side of Fig. 1. However, Aucoin's analysis of these ideas was similar to H&J's discussion of NPM as an administrative argument. Under this interpretation, NPM refers to argumentation structured along the following lines:

$$(4) \quad T = A(PC, MAN),$$

where T refers to general or theoretical claims about how government should be organized and managed, PC refers to the *public choice paradigm*, and where MAN refers to the *managerialism paradigm*.

Aucoin sought to describe the relationship between T on the left side of Expression (4) and PC and MAN on the right side. In doing so, Aucoin translated PC and MAN into a common frame of reference drawn from the professional-academic literature on organization structure. The terminology he used included the concepts of *centralization* and *decentralization*. In translating each discourse into the language of organizational structure, Aucoin inferred that the prevailing administrative philosophy incorporated arguments for centralization, originating in the public choice paradigm, along with arguments for decentralization, originating in managerialism. Aucoin then underscored his observation that the doctrinal claims comprising the prevailing administrative philosophy pointed in opposite directions, a situation he described as “paradoxical.”¹⁴

Both Aucoin (1990) and Hood (1991) were widely seen as making the same broad points about contemporary changes in the organization and management of executive government in such countries as the UK, Australia, and New Zealand: first, that a change in accepted administrative doctrines occurred during the 1980s; second, that these changes were integral to international public management trends; and third, that the arguments behind these ideas should be analyzed and assessed. However, as we have now seen, the details of their discussion differed. Aucoin’s discussion was tied more closely to the fashionable discourses of public choice and managerialism, and he translated these ideas into a more conventional frame of reference about organization design. More substantively, Aucoin’s view that the prevailing doctrines of administrative reform pointed in opposing directions was markedly different from H&J’s assessment that NPM is a coherent, if skewed, administrative argument.¹⁵

3.2. *NPM as new institutional economics*

In 1991, Jonathan Boston, John Martin, June Pallot, and Pat Walsh published *Reshaping the State: New Zealand’s Bureaucratic Revolution*. The volume included Boston’s influential chapter on the “theoretical underpinnings” of the New Zealand reforms (Boston, 1991: 1–26). This particular discussion was part of an argument intended to explain policy choices, related to public management, made by the New Zealand government in the 1980s. These choices were shaped by policy proposals offered by the Treasury. In accounting for the Treasury’s proposals, Boston discussed the policy development process. The author’s description of the process focused on argumentation about doctrines and policies. In describing this aspect of the policy development process, Boston played down organizational dynamics and highlighted the reasoning involved. The description of how the Treasury staff reasoned about public management illuminated three key components of the New Institutional Economics: public choice theory, transactions-cost economics, and the economic theory of agency. These ideas—which were common currency for the Treasury’s staff of trained

economists—greatly influenced the department’s proposals and ultimately the New Zealand government’s policy choices.

Boston’s discussion of that experience has greatly influenced scholarly and professional claims about NPM. Some take Boston to have said that New Institutional Economics (NIE) is the intellectual foundation for New Public Management (Aucoin, 1995; Kettl, 1997). What was put forward by a political scientist as an explanation for New Zealand’s policy choices thereby became a much grander and more ambiguous claim. Grander, in the sense that NPM denoted an *international trend* (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991), whereas Boston referred to recent history in one country. Ambiguous, in the sense that *intellectual foundations* suggests, without fully claiming, that applying New Institutional Economics is the only serious way to argue about public management.

Boston’s discussion relates to H&J’s model of NPM as an administrative philosophy, situated on the right side of Fig. 1, because he sought to account for governmental policy decisions. The way he rendered this account, however, reflected the concept of administrative argument. Boston analyzed the Treasury’s doctrinal arguments in a similar manner as Aucoin analyzed prevailing ideas about administrative reform in a wider range of cases. Specifically, he described how claims about public management were drawn from contemporary fields of discourse, rather than from a reservoir of catalogued doctrines and justifications, as in H&J. Boston outlined the reasoning behind doctrinal claims, such as “purchasing and provision functions should be separated organizationally.” The considerations backing this claim were drawn from NIE, especially public choice theory and principal-agent theory. By way of illustration, this particular unit of argument can be modeled as follows:

$$(5) \quad d_s = A(NIE[T_{PC}, T_{PA}]),$$

where d_s refers to the doctrine of structuring government so that purchasing and providing functions are separated, *NIE* refers to New Institutional Economics, T_{PC} refers to public choice theory, and T_{PA} refers to principal-agent theory.¹⁶

Boston also outlined the Treasury’s reasoning about other issues of organizational design, including how relationships between ministers and top officials should be structured. The set of doctrinal claims about organizational design issues accepted by the Treasury can be referred to as this organization’s theory, T , of public management. A general model of the Treasury’s reasoning at the level of doctrine is, then, as follows:

$$(6) \quad T = A(NIE[T_{PC}, TCE, T_{PA}]),$$

where *NIE* refers to transactions cost economics, *TCE*, as well as to the other streams previously mentioned.

Boston also indicated how the Treasury moved from doctrinal claims to policy proposals. One of its proposals was to reorganize the machinery of government so that chief executives would oversee either policy-making or operational functions, but not both. This reasoning involved a diagnosis that the economic efficiency of New Zealand’s core public sector in the mid-1980s was limited by the formal organizational structure. Symbolically, this unit of argument was structured as follows:

$$(7) \quad D_{p,t} = A(S_{p,t}, T),$$

where $D_{p,t}$ refers to a diagnosis for New Zealand (p , for place) in the mid-1980s (t , for time), $S_{p,t}$ refers to a survey of New Zealand's administrative situation, and T refers to the Treasury's doctrine of public management. The Treasury's diagnosis became the basis of policy proposals involving the reorganization of government. Formally,

$$(8) \quad P_{p,t} = A(D_{p,t}).$$

Given the diagnosis, the implication was that reorganization was called for.

Thus, Boston described the multi-staged argumentation through which the Treasury arrived at policy proposals. He indicated how the Treasury staff's educational background in economics led them to draw practical inferences about plausible public management doctrines—such as “separate purchasing from provision”—from the warrants embedded in NIE discourses. Boston described not only the Treasury's doctrinal argumentation, but also its *policy* argumentation. This phase of argumentation—what Herbert Simon (1945/1976: 38) called *administrative analysis*—took New Zealand's *administrative situation* into account in arriving at a *diagnosis*. The Treasury's diagnosis rested on the interaction between information about this situation and the doctrines of public management settled upon during an earlier round of argumentation, represented by Expression (6). The Treasury intended to eliminate the constraints identified in the course of its diagnostic argumentation. This department moved forward from its diagnosis to conclusions about what steps to take. Acting as a policy entrepreneur, the Treasury put forward specific proposals and supporting arguments to ministers. From this standpoint, what was significant about the Treasury's reasoning was not so much the presence of *NIE* on the right side of Expression (6), but rather the multi-staged flow of reasoning moving from warrants embedded in this field of discourse through diagnostic argumentation (Expression 7) and on to argumentation about what steps to take in these circumstances (Expression 8). The interpretation that NIE constitutes the intellectual foundations of New Public Management, as can be seen, is due to shining the spotlight on the right-hand side of one unit of argument within a larger, situationally specific discussion.

3.3. *The big wave of 1992*

Written by two non-academics in the United States, *Reinventing Government* (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) became a best seller in 1992. This work played a major role in the process by which NPM doctrines came to influence agenda-setting in the US Federal government during the first Clinton Administration (Kettl, 1995). Its doctrines were expressed as slogans, such as “steer, don't row.” Several of the slogans were meant to apply to broader questions of government than “organization design” as defined by H&J. Accordingly, this book broadened the subject of NPM to include fundamental changes in public service delivery, such as using tax-financed voucher schemes to fund education.¹⁷

The year 1992 also saw publication in the US of *Breaking Through Bureaucracy: A New Vision for Managing in Government* (Barzelay, 1992), which grew out of the Ford Foundation/Harvard University Program on Innovations in State and Local Government.¹⁸ The research site for this study was Minnesota state government in the period 1983–1990. This work, like Boston et al. (1991), wove together different types of discussion. One was a

narrative account of organizational change in three staff agencies of the executive branch, primarily the Department of Administration and the Department of Employee Relations. The other discussion was the formulation of an administrative argument, mainly on the subject of the organizational strategy in staff agencies.

The first of these two discussions was similar to H&J in stressing the mechanism of belief-formation as an explanation for changes in the organization design of government. This similarity was evident in the author's detailed treatment of how the initiators of an eight year-long "organizational intervention" in Minnesota formulated their initial doctrinal views, as well as of how they sought to persuade others—including middle managers, executive colleagues, and legislators—to accept changes in institutional rules and routines. Barzelay (1992) was, however, different from H&J in three main respects. One, the book was based on the study of a "natural case," rather than on the analysis of an abstract or stylized "case" defined in terms of the acceptance of an administrative philosophy. Two, Barzelay was not only concerned with agenda-setting, but also with the reworking of organizational routines and cultures in the "implementation phase" of the policy-making process (Kingdon, 1984). Three, *Breaking Through Bureaucracy* explained change in Minnesota using narrative methods linked to an implicit theory, whereas H&J applied a theoretically-based explanatory framework—i.e., the acceptance factors—to selected facts in its stylized "case."¹⁹

In effect, Barzelay (1992) added two dimensions to the scholarly literature on NPM. First, he introduced an additional node to the lower right corner of Fig. 1. This node might be labeled "implementation" or "organizational change." The links between this new node and "agenda-setting" were described in terms of organizational interventions from positions of executive authority. Second, the author expanded the range of "genres" (Czarniawska, 1999) on NPM by providing an extended narrative about a particular experience.²⁰

As indicated earlier, the second major discussion in Barzelay (1992) was an administrative argument. The subject of this argument was public management policy, as defined at the outset of this paper. This subject was narrower than organization design in government. Within public management policy, the author gave more attention to organizational routines than to institutional rules, reflecting the empirical fact that institutional rules—for instance, those governing civil service appointments—remained broadly stable during the period of his study.²¹

Barzelay's administrative argument was presented as a body of principles and supporting arguments about the organizational strategies of administrative functions and staff agencies. An illustrative principle was "separate service from control." This principle was much like a doctrine in H&J's sense: it framed and resolved an issue about organization design in government, and it was presented as a doctrinal teaching.²² In *Breaking Through Bureaucracy*, the doctrines' justifications made scant reference to the professional-academic literature on management and government.²³ Instead, the justificatory argumentation was mainly taken from the book's own narrative treatment of the Minnesota experience.

An attempt was made, as in H&J, to reveal the common essence of the various components of the author's administrative argument. At this stage of his discussion, Barzelay focused upon the right side of Expression (3), above. However, the analytic strategy was different. Whereas H&J conceived the essence of a unit of administrative argument in terms of its value premises, Barzelay sought to identify the "entrenched generalizations" (Schauer,

1991) that served as “assumptions” or “presumptions” (Walton, 1992) for particular lines of administrative argument. These entrenched generalizations were revealed through comparing justificatory arguments that were prevalent in Minnesota’s staff agencies in the early 1990s with justificatory arguments that had been commonplace in Minnesota state government before the “intervention.” The previously entrenched generalizations were labeled the “bureaucratic paradigm”; the later ones were called the “post-bureaucratic paradigm.” The book, as a whole, argued in favor of the post-bureaucratic paradigm, so defined, as well as in favor of such doctrinal claims as “separate service from control” and “identify customers with care.”²⁴

The spate of works published in 1992 included Colin Campbell and John Halligan’s study of executive leadership and public management policy-making in Australia during eight years of Labor rule in Australia (1982–1990). This work, *Political Leadership in an Age of Constraint* (1992), emerged from the political science wing of the public administration field. As such, its principal task was to describe and explain governmental decisions and their effects on both public bureaucracies and public policy. Decisions in this context included public management policies, especially in the areas of expenditure planning and financial management. Such decisions included use of a ministerial Expenditure Review Committee, as part of the expenditure planning process, and the initiation of a Financial Management Improvement Program, as part of financial management. While Campbell and Halligan (1992) also included some evaluative commentary on the Australia experience, to say that their book set forth an administrative argument would be an exaggeration.

The significance of Campbell and Halligan’s book for the present discussion derives from the fact it was a descriptive/explanatory study of public management policy change in Australia. The authors’ case evidence related to changes in the two key dimensions of public management policy: institutional rules *and* organizational routines. Their method of explanation was to provide a narrative account. The theory used to explain changes in institutional rules and routines was largely implicit. The major constructs implicitly employed by Campbell and Halligan came from literature on public policy-making (mainly to account for major decisions changing institutional rules), on one hand, and from literature on the conduct of organizational interventions from positions of executive authority (mainly to explaining changes in routines), on the other.²⁵

Campbell and Halligan’s book can usefully be contrasted with H&J in several respects. First, the authors’ conceptual scheme was centered on the lower right hand corner of Fig. (1), as amended in the course of this paper. In other words, their study was centrally concerned with the nodes of agenda-setting, decision-making, and implementation as well as the links among them. Second, each of these nodes was analyzed in detail as part of explaining the events making up the Australia case. Third, the authors’ implicit use of the public policy process construct meant that social mechanisms other than belief-formation were incorporated into their explanatory approach. Specifically, they gave accounts of “opportunity emergence” (Kingdon, 1984; Elster, 1998), or moments when the potential for policy or organizational change was significant. For instance, the budgetary effects of macroeconomic policy reversals in the early 1980s were analyzed in terms of how they helped to create an opportunity to change institutional rules and organizational routines in financial management. The combined structural effect of these public management policy changes was to

selectively decentralize decisions about how to spend budgeted resources.²⁶ Fourth, and relatedly, Campbell and Halligan discussed how specific actors within the government capitalized on these opportunities. For instance, the authors explained how Malcolm Holmes, a career official in the Finance Department, collaborated with this central agency's top officials and minister in devising and operating the Financial Management Improvement Program. In sum, Campbell and Halligan provided a very different theory and method for studying NPM than H&J.

4. Mid-1990s studies from the NPM heartland

In 1994, Hood published *Explaining Economic Policy Reversals*, which included a chapter on New Public Management. Its principal task was to account for a dramatic shift in the style of organizing public services from Progressive Public Administration (PPA) to NPM. Hood's account of this shift was meant to cohere with explanations given for economic policy reversals presented in other chapters of the same volume. Each chapter critically analyzed a fixed menu of explanations in the context of a single domain of economic policy. The chapter of interest here examined, with a critical eye, several contrasting explanations of the shift from the PPA style to that of NPM.

Hood (1994) was different from H&J in several significant respects. First, it focused on the right side of Fig. 1. Indeed, the idea that NPM is an administrative argument was not mentioned. Second, NPM referred to a pattern of policy and practice described as a *style of organizing public services* and not to an administrative philosophy. The concept of style tended to blur the distinction between policy and practice, on one hand, and administrative philosophy, on the other. Third, the 1994 book chapter introduced the concept of PPA—also conceived as a style of organizing public services—in order to *describe* a “policy reversal” (emphasis added). All told, Fig. 1, based on Hood and Jackson (1991), is ill-equipped to describe the conceptual structure of Hood (1994).²⁷

4.1. *The debut of comparative political analysis*

In the same year, Herman Schwartz (1994) published “Small States in Big Trouble” in *World Politics*. The main task of this article was to account for similarities among Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, and Denmark in the 1980s. Schwartz's larger goal was to bring changes in public management within the scope of comparative political science research on institutional and policy change.

In this article, NPM was not an *explanatory factor* accounting for change in government, as in H&J; rather, NPM *described* changes in government, as in Hood (1994). In the terminology of case-oriented research (Ragin, 1987), NPM was the “case outcome.” NPM was said to have occurred in a case if policies consistent with four major “themes” were present. These themes included “let managers manage” and “inject competition.” Schwartz drew case evidence from such disparate areas as expenditure planning and financial management, central state-local government relations, and organizational design of public service delivery. On this theoretical and empirical basis, Schwartz argued that Australia, New

Zealand, Sweden, and Denmark were mostly similar in terms of the defined case outcome. He then proceeded to explain this similarity, using a fairly large proportion of the repertoire of theoretical ideas in the field of comparative politics and policy.

By dispensing with the conventional idea that policy-making is normally a decentralized process structured by policy domains (Weir, 1992; Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Knoke et al., 1996) and by using ideas—e.g., NPM's themes—more to describe than to explain case outcomes, Schwartz's strategy for defining a case outcome was unusual.²⁸ However, Schwartz's *explanatory* ideas were broadly conventional for this field. All told, Schwartz conducted an unprecedented and highly stimulating "dialogue among ideas and evidence" (Ragin, 1987) about NPM within the comparative politics and public policy field.

4.2. *Comparing narratives of policy implementation*

Another work appearing in 1994 was Spencer Zifcak's comparative study of the UK's Financial Management Initiative and Australia's Financial Management Improvement Program. Based on a dissertation completed at the London School of Economics, this book examined changes in organizational routines within the area of expenditure planning and financial management. Zifcak used narrative methods and theoretical ideas about organizational interventions to conduct research on these two experiences.²⁹

4.3. *An ambitious argument about NPM*

Peter Aucoin's *New Public Management: Canada in Comparative Perspective* appeared in 1995. This work included a number of discussions, including an administrative argument. This argument was complex and included the formulation of a doctrinal argument on public management policy; an evaluation of public management policies in the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada; and an argument in favor of choosing and implementing selected policy alternatives in Canada. Aucoin's extended administrative argument thus encompassed both doctrinal and policy levels of argumentation. Aucoin's administrative argumentation is situated on the left side of Fig. 1, see page 6.

Aucoin's administrative argument was concerned with the preconditions of responsible and good government, defined as politically responsible and capable of formulating and implementing substantively valuable public policies. Aucoin's argument can be roughly split into three parts. First, there is an argument in favor of having a career civil service. This argument was made by drawing lessons from history. Second, Aucoin argues that the question of how to structure and manage the relationship between the career civil service and ministers should be approached as if solving a principal-agent problem. The proposed solution was for ministers to write explicit contracts containing specific output goals. This argument was made by applying principal-agent theory to the circumstances of government. The third argument concerns the internal management of government agencies. Drawing on Brodtrick's (1991) concept of *well-performing organizations*, Aucoin argued in favor of an emphasis on people, participatory leadership, innovative work styles, and strong client orientation. This argument was made by applying fashionable doctrines of management to public bureaucracies.

In developing and defending his doctrinal claims about public management, Aucoin brought three loosely coupled universes of discourses—normative public administration theory, New Institutional Economics, and management thought—into close contact. The structure of Aucoin's doctrinal argumentation can be stated as:

$$(9) \quad T = A(PPG, NIE, MAN),$$

where T refers to doctrinal claims about public management, PPG refers to a public philosophy of governance, NIE refers to New Institutional Economics, and MAN refers to management thought.

Aucoin's doctrinal argumentation is usefully compared to Boston's description of the Treasury's doctrinal argumentation in the 1980s. One evident difference is that Aucoin discusses lessons from history in translating ideals of good and responsible government into a granular, institutionally-oriented PPG . The Treasury's PPG , by contrast, was tied in with NIE . A second difference is that Aucoin considered doctrinal arguments drawn from (a limited range of) management thought in addition to economic theory. A third difference is that Aucoin was more selective than the New Zealand Treasury in drawing on NIE . Specifically, Aucoin rejected public choice theory and worked out some of his doctrinal arguments on the basis of principal-agent theory.

While the overall structure of Aucoin's administrative argument, labeled NPM , was clear, the details of his reasoning were often obscure. An illustrative example is Aucoin's argument that relations between politicians and the civil service should be structured through the use of explicit contracts. Aucoin told the reader that his argument was backed by principal-agent theory. Analysis of his argument reveals, however, that *explicit contracts* in Aucoin's framework is a radically different concept than *contracts* in principal-agent theory (Barzelay, 2000a). In principal-agent theory, rational principals design contracts that provide efficient *incentives* to agents. In Aucoin's framework, however, the role of explicit contracts is to establish shared aspirations between ministers and civil servants, to specify a standard for evaluating the performance of government organizations, and to reduce the perceived need to monitor the public service's actions in detail. The conceptual distance between NIE on the right side of Expression (9) and T on the left side is unbridgeable without additional argumentation, specifying the intellectual operation, A .³⁰

Aucoin's ambitions for achieving breadth and coherence in administrative argumentation about New Public Management were as elevated as Schwartz's ambitions for explaining similarities among cases of institutional and policy change within the field of comparative politics and public policy. In my view, their reach on these occasions exceeded their grasp (Barzelay, 2000a; Barzelay and Hassel, 1994). Irrespective of any limitations, however, these works raised the sights for policy argumentation and research on NPM within political science/public administration.³¹

4.4. *NPM as executive leadership: the case of Mark Moore*

Another ambitious work published in 1995 was Mark H. Moore's *Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government*. Long in the making at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, this volume presented an elaborate doctrinal argument, mainly addressing

appointed and career executives in the United States.³² In terms of Fig. 1, the book was situated on the left side, as Moore presented his own administrative argument, which he described as a “structure of practical reason” (p. 1). Unlike H&J, the subject of Moore’s administrative argument was executive leadership. Accordingly, rather than dealing with recurring issues of organizational design, his book set forth a point of view about the *role* of “public managers.”³³ Moore’s elaborate administrative argument on the subject of executive leadership by public managers has no equivalent, to my knowledge, in the recent public management literature emanating from the NPM heartland of the UK, Australia, and New Zealand.

Moore’s administrative argument incorporated two types of discussions. The first was a “doctrinal argument” in roughly the sense in which this term has been used so far here. His doctrinal teachings included the controversial view that public managers should discern their agencies’ mandates by engaging in political management. This style of argument is easy to model, since codified doctrinal teachings are presented (see below). The second discussion was the analysis of cases depicting how administrative situations had been handled by public managers. To a degree, the case analyses simply “translated” (Czarniawska, 1999) Moore’s doctrinal claims into concrete terms, involving stories featuring actors and institutions with proper names. Yet, Moore’s case analyses typically did more than translate doctrines into stories for presentational purposes. To a significant degree, the case analyses *constituted* his administrative argument. The fact that Moore backed up his remarks about the analyzed cases with codified doctrinal claims put forward elsewhere in the same text is not inconsistent with the observation that Moore’s administrative argument *inherited* in the case analyses. Accordingly, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Moore’s second type of doctrinal argumentation was casuistical.

Casuistry is a method of practical reasoning, whose history has been told by Toulmin and Jonsen (1988). While Aristotle was one of its originators, casuistry reached a high art form in the hands of the Jesuits. The casuistical method is suited to argumentation about what individuals should do in particular circumstances. It operates, in part, through discussion of “paradigm cases.” The issues arising in paradigm cases are not only intrinsically significant for the particular matter at hand, but are also instrumentally significant, as such issues are thought to arise in countless other circumstances.³⁴ Analyzing paradigm cases is regarded by casuists as the only way to elaborate, refine, and communicate doctrines that take circumstances seriously. By this interpretation, it would be oversimplified, as well as historically uninformed, to say that Moore’s second discussion resembles case discussions at Harvard Business School or the Kennedy School of Government, as it plainly does.

Nonetheless, Moore’s administrative argument can partially and imperfectly be codified as follows. This argument incorporates three main subarguments. The first subargument (aa_1) concerns the main concept in the book’s title, “public value.” This unit of argument does not, in itself, concern public management; rather, it provides warrants for later rounds of argumentation about public bureaucracies and the role of public managers. The concept “public value” relates to that of a public philosophy of governance that focuses on “government in action” more than on appropriate institutional arrangements.³⁵ Moore’s general position—call it “ d_1 ”—is that a polity’s collective aspirations, more than any other single consideration, determine where public value lies. Put differently, any actor or observer’s

claims about what would constitute an increase or decrease in public value must rest on an accurate assessment of a polity's collective aspirations. In chapter 2, Moore arrives at this conclusion to aa_1 by drawing inferences about public value from fields of discourse in American social science and public affairs: democratic theory, primarily, and welfare economics, secondarily. This unit of Moore's argument can be represented symbolically, as follows:

$$(10) \quad d_1 = A (\text{Dem Theory, Welfare Econ})$$

Analytically, a second unit of argumentation in Moore (1995)—call it aa_2 —concerns public bureaucracies. This unit, unlike aa_1 , takes notice of the circumstances in which public bureaucracies operate. Circumstances shape *opportunities* to create public value, as conceived in aa_1 . Public value, by contrast, is a point of view from which to assess imagined changes in what government agencies do.

The problem with circumstances is that they are so varied. Within aa_2 , Moore therefore undertook an important move, namely to discern the “essence” of circumstances. The result of this move was to introduce a trilogy of concepts: substantive value, support, and operational capacity.³⁶ The concept of “substantive value” mainly drew its meaning from theories of policy analysis, as qualified by Moore's conception of “public value” (d_1). The concept of “support” mainly drew its meaning from the “domain of experience” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) called politics, especially the subdomain involving the getting of authority and public money to operate organizations and programs along particular lines. The concept of “capacity” drew its central meaning from the domain of experience involving production and organizational management.³⁷ Obviously, all three concepts were open to detailed and varied specification.

The one-line version of Moore's discussion of this trilogy is that a good policy idea, to become good public policy, requires authority and public money (hence, support), as well as operational capacity.³⁸ This statement can be translated into one about “organizational success” in government; the translation is appropriate since Moore's administrative argument is centered on organizations rather than on policies and programs. As I read Moore, a public bureaucracy is successful, by definition, when it takes full advantage of its opportunities.

Apart from this doctrinal axiom, aa_2 is mainly a framework for giving a specific, contingent meaning to “opportunities” and “organizational success.” In this sense, aa_2 is more a *guide to argumentation* conducted in particular circumstances than a *doctrinal teaching plus justification*, as in the case of H&J's default model of the generic administrative argument, aa_1 (see Expression 4). Accordingly, Moore's “doctrine of organizational opportunities and aspiration levels” might be expressed as follows:

$$(11) \quad \text{Opp} = A (\text{Circ}, d_1),$$

where Opp refers equally to organizational “opportunities” and “appropriate aspiration levels” for an organization.³⁹ The right hand side of (11) indicates that any judgment about organizational opportunities should take account of the doctrine of “public value” (d_1) as well as the circumstances (Circ) in which that doctrine is applied. Given Moore's analysis of circumstances, Expression (11) can be rewritten as follows:

$$(12) \text{ Opp} = A(\text{Value, Support, Capacity, } d_1).$$

The reason why both Value and d_1 appear on the right side of (12) is that they are different, if interdependent, concepts. Value refers to the assessed effects of imagined changes operating through channels leading from organizational routines to policy impact. The term d_1 refers to general, possibly timeless, beliefs about “public value” reflecting a larger public philosophy of governance.⁴⁰ Value and d_1 are interdependent concepts because the latter is a general basis for assessing what a particular public bureaucracy might do differently in its circumstances.

As indicated earlier, a third unit of argumentation in Moore (1995)—call it aa_3 —concerns the role of public managers. As I read Moore, his fundamental doctrinal teaching for public managers (d_3) is to discern opportunities, formulate a strategy to achieve organizational success, translate that strategy into a planned organizational intervention, and carry out that intervention skillfully. The concepts of “opportunities” and “organizational success” were defined in discussing aa_2 . The additional concepts of “strategy” and “organizational intervention” come from the professional-academic literature on management, particularly from strategic management and organizational behavior. Thus, Moore’s subargument on the role of public managers can be expressed as follows:

$$(13) \text{ } d_3 = A(aa_2, \text{MAN}),$$

where d_3 refers to Moore’s high-level claims about the role of public managers, aa_2 refers to his doctrinal argument about organizational opportunities and success, and MAN refers to the management literature.

In his book, Moore specified d_3 in a variety of ways. One type of specification is to construct the role of the public manager as an “entrepreneur” and a “strategist,” reflecting the strong influence of the design school of strategy (Mintzberg, 1994; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel, 1998). Another type of specification is to identify organizational functions and types of interventions that public managers are supposed to perform, such as political management and reengineering, respectively. A third type of specification is to identify granular, if generic, actions that a public manager should be expected to take, such as formulating a mission statement. The most elaborate discussions in the book concern political management and reengineering. It is these abstract doctrinal discussions that are intertwined with analyses of multiple paradigm cases.

In sum, Moore’s reader-friendly text, *Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government*, was an administrative argument about *leading* public organizations rather than about the *design* of organizations. As such, it extended H&J’s concept of an administrative argument to include another subject within public management: executive leadership. As Moore’s argumentation was presented very informally, its structure is, however, not easy to discern. Upon analysis, it appears that his book includes two complementary styles of administrative argumentation: codified doctrinal argumentation and casuistical argumentation about paradigm cases. The codified doctrinal argument incorporates three distinct subarguments dealing with public value, opportunities and organizational success, and the role of public managers. While Moore’s book reflects professional education about NPM,

especially in the US, it has not yet had much influence on methods of administrative argumentation in this field.⁴¹

5. NPM scholarship comes of age

The year 1996 included four significant publications related to New Public Management, which I will briefly survey here. One was Ferlie et al.'s *The New Public Management in Action*. The focal institution in this study was the UK National Health Service. It was mainly concerned with how this panoply of state-steered organizations was restructured during the 1980s and early 1990s. Part of the work dealt with major policy decisions made by institutional power centers, while other discussions dealt with organizational interventions from various positions of executive authority within the NHS system. Its subject matter focus was mainly the design of programmatic organizations, rather than executive leadership or public management policies. Its empirical focus places it on the right side of Fig. 1, as amended to include, among other nodes, implementation.

5.1. An analytic narrative

A second publication from 1996 was an edited book by Johan P. Olsen and B. Guy Peters, *Lessons from Experience. Experimental Learning in Administrative Reforms in Eight Democracies*. While the reach of this collective effort arguably exceeded its grasp (Barzelay and Fuechtner, 2000), the chapter on the United Kingdom by Christopher Hood was both ambitious and highly successful. This chapter sought to explain such policy events in the UK as initiation of the Next Steps Initiative. As such, it belongs on the right side of Fig. 1, as amended to include government decisions. The node on which Hood's piece analytically focused was "agenda-setting," if this node is taken to include "alternative-specification," the other analytically-defined process operating in the pre-decision phase of the policy-making process (Kingdon, 1984). Unlike H&J, Hood (1994) examined the "natural case" of the UK during the 1980s rather than an abstract case styled on the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, as in H&J and Hood (1994). His method was to provide a narrative account of historically and analytically significant events within this natural case.⁴²

Hood's narrative account was the product of a particular sort of "dialogue between ideas and evidence" (Ragin, 1987). These ideas, developed in the first part of the chapter, were centered on the concept of "political learning." This concept referred to a type of process involving the social mechanism of belief-formation. The operation of this mechanism involved incumbent ministers drawing inferences about how to govern based on their own experience in office. The range of experience included their losing power in prior elections. In applying this theory to the UK case, Hood revealed the significance, for agenda-setting and decision-making in the Thatcher years, of events that occurred during the Conservative government of Edward Heath in the 1970s. Hood also adduced evidence showing that the Next Steps Initiative was linked to the Thatcher government's industrial privatization policy via the mechanism of political learning. In this way, Hood, in effect, claimed that Next Steps was a "policy spillover effect" (Walker, 1977) of privatization, at least in part. The larger

significance of this chapter lay in showing the benefits of a particular style of case research, which involved narrative explanations of significant policy events, guided by an explicit theory in which the social mechanism of belief-formation is prominently featured.

5.2. *An evaluative argument about New Zealand*

A second study published in 1996 was Allen Schick's "The Spirit of Reform," a study commissioned jointly by New Zealand's Treasury and State Services Commission. The first part of this study was a narrative report discussing how New Zealand's bureaucratic revolution took place. The majority of the chapters, however, presented an administrative argument. The subject of this argument was mainly New Zealand's public management policies, as implemented. These policies covered a wide array of areas, including expenditure planning and financial management and civil service and labor relations. The author's main task was to evaluate the institutional rules and organizational routines in these areas, viewed as a system. Among many other points, Schick bestowed praise on a government-wide strategic planning process adopted in the 1990s as a corrective for limitations of public management policies implemented in the 1980s, and he also criticized New Zealand's rules and routines of expenditure planning and financial management for lacking a proper cost accounting system. Thus, unlike Boston (1991), Schick was presenting his own administrative argument for purposes of elevating policy discussion about public management in New Zealand, rather than describing the Treasury's argument for purposes of explaining policy choices.⁴³

In evaluating New Zealand's public management policies, Schick surveyed the administrative situation, which he implicitly considered in light of doctrinal arguments about public management policy. Accordingly, an element of his argumentation was as follows:

$$(14) \quad E_{p,t} = A(S_{p,t}, T),$$

where $E_{p,t}$ refers to the evaluation of public management policies in New Zealand (p) in the mid-1990s (t), $S_{p,t}$ refers to his survey of the administrative situation, and T refers to his theory or doctrinal argument about public management policy.

An example of $E_{p,t}$ is Schick's criticism of the output orientation of New Zealand's budgeting practices. $S_{p,t}$ in this case refers to information about how decision-making in New Zealand's public service was influenced by structures and processes operating at the time. How Schick specified T is implicit in his report. The considerations mentioned include ideas about the purpose of government, the empirical regularity of a time delay between policy actions and outcomes, and doctrinal arguments about management. On this basis, Schick's doctrinal argumentation can be formalized as follows:

$$(15) \quad T = A(PPG, K_G, MAN[SM, MAN]),$$

where PPG refers to Schick's public philosophy of governance in which public management is part of solving complex social problems, K_G refers to knowledge of governmental processes such as policy implementation, and MAN refers to doctrinal arguments about management applicable to public as well as private organizations. Schick's ideas about

management are associated with strategic management, *SM*, and management accounting and control, *MAC*. Thus, Schick's argument can be analyzed as having a two-stage structure, including a doctrinal argument about public management policy and an evaluative argument about New Zealand's public management policies in the mid-1990s.

In another, if related, discussion, Schick criticized some aspects of prevalent doctrinal argumentation in New Zealand, which he called the *contractualist model*. One doctrine he criticized was that ministers are *purchasers* of outputs provided by government departments within their portfolios.⁴⁴ Schick argued that this doctrinal claim was unsound, unless qualified by the statement that ministers also possess an *ownership interest* in these organizations. Schick argued that influential policy-makers had failed to appreciate ministers' ownership interest in departments, which may have contributed to the evident lack of effort to develop proper cost accounting systems. In discussing the Treasury's argumentation, which Boston (1991) had described analytically, Schick took aim precisely at the contractualist model as a whole, which was assessed unfavorably against an alternative managerialist model.

Outlining Schick's argumentation makes it easier to see why he reached a different evaluation of NPM than Aucoin. Schick's argument was based on a different and more detailed survey, $S_{p,r}$, and a different theory or doctrinal argument about public management policy. In Schick's doctrinal argument, *MAN* was specified as *SM* and *MAC* rather than as four determinants of well-performing organizations; empirical knowledge of the governmental process (K_G) was introduced to take the lag structure of policy implementation into account; and *PPG* was specified as a *functional* view of good government, rather than an institutionalist view setting forth institutional requisites for good and responsible government. This comparative analysis of argumentation suggests that opportunities for both controversy and dialogue about NPM are plentiful.

5.3. *A cold wind from Chicago*

A fourth study published in 1996 worth mentioning is Laurence Lynn's *Public Management as Art, Science, and Profession*.⁴⁵ Although this book did not discuss NPM, it did speak to matters of theory and method in public management research. A professor at the University of Chicago, Lynn was vociferously critical of a strand of scholarship that had emerged from US public policy schools in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This strand was typified by Robert Behn's *Leadership Counts* (1991), but was described broadly to encompass *Breaking Through Bureaucracy* (Barzelay, 1992) and other works emanating from public policy schools at the time. Moore's (1995) book was too recent to figure in his discussion. In line with Lynn's apparent intentions, a cold wind blew through that part of the US academic community most interested in the New Public Management in the mid-1990s.⁴⁶

What Lynn proposed as a way forward is a matter of some interpretation. At the most general level, he urged the field of public management to become more scientific without losing the sense of purpose, jurisdiction, and legitimacy drawn from its professional orientation. Within this context, Lynn suggested that public management scholars reallocate their efforts so as to restore a "proper balance" in their attention to organization design, on one hand, and executive leadership, on the other.

As far as studying executive leadership was concerned, Lynn suggested that scholars take a radically different approach to pursuing the same ends. He illustrated what that approach might look like in practice, offering a prototype of his favored design. The technology embedded in the prototype was case analysis (like Moore, 1995), which clearly identified the social mechanisms whose operation provided the link between managerial action and their effects. Influenced by the New Institutional Economics, the social mechanisms emphasized by Lynn did not feature “belief-formation” quite as much as some others have done. It may be that Lynn was proposing that the study of leadership work within the genre that Robert Bates and colleagues (1998) subsequently dubbed, “analytic narratives.” Bates et al. presented a series of historical studies whose theoretical tools were drawn from rational choice studies of politics. I am unaware of any works related to executive leadership and New Public Management to have followed this interesting suggestion.

6. The burgeoning recent literature

The period from 1998 to 2000 has seen another wave of writings on the New Public Management, too large to survey here. These writings include articles in newly founded journals, such as *The International Public Management Journal* and *Public Management: An International Journal*, as well as in more established journals, including *Governance*, *Public Administration*, *Public Administration Review*, and the *Journal of Public Management Research and Theory*. At the same time, several potentially significant books have appeared.

These books include Eugene Bardach’s, *Getting Agencies to Work Together* (1998). The study focused on the operation of programmatic organizations and, especially, on how to identify and satisfy opportunities to achieve policy goals through interagency collaboration. Bardach’s book also proposed “smart practices analysis,” as a theory-intensive way to conduct a scientific and professionally-relevant dialogue between ideas and evidence. A second book, also published in 1998, was Christopher Hood’s *Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric and Public Management*. This erudite study respecified H&J’s model of agenda-setting, drawing on the strand of culture theory associated primarily with Mary Douglas. The volume also included several chapters that commented on NPM in an analytic and critical vein. In the succeeding year, the Brookings Institution published Donald Kettl’s (2000) study of the “global public management revolution.” This work conveyed a good deal of information on developments in the NPM heartland to a mainly US audience.

In the year 2000, three volumes on NPM have been (or soon will be) published. Oxford University Press has brought out Christopher Pollitt and Geert Boukaert’s *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis*. Routledge has published Jan-Erik Lane’s *New Public Management*. My own book, *The New Public Management: Improving Research and Policy Dialogue*, was published this year by University of California Press. Commenting on this spate of books lies beyond the scope of this paper. I would like to think, however, that cumulative learning is accompanying the flow of publications. Ideally, progress of sorts is being made in both research and doctrinal/policy argumentation, corresponding to the right and left sides of Fig. 1. Such cumulation is more easily appreciated if recent works on NPM are read in light of previous ones.

It is now time to review two publications about public management policy and the design of programmatic organizations in Latin America, considered as scholarly contributions to the NPM discussion.

7. Public management policy in Mexico

A recent article in CLAD's own journal, *Reforma y Democracia*, by scholars based at CIDE in Mexico City, provides an interesting discussion of public management policy in the area of expenditure planning and financial management (Arellano, Gil, Ramírez, and Rojano, 2000). This text contains two distinct, though interrelated, discussions. One discussion is addressed specifically to participants in the process of reforming budgeting systems in Mexico. A second discussion—somewhat implicit—is about how to study and argue about the New Public Management.

The main argument addressed to participants in Mexico's budget reform process appears to be as follows. If the broad idea of using the budget system as an instrument for achieving the aspiration of results-oriented government is accepted, the discussion should turn to several linked issues. The main issue is what should be the role-relationship between the department responsible for budgeting, the Secretaría de Gasto y Hacienda Pública (SGHP), and spending departments. As this role-relationship is shaped by institutional rules (a concept that relates to *marco normativo y legal*) and organizational routines, an issue is: how should such rules and routines evolve?

The authors argue that discussions about such rules and routines should be informed by a proper view about NPM. Furthermore, a key topic of discussion ought to concern how changes in rules and routines would affect government's organizational structure, which the authors (much like Aucoin, 1990) describe in terms of centralization/decentralization. The authors acknowledge the force of arguments for centralization (mainly on accountability grounds) as well as decentralization (mainly on technical efficiency grounds). The authors suggest (much like Aucoin, 1995) that unqualified arguments in favor of decentralization are implausible in a governmental context, as are unqualified arguments in favor of centralization. The authors call for rigorous and vigorous discussion of this topic in Mexico.

In the second, analytically distinct discussion, the authors primarily conceptualize NPM as concrete experiences rather than as an "administrative argument." The cases of the UK, Australia, and New Zealand are specifically considered. The authors focus on budget reform, setting aside other aspects of the benchmark cases of NPM (Barzelay, 2001).⁴⁷ Budget reform is described as a learning process. A question is, what can Mexicans (or for that matter, anyone else) learn about budget reform from the UK, Australia, and New Zealand?

Their answer is: a fair amount, for a couple reasons. First, the aspirations and arguments guiding Mexico's budget reform are similar to those that have guided public management policy-makers in the NPM benchmark cases. Second, the process of budget reform in Mexico has been, and will necessarily be, similar to that of the NPM benchmark cases in key respects, such as in the fact that budget reform requires change in routines and supporting beliefs of all participants in the system: central agencies, spending departments, and politicians.

The specific way in which the authors pursue this line of argumentation takes some effort to discern. With the usual caveats, here is an attempt to model their discussion. One type of claim is doctrinal. To illustrate: “*El papel ideal de las agencias controladoras tiende a ser el de generar reglas generales, simples, transparentes y precisas . . .*” In English, the institutional rules of a budgeting system should be general, transparent, and precise. This claim—call it d_1 —is doctrinal in that it does not refer to specific circumstances (Hood and Jackson, 1991; Barzelay, 2000a). Its scope appears to be universal rather than limited to, say, Mexico. While the ideas of transparency and precision of agreements are frequently expressed within doctrinal arguments about public management policy (Aucoin, 1995), and while the transparent application of general rules is a common doctrine of “bureaucratic justice” practiced by programmatic organizations (Mashaw, 1983), d_1 sounds slightly unusual to the foreign ear.

What is the justification for d_1 ? The preceding paragraph contains a clue: “*Para que los gobiernos funcionen deben ser vigilados y para esto deben existir responsables visibles y específicos.*” This statement—translated as “the effective functioning of governments requires that specific individuals be made responsible and visible”—suggests that d_1 is part of an argument that might have the following structure:

$$(16) \quad d_1 = A(\text{PPG}, \text{MAN}, \text{K}_G),$$

where the terms within $A(\cdot)$ refer to three broad universes of discourse: public philosophies of governance (PPG), management (MAN), and knowledge of the governmental process (K_G). The reference to PPG is implicit in the concept of “para que los gobiernos funcionen.” The idea that control of government requires visible and identifiable individuals is presumably based on both K_G and doctrines of management control within MAN. The argument might be similar to Dennis Thompson’s (1987) analysis of “the problem of many hands,” which shows how difficult it is to ascribe blame to individuals when things go wrong in government, and which argues for taking steps to increase officials’ sense of personal responsibility. Whether that sort of argument applies with equal force to budget systems deserves to be examined. In any event, the argumentation on this point appears to be based more on “theory” than any specific observations about the NPM benchmark cases. The paper’s emphasis on these cases does not, however, prepare the reader for arguments relying so heavily on theory.

Based on their survey of the NPM benchmark cases (and some theory), the authors identify what might be characterized as a “critical success factor” for achieving the aspirations of budget reform. The critical success factor lies in the role-relationship between central agencies and spending departments. This success factor, according to the authors, is not satisfied by the role-relationship that typically obtains prior to NPM-style budget reforms. Change is required. Although they do not use the term, the authors can be taken to suggest that change requires an “organizational intervention”—presumably, one led by the most senior people in the situation. Hence, a critical success factor for budgeting reform is an effective organizational intervention that changes the role-relationship between central agencies and spending agencies.⁴⁸

The paper contains a few loose ends, as the authors readily acknowledge. One loose end

is the observation that the structure of the Mexican governmental system is different from that of the benchmark cases. It appears that Mexico's governmental system includes a "transformative legislature" (a concept Colin Campbell retrieves from Polsby [1975] to discuss this subject). The benchmark cases are dissimilar in this respect. This fact raises questions about whether Mexico might have more to learn from the USA or Germany. Since lessons from experience are highly theory-based, this same point also raises a question as to which theoretical frameworks (situated within K_G) are usefully employed by analysts in the dialogue with case evidence. The chief merit of the paper is to clarify these issues, which provide a basis for further discussion.

8. Design of programmatic organizations in Brazil

Tendler and Freedheim's (1994) article, "Trust in a Rent-Seeking World: Health and Government Transformed in Northeast Brazil," can be viewed as a contribution to the literature on NPM in Latin America. The article analyzes the Health Agent Program (PAS) in the Brazilian state of Ceará during its initial period (1987–1993). The perspective taken by the authors is that of public management researchers, rather than as specialists in public health.

Tendler and Freedheim's article is a seamless weave of four analytically distinct subdiscussions. The first subdiscussion is an evaluative argument about the PAS. The conclusion to this argument is that the program was a success by any reasonable standard—thereby providing a reason for researchers to study this experience in detail. The second subdiscussion is an explanatory argument. The authors identify a number of analytically significant facts about the program and then provide an explanatory account of them. These facts include the huge scale and wide geographic reach of the state-directed program; the intense loyalty to the programmatic enterprise exhibited by the front-line health agents and supervising nurses; and the creative ways in which many health agents won the confidence of skeptical and even suspicious clients belonging to the program's main target groups. The authors' explanation drew upon knowledge and frameworks rooted in political science, sociology, and organizational behavior.

The third subdiscussion is a doctrinal argument about the design of programmatic organizations. The specific doctrinal teaching with which the authors take issue is that program structures should be decentralized. Tendler and Freedheim argue that if Ceará state officials had followed this doctrinal teaching, the PAS would not have been nearly as successful as it turned out to be. On this basis, they express severe doubts about standard—and simplistic—versions of doctrines favoring the decentralization of programmatic organizations. Tendler and Freedheim go on to suggest how doctrinal argumentation about the design of programmatic organizations would be improved.

The fourth subdiscussion is a critique of the climate of opinion in international development institutions regarding the possibilities of what Tendler elsewhere has called "good government in the tropics" (Tendler, 1995). The basic argument is that pessimism about public sector performance is partly attributable to researchers' selective attention to program failures. This subdiscussion both justifies the authors' attention to a successful experience

and casts doubt on the validity of advice premised on studies that dwell on experiences whose outcomes have been unsatisfactory.

The subargument that definitively places Tandler and Freedheim's article within the literature on NPM is their doctrinal argument on the design of programmatic organizations. This subargument is intimately linked to their explanatory one. Tandler and Freedheim argue that the success of the PAS is due, in part, to the state government's decision to row alongside Ceará's municipal governments (e.g., by selecting the front-level health agents), rather than to confine its activities to steering (e.g., designing program guidelines and funding municipal-level positions). This programmatic design, they argue, enabled the program to avoid a common failure mode involving "patrimonial" practices by mayors. The fact that success depended on the center's rowing supports the authors' contention that decentralization is a questionable doctrine for designing programmatic organizations in circumstances like those of Ceará, where local politicians typically give "extended use to their authority" (Lindblom, 1977) to reward political supporters and to provide disproportionate benefits to family and friends.

It is important to examine the structure of Tandler and Freedheim's explanatory argument, since the plausibility of the authors' critique of conventional doctrinal teachings rests on this subargument. As mentioned earlier, the analytically significant facts within this case include the scale and geographic reach of the state-directed program; the loyalty of the front-line health agents and supervising nurses to the programmatic enterprise; and the ways health agents won the confidence of clients within the program's main target groups. These facts are analytically significant for two distinct reasons. First, the PAS would presumably have risked failure if the events generating these facts had not occurred. In this sense, these facts were "critical success factors" for PAS. Second, these same sorts of factors are critical to the success of other programs. For instance, gaining the confidence of program clients was a critical success factor in a government-led scheme to promote industrial development in southern Spain in the mid-1980s (Barzelay and O'Kean, 1989; Barzelay, 1991). A plausible explanation for how such success factors as these were satisfied in the case of the PAS would, therefore, enrich professional discussion about designing organizations to operate large-scale programs involving client co-production in circumstances where client trust in government representatives is initially low.

The authors' explanation for why these critical success factors were satisfied in the PAS case is rooted in political science, sociology, and organizational behavior. Political science is used mainly to account for the numerical scale and geographical scope of the Health Agents Program. In order for the PAS to operate in any given municipality, the local government had to provide funds for nurse supervisors and mayors had to tolerate rules stipulating that the program organization would not be used as a support structure for partisan political activity. Tandler and Freedheim seek to account for municipal choices. The explanation varies according to the timing of the decision to join the program, with later decisions induced by the "bandwagon effects" (Schelling, 1978) triggered by the apparent success of the program in neighboring communities.

Sociology is the basis of explaining the high degree of loyalty displayed by front-line health agents and their nurse supervisors. The authors draw on literature that considers roles and the socialization process.⁴⁹ The principal events in the socialization process included the

prospective health agent's first encounter with information about the program (through word of mouth and publicity campaigns), information sessions held in municipal venues to describe how to apply for positions, the completing of an application form, the receipt of a notification from the state health department that an interview would take place, the interview session with a nurse and social worker from the state-level coordinating team, notification from the state health department that a contract to be an employee of their municipality's health agent program was being offered to them, and participation in three months of full-time training delivered by the state health department. These events, which occurred against the background of limited alternatives for employment, income, and training available to health agents, created strong bonds of loyalty between health workers and the Health Agents Program as an abstract entity. They also help to account for the relative absence of patrimonial ties between health agents and the mayor of the municipality that employed them.

The literature on organizational behavior—which is rooted in sociology and psychology—is the principal basis of explaining why health agents found creative ways to gain the confidence of program clients. The design of a health worker's job was one where outputs were largely unobservable, while outcomes were substantially observable. Outputs were unobservable because a health agent's routines were not standardized (apart from standardizing their skills) and because most transactions with clients were not observed by nurse-supervisors. Outcomes were observable in the sense that changes in client behaviors and health status could be tracked. Thus, the job design of health agents fit within the broad pattern known as a craft organization (Wilson, 1989).⁵⁰

This context provided an ideal habitat for health workers' developing their own approaches to achieving program goals. As they proceeded along their respective idiosyncratic learning paths, health agents discovered that clients were more inclined to pay attention to advice on how to prevent health problems *after* they experienced benefit from agents' *curative* care interventions. Providing curative care, however, was not part of the official design of the PAS. Nonetheless, many health agents offered some degree of curative care as a "calling card" in the process of marketing and promoting preventive health at the "retail level." Tandler and Freedheim make a similar argument in relation to health agents' strategy of constructing the role-relationship of "friendship" between themselves and clients, using such tactics as helping women with childcare and domestic chores. The broad argument here is that the job design (i.e., the pattern of a craft organization) provided the enabling conditions for health agents to have the motivation and opportunities to invent practical ways to overcome constraints on achieving programmatic goals such as an initially low level of trust between government representatives and clients in the program's target groups.

This explanatory argumentation feeds into the doctrinal argumentation in three distinct ways. As suggested earlier, the first conduit is a riposte to doctrinal teachings of the "steer, don't row" (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992) variety. This riposte is backed up by the explanation for employee loyalty to PAS as an abstract entity. The events that satisfied the loyalty success factor were choreographed by the state health department. In these events, the state was rowing alongside municipal governments. The authors thus argue that rowing should be done at both central and local levels—thereby providing a critique of what some regard as a core principle of NPM, at least in settings similar to Ceará.

The second conduit is reflected in the effort to reframe doctrinal argumentation about the design of program organizations. I read the authors as saying that doctrinal argumentation might best concern critical success factors, rather than specific teachings as to how to design program organizations. Standard critical success factors might include: achieving employees' loyalty to the program and enabling co-production by coordinate authorities (such as state and municipal governments) as well as program clients.⁵¹

A third conduit is by discussing how to satisfy such critical success factors. The wide variety of practice settings and the causal importance of configurations of factors limits the reach of comparative case research. However, "how-to" discussions might include case analyses along casuistical lines, with reliance on interpretations of "paradigm cases." The PAS serves as such a paradigm case. A common thread of such casuistical case analysis would be the frames of reference employed. The universe of discussion would consistently include doctrinal considerations as well as knowledge of the governmental process, organizational behavior, and management.⁵²

9. Concluding remarks

The New Public Management has been approached in multiple ways by specialists in political science/public administration. Hood and Jackson (1991) considered NPM as a point of view about organizational design in the public sector, which they specified as an *administrative argument* (described as a set of doctrines and an approach based on sigma-type administrative values) and as an agenda-setting climate of opinion, referred to as an accepted *administrative philosophy*. The notion that NPM is a point of view about organization design in the public sector has been advanced by other scholars. From his Canadian vantage point, Aucoin (1995) has pursued the idea that NPM is a doctrinal argument about organization design that draws on the New Institutional Economics, codified views about how to achieve well-performing organizations, and conceptions of good and responsible government. Barzelay's (1992) post-bureaucratic paradigm, written in a US context, was a doctrinal argument about rules and routines for operating central administrative agencies. Moore (1995) provided an elaborate doctrinal argument about the role of public managers. Schick's (1996) study applied his own plausible doctrines of public management policy to information about government-wide rules and routines for steering, motivating, and controlling public organizations in New Zealand. The resulting evaluative judgments led Schick to challenge the Treasury's widely publicized doctrinal arguments, which he labeled the *contractualist model*. Instead, he proposed a mode of argumentation called the *managerialist model*. Thus, the political science/public administration field has taken forward the idea that NPM is an administrative argument. This idea has broadened into an ongoing professional and policy discussion, mainly about organization design in government.

The notion that NPM is an administrative philosophy has grown into a substantial empirical research effort intended to explain change in the organization design of government. This development was fully evident in Campbell and Halligan's (1992) study of initiatives pursued by the Australian Labor Party in the 1980s. Barzelay (1992) provided a narrative explanation of changes in organizational routines across Minnesota's staff agen-

cies. An effort to explain organizational policy choices was manifest in Hood's (1994) discussion of the shift from Progressive Public Administration to NPM, conceived as styles of organizing public services. A different, more stimulating effort was Hood's (1996) analytic narrative explaining specific policy choices in the UK case, including the Next Steps initiative.

In conclusion, the early formulation of NPM as an idea-dominated trend in organizational aspects of government has given rise to two types of scholarly discussions that befit a field of public policy research: argumentation over doctrinal and policy issues, on one hand, and explanatory analysis of policy choices and organizational change in complex governmental systems, on the other. These two types of discussions are increasingly recognizable as such in scholarly works. The stage is now set for more productive discussion of the doctrinal and policy issues and for the use of more sophisticated approaches to explaining policy choices and organizational change in government.

Notes

1. By public management is meant the performance of the executive function in government (Lynn, 1996).
2. I have yet to come across studies on government operations or executive leadership in Latin America. My impression is that one of the few studies in the Spanish language on these topics is based on a case situated in Spain's Autonomous Community of Andalusia (Barzelay and O'Kean, 1989).
3. As indicated earlier, I became acutely aware of these prospective benefits in working with Susana Berruecos and Francisco Gaetani, doctoral candidates at the LSE, in delivering the CLAD-UNESCO distance learning course focusing on NPM.
4. Chapter 2 of Barzelay (2001) provides a literature review of country case studies on public management policy change in the UK, Australia, Canada, US, Sweden, and Germany. Because it focuses on research about public management policy change, that chapter is too specialized for the purpose undertaken here. The present bibliographical essay is more concerned with methodological and theoretical issues than with substantive findings, as well.
5. I draw this inference, in part, from a workshop of the International Public Management Network devoted to issues of methodology in public management research and held at the University of Sienna in July 1999.
6. For a summary presentation and critique of Toulmin (1958), see Gaskins (1993). For a diagrammatic method of analyzing arguments, also following Toulmin, see Dunn (1994).
7. Expression (2) is not a functional equation, since claims are not logically *derived* from warrants; claims are instead *drawn* from warrants via "informal logic" (Walton, 1992).
8. The conceptual relationship between administrative values and justifications appears styled on the Platonic metaphor that conceives ideals as the essence of ideas (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 368).

9. This point is elaborated in Hood (1991).
10. I was taught this way to model frames of reference by Professor George Lakoff of Berkeley's Department of Linguistics in the course of a collaborative project. This technique is evident in Lakoff (1996).
11. As anyone who has taken the LSE graduate courses in Public Management Theory and Doctrine and Contested Issues in Public Management will readily attest.
12. NPM is not the only topic in management where it takes some effort to formulate a coherent picture of the field. Another is corporate strategy. For a roughly parallel effort to make sense of literature on corporate strategy, with special attention to the so-called resource based view, see Kay (1997) and Barzelay (2000b).
13. Under Aucoin's analysis, neither field of discourse was centered on scholarly works. Still, Aucoin mentioned an affinity between the public choice paradigm and Niskanen's (1971) thesis about budget-maximizing bureaucrats. Managerialism was identified with Peters and Waterman's (1982) best-seller, *In Search of Excellence*.
14. It is worth noting that Aucoin did not refer to the classic work on organization structure written by his compatriot, Henry Mintzberg (1983). Accordingly, Aucoin's discussion of organization structure omitted such useful distinctions as horizontal vs. vertical decentralization and parallel vs. selective decentralization. Aucoin also avoided mention of such "configurations" as the divisional structure. If he had done so, the coincidence of centralizing and decentralizing changes in organization structure might have seemed less paradoxical, since the divisional structure centralizes decisions about goals and resources and decentralizes decisions about how to achieve the goals.
15. Whereas H&J were mainly addressing public administrationists urging them to take NPM seriously, Aucoin, I think, was mainly addressing practitioners having difficulty making sense of their experience with administrative reform in the 1980s.
16. Bringing Aucoin (1990) back into our discussion might be helpful at this stage. First, the concept of "public choice" in Aucoin, where it is a paradigm, is not the same as in Boston, where it is a field of academic discourse. Second, Aucoin does not analyze his identified paradigms in the same way as Boston analyzes the Treasury's doctrinal arguments. Aucoin translates the diverse paradigms into a common language of organization structure; Boston describes NIE's three fields of discourse and suggests how the Treasury drew inferences about organization design in government from them. Third, Aucoin aimed to identify common elements of three experiences, while Boston was solely concerned with the New Zealand experience.
17. Another book that influenced the Clinton Administration's policy agenda was Kelman's (1990) *Procurement and Public Management*. This book, authored by a professor at the Kennedy School of Government, used a creative research design to reach empirical conclusions about the effects of established procurement policies in the US Federal Government. These conclusions helped to support Kelman's "administrative argument." This argument included a doctrinal viewpoint at one level, and a policy viewpoint at another. The process by which this research influenced the Clinton Administration's public management policy agenda (and other aspects of the policy-making process) included Kelman's appointment and three-year service as

Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy within the Office of Management and Budget.

18. Published in Spanish as Barzelay (1998).
19. For an interesting account of the relationship between narrative methods and theory, see Kiser (1996).
20. Some of the same experiences were discussed by Osborne and Gaebler (1992), but the genre they employed was the vignette (often referred to critically as “anecdotes”) rather than the extended narrative.
21. The subjects of the administrative arguments in Boston et al. (1991) were mainly public management policy, as well. The difference was that Boston et al. focused on institutional rules, whereas Barzelay (1992) focused on organizational routines.
22. The main difference in this case is that the “scope of the claim” (Barzelay, 2000a) was limited to administrative functions and staff agencies.
23. Barzelay (2001), chapter 5, discusses how references could have been made to professional-academic literatures on government and management.
24. In terms of this paper’s representation of the generic doctrinal argument, the chapter stating principles or doctrinal claims in *Breaking Through Bureaucracy* highlighted the left side of Expression (3), whereas the subsequent chapter that discussed the post-bureaucratic paradigm highlighted the right side.
25. The affinities between Campbell and Halligan (1992) and Barzelay (1992) are strong, apart from the latter’s inclusion of its own extended administrative argument on public management policy. The major difference with respect to their respective narrative explanations is that Barzelay’s background construct was that of an organizational intervention, while Campbell and Halligan utilized not only this construct but public policy-making as well. This difference reflects the fact that major changes in institutional rules structuring public management policy occurred in Australia, but not in Minnesota.
26. Campbell and Halligan’s explanatory framework also included belief-formation. For instance, a good deal of attention was devoted to explaining the beliefs of elected political leaders as well as of the staffs of the three central-coordination agencies, Treasury, Finance, and Prime Minister & Cabinet. A shared belief was in a policy approach called “economic rationalism.” The concept of “policy approach” is not equivalent to that of an “administrative philosophy,” but the differences are not worth pursuing here.
27. A main point of similarity between H&J and Hood (1994) is that both analyzed a stylized case rather than a “natural” case. A secondary point of similarity is that NPM mainly referred to organization design across all policy and program areas in the public sector.
28. What is more usual in comparative politics and public policy is to explain policy change or variety within a focal policy domain and to regard ideas as part of the explanation for policy change (see, e.g., Hall, 1992). In playing down distinctions among policy domains, such as health, education, and public management, and in bringing central state-local government relations into the frame, Schwartz accepted an

- extremely broad definition of NPM, on par with Osborne and Gaebler (1992) and Hood (1994).
29. For a discussion of the substance of Zifcak's findings, see Barzelay (2001), chapter 2.
 30. An attempt to bridge the gap is presented in Barzelay (2000a).
 31. As a matter of intellectual biography, Campbell and Halligan (1992), Schwartz (1994), and Aucoin (1995) provided the point of departure for the two major discussions in my forthcoming book (Barzelay, 2001). Co-teaching with Christopher Hood at the LSE since 1995 has provided another major point of reference, difficult to exaggerate.
 32. Earlier versions of Moore's argument influenced a number of works that appeared before *Creating Public Value* in 1995. In the Spanish language public management literature, one such work was Barzelay and O'Kean (1989).
 33. This distinction is stressed in Lynn's (1996) discussion of differences between the fields of public management and public administration as these have developed in the U.S. Moore also stresses the same distinction in the preface to his book.
 34. I am using the terms "intrinsic" and "instrumental" in roughly the sense of Stake (1995).
 35. By contrast, the public philosophy of governance set forth in Aucoin (1995)—namely, the 13 statements I grouped under "progressive public administration" (Barzelay, 2000a)—are focused on the institutional set up of government (in Westminster systems).
 36. This trilogy has been a basis for teaching public management at the Kennedy School. It was first presented in print, to my knowledge, by Lax and Sebenius (1986).
 37. The ideas in terms of which this domain of experience has been conceptualized at the Kennedy School are presented in Kelman (1986), in a chapter entitled "Production."
 38. Or as Robert Leone was fond of saying when introducing courses on public management we co-taught at the Kennedy School, "A good idea is not good public policy unless and until it is done."
 39. I am using the term "opportunities" in a sense related to the concept of "opportunity horizon" in Hamel and Prahalad (1995). The idea of "appropriate aspiration levels" refers to James G. March's relatively recent writings on the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1989) and organizational learning (Levitt and March, 1990).
 40. This distinction relates to that between "standing volitions" and "action volitions" (Lindblom, 1990).
 41. But see Bardach (1998), who styles his "theory of managerial craftsmanship," in part, on Moore (1995). Colin Campbell and I are taking Moore's approach further in a forthcoming book on long-range strategic planning in the U.S. Air Force.
 42. The idea that a task for social scientists is to explain events, as well as facts, is presented by, among others, Elster (1989). The idea that events should be historically and analytically significant is discussed, among other works, in Thelen and Steinmo (1992).
 43. Boston and his collaborators did present their own administrative arguments within some chapters of their 1991 volume.

44. This doctrinal claim is a specification of the left side term in Expression (15).
45. The book was based on an article commissioned a few years earlier by Lee Friedman, a professor at Berkeley's Graduate School of Public Policy, in his capacity as editor of the *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*.
46. Actually, the metaphor Lynn used to describe his self-appointed role, in a session chaired by Don Kettl at the 1997 Association for Public Policy and Management (APPAM) research conference, was that of a "bomb thrower."
47. The authors' justification for focusing on budgeting is as follows: "Los procesos de presupuestación han venido apareciendo como un elemento indispensable de las reformas administrativas cuando se quiere dirigir a los gobiernos a actuar con base en la obtención de resultados y no sólo o principalmente en el control de recursos y gastos."
48. This is a major point, as I take it, of Campbell and Halligan's (1992) study of political leadership and management reform in Australia in the 1980s.
49. For significant recent discussions of roles and socialization processes, see Montgomery (1998) and Montgomery (2000).
50. Tendler and Freedheim do not refer specifically to Wilson (1989).
51. For a similar argument, see Bardach (1998).
52. The reader should be advised that I am deliberately placing my own spin on Tendler and Freedheim's effort.

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