ADMINISTRATIVE STYLES AND REGULATORY REFORM: INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR

MICHAEL HOWLETT
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT: The institutional structure of an organization creates a distinct pattern of constraints and incentives for state and societal actors which define and structure actors’ interests and channel their behavior. The interaction of these actors generates a particular administrative logic and process, or culture. However, since institutional structures vary, a neo-institutional perspective suggests that (1) there will be many different kinds of relatively long-lasting patterns of administrative behavior, each pattern being defined by the particular set of formal and informal institutions, rules, norms, traditions, and values of which it is comprised and (2) many different factors will affect the construction and deconstruction of each pattern. Following this logic, this article develops a multi-level, nested model of administrative styles and applies it to observed patterns of regulatory reform in many jurisdictions over the past several decades.

At first glance, the efforts over the past several decades of governments in many jurisdictions throughout the world to reform their regulatory regimes (McCourt and Minogue 2001; Peters 2000) appear to be linked, in that reforms have occurred in many countries at about the same time, and with generally similar content. As the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Public Management Committee (PUMA) put it in their 1995 summary document Governance in Transition, “OECD countries’ reform strategies have many points in common. They are aimed at both improving performance of the public sector and re-defining its role in the economy. Key reform thrusts are: a greater focus on results and increased value for money, devolution of authority and enhanced flexibility, strengthened accountability and control, a client- and service-orientation, strengthened capacity for developing strategy and policy, introducing competition and other market elements and changed relationships with other levels of government” (25).
PUMA argued that, taken together, these elements constituted a paradigm shift in administrative thinking. However, it is significant that some doubts remained about the character of these developments. As PUMA also noted, there is no single model for reform, and differences among countries can be seen in emphasis and take-up of particular reforms:

Certainly countries differ at the level of individual reforms. They place different emphasis on different aspects and implement reforms at varying speeds. The rate of take-up of reforms shows considerable variation among countries: not all countries are reforming the areas described . . . likewise, there are several important divergences in reform objectives. Some countries, for example, have set a reduction in the size of the public sector as a specific objective, while others put more stress on improving its performance and strengthening its role (OECD 1995, 25).

That is, administrative reforms have not been identical, nor have they always addressed the same aspects of administrative structure and performance. The same initiatives have not always succeeded in different jurisdictions, nor has their implementation always yielded the same results (OECD 1997). While bodies like the OECD are still willing to argue that clear patterns of change have emerged, they have also been forced to concede that considerable divergences exist in the methods, practices, and outcomes of reform efforts in different countries. This is a finding which requires analysis (Howlett 2002, 2004; Lynn 2001; Bevir, Rhodes, and Weller 2003a, 2003b).

**UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM: BEYOND THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS**

As a wave of administrative and regulatory reforms first occurred in the 1980s and 1990s in Western Europe and North America, the distinct tendency was to assume a greater trend towards convergence than is presently acknowledged and to attribute this to the triumph of ideological factors such as neo-liberalism, first in the most advanced industrial countries, then spreading through international institutions to the less developed (Aberbach and Christensen 2003). Central to this argument was the assertion that neo-liberal preferences for small states and enhanced markets were codified in a new administrative paradigm, New Public Management (NPM), which contained a series of prescriptions for administrative privatization, contracting out, downsizing and regulatory reform whose successful implementation was the aim of the reforms of the period (Ascher 1987; Starr 1990).

In many countries these kinds of reforms are still often attributed to, or blamed upon, the notions contained in NPM thinking (in the Canadian case, for example, see Shields and Evans 1998), but the role of administrative ideas is only one of a possible set of factors explaining such changes (Aucoin 1990; Christensen and Laegreid 2001; Borins 2001) and there are serious questions as to the coherency of NPM theory and hence its ability to drive administrative change (Hood 1991, 1995; Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Gruening 2001). That is, multiple efforts at reform in different countries, the patchy record of success and failure, and the contradictory efforts to adopt more stringent financial controls on government while expanding the opportunities for citizen participation in administrative deliberations.
The diverse responses to NPM initiatives, coupled with doubts about the coherence of this potential administrative paradigm, suggest that additional theoretical and conceptual work remains to be done in aiding the analysis of this important era of administrative history (Thynne 2003; Raadschelders 1998, 2000; Eisner 1994a). A re-examination of the theory and concepts developed in the study of comparative public administration is helpful in this regard, and helps to establish a research agenda with some promise in moving beyond NPM-inspired analyses of regulatory reform (Morgan and Perry 1988).

An important step in this direction is the development in comparative administrative studies of the notion of an administrative style; that is, a more or less consistent and long-term set of institutionalized patterns of politico-administrative relationships, norms, and procedures. This concept is useful in analyzing regulatory reform for several reasons. First, it sets out the background against which reforms occur, providing a useful aggregate unit for describing the basic characteristics of a stable administrative system. Second, in so doing, it simultaneously provides a standard or benchmark against which the degree of change in such systems can be assessed, as reforms alter aspects of a previously existing administrative style.

The Concept of an Administrative Style

The general idea of an administrative style is not new, of course, with clear links to not only the foundational studies of bureaucracy and bureaucratization developed by Max Weber and others in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Weber 1978; Eisenstadt 1963), but also to the first wave of comparative administrative studies carried out after the Second World War which focused on the identification and elaboration of national administrative cultures (Waldo 1948; Barker 1944). The concept of such styles reemerged in the late 1990s in the works of, among others, Christoph Knill (1998, 1999; see also Heritier, Knill, and Mingers 1996) and Hans A.G.M. Bekke (1999; Bekke, Perry, and Toonen 1993, 1996; Bekke and van der Meer 2000) and their colleagues and has proven to be of some use in helping to understand, for example, the difficulties encountered in the European Union adoption of EU-wide administrative initiatives. Both Knill and Bekke have suggested the critical importance of this concept in assessing the role played by existing administrative systems in affecting public policy processes and outcomes, including efforts to reshape the administration itself through regulatory reform.

However, there are several problematic aspects of current uses of this concept which must be addressed before it can be applied to the study of administrative or regulatory reform in any particular jurisdiction. Two of the most important interlinked issues are the appropriate unit of analysis to use in developing and applying the concept (Heady 1996) and the appropriate level of analysis to which these concepts can be applied (Peters 1996).

With respect to the former issue, recall that an administrative style refers to two separate but intertwined units of analysis, one structural and the other behavioral. That is, while the concept of an administrative style refers to the behavior of administrative agents,
it has a heavily structural or institutional component, as it is assumed that these agents are not free-floating and unencumbered but rather operate within an institutional context that at least in part determines their behavior.

In this sense, the notion of an administrative style can be situated within the confines of a neo-institutional approach to the study of social and political life (Kato 1996; Hall and Taylor 1996) in which institutions are defined to include not only formal organizations such as bureaucratic hierarchies and market-like exchange networks but also legal and cultural codes and rules which affect the calculation by individuals and groups of their optimal strategies and courses of action (March and Olsen 1984). The neo-institutional argument is not that institutions cause an action, but rather that they affect actions by shaping actors’ interpretation of problems and possible solutions by both constraining and facilitating the choice of solutions and by affecting the way and extent to which they can be implemented (Clemons and Cook 1999; Heikkila and Isett 2004). That is, while individuals, groups, classes, and states have their specific interests, they pursue them in the context of existing formal organizations, and rules and norms that shape expectations and affect the possibilities of their realization.

In the political realm, institutions are significant because they “constitute and legitimize political actors and provide them with consistent behavioral rules, conceptions of reality, standards of assessment, affective ties and endowments, and thereby with a capacity for purposeful action” (March and Olsen 1996, 249). In an administrative context, as Morten Egeberg has noted, “[f]ormal organization provides an administrative milieu that focuses a decision-maker’s attention on certain problems and solutions, while others are excluded from consideration. The structure thus constrains choices, but at the same time creates and increases action capacity in certain directions. The organizational context surrounding individuals thus serves to simplify decisions that might otherwise have been complex and incomprehensible” (1999, 159).

Thus, as many observers have noted, the structure of administrative organizations affects politico-administrative decision making by facilitating the interpretation and reconstruction of diverse situations into existing frames, making them amenable to standardized decision-making processes such as the establishment of standard operating procedures, bureaucratic routines, or operational codes (Allison and Halperin 1972; George 1969). And the existence of institutionalized rules of behavior affects calculations of actors’ interests and self-interests by defining the nature of the win-sets which exist in given decisional circumstances, as well as the action channels these decisions will follow (Hammond and Knott 1999; Scharpf 1990, 1991).

Ultimately, structure and behavior are joined together in a distinct administrative style; a typical way of doing business which is both institutionally and psychologically rooted (Pierre 1995; Peters 1990). Together, these have an impact on the ideas that actors hold, as well as their assessments of what is feasible in a given situation (Campbell 1998; Majone 1975). The link between structure and behavior means, among other things, that such styles will be relatively long-lasting, quasi-permanent arrangements establishing a trajectory of activity which is very difficult to change—an inference which is congruent with the neo-institutional idea of path dependency whereby decisions are seen as layered
upon each other so that earlier decisions affect later ones and act as a further constraint on decision makers’ freedom of action (Pierson 2000; Zysman 1994).

The level of analysis issue is more complex as, following this same neo-institutional logic, administrative styles can be seen to exist at a number of different levels of government. That is, from a neo-institutional perspective, an administrative style is best thought of as a set of administrative routines and behaviors heavily influenced by the rules and structures of the civil service system in which it is located. Very significant sets of rules and structures include macro-level ones such as the constitutional order establishing and empowering administrators, as well as more meso- and micro-level ones affecting the patterns and methods of recruiting civil servants and the nature of their interactions with each other and with members of the public in the course of their day-to-day activities in the field. Not only are factors such as the nature of the political regime in which a system is located crucial to understanding an administrative style but so too, as Weber noted, are more mundane items such as the open or closed nature of recruitment, the basis of selection on either a career or program orientation, the nature of job evaluations and rank and pay considerations, as well as the presence or absence of opportunities for training and development (Bekke, Perry, and Toonen 1993).

To a certain extent, as has been recognized by many authors, administrative styles and orders of government overlap and coincide. As Bekke, Perry, and Toonen noted in their path-breaking 1996 work on civil service systems, “[a]lthough our definition refers to the state and the focus of this book is on national systems, it is not our intention to exclude other levels of government. We believe the logic and the analytic approaches can be extended to other government levels. . . . One basic assumption of this approach is that civil service systems, whether national, subnational, or local, vary across political jurisdictions and that this variation merits study in its own right and for its implications for the management and development of these systems” (1996, 4).

Administrative styles can thus be thought of as being composed of sets of institutions and behaviors which parallel the institutional structure of society. That is, there are multiple administrative styles which exist in a nested relationship to each other. Three critical levels are the macro, or national; the meso, or sectoral; and the micro, or agency level. This general conception of multi-level administrative styles comprised of both long-term patterns of administrative behavior and relatively permanent institutional structures is set out in table 1 below. The actual factors which determine the different styles present at each level and their impact on regulatory reform efforts are discussed in the following section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component of a Style</th>
<th>Resultant Administrative Style</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional Structure</td>
<td>Administrative Behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Civil service system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectoral</td>
<td>Regulatory regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Enforcement structure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPLYING THE CONCEPT OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE STYLE TO THE SUBJECT OF REGULATORY REFORM

National Administrative Styles and Their Impact on Regulatory Reform

Macro- or national-level administrative styles are the most well known. Weber attempted to identify a common set of structural and behavioral features of modern monocratic and traditional patrimonial bureaucracies which, he argued, transcended jurisdictional and temporal boundaries, but later scholars insisted his ahistorical ideal type construction served only at best as a useful guide to general trends (Rudolph and Rudolph 1979; Jacoby 1973; Chapman 1971). With few exceptions, students of public administrative systems have insisted on the preeminence of national systems and their idiosyncrasies in identifying actual administrative models in practice (Bevir and Rhodes 2001; Bevir, Rhodes, and Weller 2003a, 2003b; Dwivedi and Gow 1999).

As Francis Castles has observed, distinct national administrative cultures have an impact on national policy outcomes, and nations tend to follow the precepts of the administrative models from which they emerged (Castles 1990). At the behavioral or cultural level, as observers from Weber onward have noted, some of the key characteristics which affect administrative behavior relate to such phenomena as the level of identity of civil servants with the impersonal order of the state rather than with more personalized elements of society such as religious, ethnic, or tribal groups, and the extent to which administrative office is seen as an avenue for achieving either the public good or personal enrichment (Hofstede 1980). These characteristics vary from country to country (Grendstad 2003; Hood 1998), and generate a basic model of national administrative cultures ranging from the state-oriented, public good identifying civil servant of the Weberian monocratic model to its opposite in the Weberian patrimonial model. The well-meaning but non-state identifying or anarchic administrator and the pathological bureaucratic rigidly identifying with the state administrator fall somewhere in between (see table A1 in the appendix).

With respect to structure, the key dimensions of state structure relevant to an administrative style are the nature of the civil service system, especially related to its relative size and pervasiveness in society, and the means by which it is politically controlled and held accountable (Heady 1996). One of the chief determinants of relative administrative size, of course, is related to the extent to which the administration is involved in economic affairs, as opposed to more traditional social, military, or legal ones (Considine and Lewis 2003). As for political control of modern administrations, only two principal means have ever been used: the traditional legislative-executive means and that of single-party partisan or judicial control (Evangelista 1995). Such analyses lead to the development of overall models of national systems of administration or civil service systems, which range from the very active legislative or executive-led systems found in developing nations such as the East Asian newly developing countries to their less active counterparts in established Anglo-American and continental European systems, and
TABLE 2
A Model of National Administrative Styles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Adherence to Rule of Law</th>
<th>Levels of Trust in State-Societal Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Bureaucratic corporatist administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Paternalistic administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Adversarial legalist administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Corrupt administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

include the party or judiciary-based activist administrations of socialist, fascist, and Islamic systems along with their less active counterparts in transitional democracies in central Asia, for example (see table A2 in the appendix).

As was discussed above, national-level administrative styles can be seen to develop through the interaction of these macro-level structural and behavioral characteristics (Eisner 1993, 1994a; Harris and Milkis 1989). Authors such as Robert Kagan (1991, 1996) and David Vogel (1986) in the U.S. and Jeremy Richardson and his colleagues in Europe (Richardson, Gustafsson, and Jordan 1982) have developed this notion and have identified a distinct set of national styles of administration, the most well known being the adversarial legalist style identified by Kagan.

Table 2 identifies several prominent types of such national styles, based upon the key structural and behavioral criteria used by Kagan: the level of trust found in state-societal relations, and the degree to which administrative behavior is rule-bound in the pursuit of its activities.

The impact of the nature of the existing national administrative style on reform efforts is significant. It affects not only the nature and extent of the reforms that are required, but also the nature of the change agent required to undertake them. Since there are significant differences between jurisdictions in these areas with respect to their receptiveness to reforms, the implications are clear. As Franz van Waarden put it in the case of regulatory reform, “[n]ational regulatory styles are formally rooted in nationally specific legal, political and administrative institutions and cultures. This foundation in a variety of state institutions should make regulatory styles resistant to change, and hence, from this perspective one would expect differences in regulatory styles to persist, possibly even under the impact of economic and political internationalization” (1995, 333).

Sectoral Policy Styles and Their Impact on Regulatory Reform

At the meso-level, many studies have argued that existing sectoral-level policy styles linked to common approaches used to address common problems such as health, education, and others (Lowi 1972; Salamon 1981) also have a significant impact on the success and failure of efforts at administrative reform. As Gary Freeman (1985, 469) has argued, this approach “assumes that each sector poses its own problems, sets its own constraints, and generates its own brand of conflict” (see also Burstein [1991]).

In their work on policy styles, Richardson, Gustafsson, and Jordan (1982) developed the foundations for a model of regulatory cultures based on the twin dimensions of the dominant approach to problem solving (anticipatory or reactive) and the relationship
existing between the government and society (consensus or imposition) in the sector under consideration. These cultures ranged from the anticipatory rationalist consensus-oriented to the imposed, reactive, negotiation and conflict one, with the reactive but consensus-oriented negotiation culture and the imposed, anticipatory concertation culture in between (see table A3 in the appendix).

Like national-level cultures, these are found in specific structural circumstances and other meso-level studies have identified distinct implementation structures—regulatory regimes—at this level as well (Harris and Milkis 1989; Howlett 2000a; Eisner 1994b). Observers have noted, for example, that states must have a high level of administrative capacity and legitimacy in order to utilize certain policy instruments in situations in which they wish to affect significant numbers of policy targets (Howlett 2000b; Howlett and Ramesh 1995; Suchman 1995). This has led to the development of models of regulatory regimes which focus upon the severity of the constraints states face in terms of their financial, informational, authoritative, and personnel resources and the size of the target group they wish to affect through their activities. A regime based on the promotion of third- and fourth-sector activities by state agencies (institutionalized voluntarism) is likely to develop where the target is large and states are highly constrained, while a state with fewer constraints facing the same large targets is able to develop a different regime based on less institutionalized incentives such as the financial, instrument-based directed subsidization. Faced with much smaller or more precise targets, states with resource abundance can opt to provide a good or service itself, developing a regulatory regime of public provision with oversight—or, if facing a higher level of constraints, may opt for a (very common) regime of representative regulation using command and control instruments in conjunction with advisory councils to govern sectoral relationships (see table A4 in the appendix).

Both these studies focusing on the behavior of regulators in the formulation and adoption of policy options and those looking at the structural aspects of the techniques and styles of policy implementation suggest that distinct patterns of administrative activity exist at the sectoral level. As was suggested above in the context of national administrative styles, these sectoral styles combine both cultural attributes such as legitimacy and trust—and structural ones such as state capacity and organization (Timonen 2001). In assessing administrative activity at the sectoral level in Europe, Christoph Knill pointed out the significance of these factors. As he argued, “[t]he dimension of regulatory styles is defined by two related aspects: the mode of state intervention and administrative interest intermediation; i.e., patterns of interaction between administrative and societal actors. [These include] dimensions [such as] hierarchical versus self-regulation, as well as uniform and detailed requirements versus open regulation allowing for administrative flexibility and discretion. In the same way different patterns of interest intermediation can be identified, such as formal versus informal, legalistic versus pragmatic, and open versus closed relationships” (1998, 2). Table 3 sets out the basic elements of sectoral regulatory styles focusing on these two key dimensions of sectoral state activity.

As was the case with national-level styles, what kind of sectoral style exists is a very important element in determining the success or failure of reform efforts such as those
aimed at regulatory reform. An inefficient administration will, of course, have difficulty implementing any action, including any oriented towards regulatory reform, while the opposite will hold true for a responsive administration. Reform efforts may become bogged down in an administration focused on legalistic proceduralism, while efforts may be well meaning but also fail to be effectively implemented in a low capacity voluntaristic administration.

**Micro Enforcement Styles and Their Impact on Regulatory Reform**

Styles also exist at the micro (departmental or agency) level (Gormley 1998; May and Burby 1998; May and Winter 1999) and many studies have identified specific enforcement styles used by different agencies in their day-to-day activities (Hawkins and Thomas 1989; Scholz 1984, 1991). As Smith, Marsh, and Richards put it, “[t]he central state is not a unified actor but a range of institutions and actors with disparate interests and varying resources . . . we need to examine how different departments behave and how various decisions within departments are made. Policy process will vary according to the department/agency that is analyzed and hence there is a need for comparative research across both sectors and states” (1993, 580).

In their path-breaking work in this area, Hawkins and Thomas (1989, 3-30) identified two basic strategies pursued by local departmental-level officials in their administrative duties—enforcement or negotiation—with the aim of either educating the regulated target or punishing them. This analysis leads to the identification of four basic types of agency enforcement cultures: incentive-based systems designed to educate clients in either a coercive or negotiated way, and the punishment-oriented legalistic or voluntaristic alternative forms of agency conduct (see table A5 in the appendix).

Looking at the issue from the point of view of the regulator, Mathew McCubbins provides a basic model of the structure of enforcement activities at the agency level and below (Lupia and McCubbins 1994; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). McCubbins distinguishes between passive structures designed to monitor cooperative clients, such as administrative fire alarms and client self-reporting, and those more active structures put in place to deal with evasive clients, such as more active policing and training and licensing schemes (see table A6 in the appendix).

Taken together these studies suggest that distinct administrative styles evolve at the local level based upon the day-to-day interactions of administrators and their targets like the situation at the national and sectoral levels. John Scholz (1984, 1991) has suggested

---

**Table 3: A Model of Sectoral Regulatory Styles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacity for State Intervention</th>
<th>Pattern of Interest Intermediation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Responsive administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Voluntaristic administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Legalistic proceduralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Inefficient administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


that key elements in the agency style are administrative capacity and the level of trust existing between administrators and their clients. Following Scholz’s logic, table 4 sets out the basic elements of a model of micro-level, agency-level administrative styles based upon these variables.

Again, as was the case with national and sectoral-level styles, the type of style found at the local agency level will have a significant effect upon determining both the nature of the regulatory reforms required in a given area and their likelihood of success. Like the styles found at the other two levels, local agency styles have a significant impact on both the conceptualization and practical outcomes of reform efforts, and differences in these micro-level styles (like those found at the meso and macro levels) help to explain the patterns of convergences and divergences found throughout the world resulting from these efforts over the past two decades.

### CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF ADMINISTRATIVE STYLES ON REGULATORY REFORM

Conceiving of an overall administrative style as a nested combination of institutional structures and administrative behaviors existing at multiple levels of analysis makes the concept more complex than many initially envisioned, but also more precise and easier to apply to practical questions such as the design and impact of regulatory reform. That is, reform efforts can be pitched at the structure or behavior of different levels of government and, if so, their impact will be felt primarily only upon the unit and level at which they are aimed, with their effects muted at different levels of administration. Only broad, well-conceived, multi-level reform efforts are likely to generate consistent results rather than a patchwork of outcomes depending upon key factors such as the level of trust that exists between citizens and government and the administrative capacities existing at different levels of government. And even such broad-based initiatives would not be able to follow a one-size-fits-all template, but would have to be carefully tailored to the particularities of the administrative styles found in that jurisdiction. This helps to explain why, for example, a similar recipe of NPM-inspired reforms can have both convergent and divergent effects across governments.

A neo-institutional model of administrative styles, as set out here, thus helps to explain the OECD findings set out at the outset of this article. That is, a mixed pattern of convergence and divergence is explicable if one considers the nested nature of the different types
of administrative styles identified above. Since each of the lower levels of institutional orders is located within a higher level, each level serves to filter or mediate the effects of changes at higher levels, moderating the impact of any changes which occur at those levels (Peled 2002). Thus, for example, the impact of global changes such as the diffusion of new ideas about appropriate state-society relations will be moderated by existing regulatory and agency styles, meaning managerial practices at the department or agency level may not be affected substantially by those reforms (Welch and Wong 2001; Knill 1999; Pollitt 2001a, 2001b; Bennett 1997). Similarly, changes which occur independently at lower levels will not necessarily impact at all on higher levels (Coleman and Grant 1998; Hills and Michalis 2000; Timonen 2001).

Developing an understanding of the administrative styles found in any country is, of course, a nuanced and complex task (Barzelay and Fuchtner 2003). Disaggregating the concept of an administrative style and undertaking analysis at multiple levels, however, provides a useful methodology for such studies. The nested nature of styles means little can be assumed, a priori, about the effects of individual causal factors on the nature of the interactions occurring between styles at different levels. However, careful case studies and empirical evaluations can allow specific conclusions to be drawn about the nature of these processes in different circumstances and the manner in which reform efforts must be at least minimally compatible with important aspects of existing styles if they are to have any chance of success (Borins 2001; Lindquist 2000; Peled 2002).

APPENDIX

TABLE A1
A Model of National Administrative Cultures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrator Identification with Public Good</th>
<th>Administrator Identification with State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weberian monocratic model</td>
<td>Anarchic administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathological bureaucracy</td>
<td>Weberian patrimonial model</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE A2
A Model of National Civil Service Systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Means of Political Control of Administration</th>
<th>State Participation in Economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian and non-authoritarian developing nations, e.g., East Asian NICS</td>
<td>Traditional Anglo-American and Continental European systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist, Fascist and Islamic systems</td>
<td>Transitional democracies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE A3
A Model of Sectoral Regulatory Cultures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship between Government and Society</th>
<th>Dominant Approach to Problem-Solving in the Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>Rationalist consensus culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imposition</td>
<td>Concertation culture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Richardson, Gustafsson, and Jordan (1982).

### TABLE A4
A Model of Sectoral Regulatory Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Severity of State Constraints</th>
<th>Nature of the Policy Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Institutionalized voluntarism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Directed subsidization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Howlett (2000b).

### TABLE A5
A Model of Agency Enforcement Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency Strategy toward Regulatees</th>
<th>Agency Purpose in Enforcement</th>
<th>Educate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coerce</td>
<td>Legalistic administration</td>
<td>Negative incentive administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiate</td>
<td>Voluntaristic self-administration</td>
<td>Positive incentive administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Hawkins (1984).

### TABLE A6
A Model of Agency Enforcement Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency Enforcement Mechanism</th>
<th>Nature of Enforcement Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercive</td>
<td>Active Policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiative</td>
<td>Training and licencing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Lupia and McCubbins (1994).
NOTE

1. While the exact contours of neo-institutionalism are an item of some disagreement across disciplines, with different variations existing within political science, economics, and (historical) sociology, these approaches share the common ideas that rules, norms, and symbols affect political behavior; that the organization of governmental institutions affect what the state does; and that unique patterns of historical development constrain future choices.

REFERENCES


