PSM, Organizational Politics, and Deviance for Promotion: An Empirical Study from China

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Outline

1. Introduction
2. Theory
3. Methods
4. Findings
5. Conclusions
Background

- Promotion in Chinese local governments
  - more up-level, more difficult to be promoted
- Many corruptions?
  - associated with official promotion usually refers to certain deviant behaviors (Sun 2008)
    - lobbying for official posts
    - buying and selling offices
    - vote buying and lobbying
    - ...
Research Questions

• Officials behave differently toward promotion
  – Some officials act deviant in various ways, such as bribery (giving luxury presents, dinner and sexual bribery), nepotism and misappropriation
  – The others keep their behaviors well
  – Why?

• Does officials with high level of PSM behave less deviant than the others?
  – PSM is an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations, which is altruism or pro-social (Perry et al. 2010)

• If not, does those officials perceived high level of organizational politics behave more deviant than the others?
  – POP is the subjective perception and interpretation of the organizational politics, which refers to the complex mixture of power, influence, and interest-seeking behaviors that may dominate individuals’ activities in the workplace (Hsiung et al. 2011)
Literature Review

**Introduction**

The Black Box of Deviance

- **motivational causes**
  - eg. Self-interested motivation (Robinson and Bennett 1995);
  - promotion willingness and motives (Liang 2004)

- **situational causes**
  - eg. political climates (Pinto *et al.* 2008);
  - stress or perceived injustice (Griffin and Lopez 2005)

*BAD APPLES*

IDENTIFY, PREVENT & MANAGE NEGATIVE BEHAVIOR AT WORK

**corruption**
Research Objectives

- Interpreting the behavioral effects
  - To explain why public officials engage in deviance for promotion
    - Integration of different perspectives
    - Dissecting the ‘black box’ of deviance
Deviance for Promotion

• Deviance is
  – voluntary behavior that violates significant organizational norms and in so doing threatens the well-being of an organization, its members, or both (Robinson and Bennett 1995)
  – the common pattern of all kinds of deviant behaviors in organization

• Deviance for promotion
  – in hierarchical context, officials engage in deviant behavior for their promotion (personal benefits),
  – by using their public power inevitably,
  – which violate public norms (misuse)
Public Service Motivation

• PSM as intrinsic belief in the value of public sector work may minimize self-interested behavior (Moynihan 2010)
  – extrinsically oriented individuals are more likely to be self-interested and concerned with individual outcomes
  – intrinsically oriented individuals are likely to confer benefits to the organization

• The officials with high level of PSM should be accountable for the public due to the public value (Rainey 2009), so they are less likely to manipulate their duties
PSM and Deviance for Promotion

- If public servants have the strong drive to serve the people in an altruism way, they ought to avoid self-serving or unethical behaviors associated with deviance for promotion
  - Individuals with higher PSM cherish higher commitment to the public interest (Perry 1996; Vandenabeele 2008)
  - Corruption could also be defined in terms of a conflict between private and public regarding motivation that private regarding motivation prevails (Warren 2004), so PSM should be negative with corruption

H1: PSM will be negatively associated with the deviance for promotion
Perceptions of Organizational Politics

- Organization is both cooperative system of employees working together to achieve multiple goals and political arena of individuals and groups with differing interest and conflicts (Brass and Krackhardt 2012)

- POP refer to actions that are inconsistent with accepted organizational norms, are designed to promote self-interest, and are taken without regard for, and even at the expense of organizational goals (Valle and Witt 2001)
  - is consistently much higher in the public sector than in the private sector (Vigoda-Gadot and Beeri 2011)
  - may lead to high levels of perceived injustice and unfairness (Hsiung et al. 2011; Rosen et al. 2009)
POP and Deviance for Promotion

• Officials who perceived higher level of organizational politics might feel less procedural justice, fairness and equity in their work environment (Andrews and Kacmar 2001), then they would like to
  – decrease organizational commitment (Miller et al. 2008),
  – engage in unfair competition via political behaviors to maximize private interest by obtain promotion

• Individuals with high careerist orientation to pursue their personal career growth paths would tend to pursue their goals through means, such as image management or manipulation of interpersonal behavior (Hsiung et al. 2011)

H2: POP will be positively associated with the deviance for promotion
Hypotheses

- PSM $\uparrow \sim$ deviance for promotion $\downarrow$
- POP $\uparrow \sim$ deviance for promotion $\uparrow$
Sample

- Data collected from Chinese local government, and focus our attention on local officials in charge of their organizations or sectors
  - These officials were selected to be students in the M Municipal Party School (MMPS) of S Province in west China
  - They were sensitive to political promotion and familiar with public organization management at local
  - They were selected by Organizational Department of CCP in M Municipal due to a strict process with demands of quasi-uniform distribution
- 77 validated questionnaires were collected, accounting for 71.30% of the questionnaires sent
**Methods**

**Process**

1. **Questionnaire Development**
   - Developed in the light of literature review and prior investigations, as well as scale translation and back-translation by 4 PhD students.

2. **Revision by Interviews**
   - Selected 12 officials who were the local ‘insider’ and might tell us frankly recommend by our conjunct friends in native, to improve wording and validity.

3. **Investigation**
   - Administered questionnaires to respondents back-to-back in 5 classrooms, while explained the purpose and the process to get their support.
Measurement of Variables

- **Deviance for Promotion**
  - *you will try to get promotion by all means* (single item)
    - Borrowed from Tharenou & Terry (1998) and modified in the light of depth-interviews
    - Not perfect measure, but available and feasible item

- **PSM**
  - 7 items taken from Perry (1996)
    - Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.850

- **POP**
  - 3 items taken from Kacmar & Carlson (1997)
    - Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.743

- **Control Variables**
  - personal demographics: age, time in job, and education
  - organizational demographics: organizational type
### Findings

#### Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

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***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
## Regression Analysis

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- $R^2$ = 0.151
- adj.$R^2$ = 0.079
- F value = 2.103*
- N = 77

***. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
Summary

• The deviance for promotion should be rooted in systemic features of the regimes, norms and institutions, such as organizational politics.

• Within the highly political situation of local government, officials would tend to involve in deviance to get promoted, no matter how strong their PSM is.
Possible Contributions (I)

- Dissecting the ‘black box’ of deviance
  - Deviance for promotion might be triggered by multiple causes
  - The dynamics is contingent due to the different matches of these factors

- Enriching the studies in public management
  - Interpret the behavioral effects of individual’s perception of organizational politics
  - Extending the research context of deviance from (business) workplace to public administration

- ‘Connecting the dots’
  - Political science and organization behavior literature might be linked up
  - Complementary assumptions of man could be integrated in a model
  - To provide middle-level model and multivariant interpretation of the complex phenomena (eg. political corruption)
Possible Contributions (II)

• Deepening the understanding of PSM
  – The behavioral effects of PSM might rely on the situational or organizational environment
  – When the high level of official’s POP exists, there was no evidence that PSM affect deviance for promotion
    • There might be *strong situations* (cf. Iddekinge *et al*. 2007), in which individuals tend to behave in very similar ways, regardless of their individual differences
    • It is very important to find the solution that make PSM work
Further work

• Supply the background of promotion for Chinese local officials in the unitary system
• Enrich the theory in different contexts
• Revise the research design
  – Multiple informants and multi-source design
  – Objective measure of deviance for promotion may be beneficial
  – Longitudinal data
  – Experimental Study?
• ....
Thanks!